The Author: Andrew Schumann,

It is a Preface to Volumes 7:3 and 7:4 (2018) consisting of articles presented at the International Interdisciplinary Conference Ideas and Society on the 150th anniversary of the birth of Leon Petrażycki, held on November 24, 2017, in Rzeszów, Poland.

The Author: Sławomir Tkacz,

The aim of this paper is to outline the general oversight of the concept of law in
Leon Petrażycki’s legal theory. On the example of the principles of law, an
attempt was made to answer the question, what Petrażycki’s theory proposes to
modern science. In the first part of the presentation, the Author presented the
current state of theoretical knowledge in the field of principles of law. The
attention was paid to the problem of various characteristics of legal principles.
In further considerations, an attempt was made to answer the question about
adoption of models proposed by Petrażycki in the contemporary theoretical
discourse. The summary presents general conclusions of the paper.

The Author: Marek Hetmański,

Expert knowledge – a concept associated with Ryle’s distinction of knowledge that
and knowledge-how – functions in distinct areas of knowledge and social
expertise. Consisting of both propositional (declarative) and procedural
(instrumental) knowledge, expertise is performative in its essence. It depends
not only on expert’s experience and cognitive competences, but also on his or
her social and institutional position. The paper considers the role of heuristic
and intuitional abilities, including particular experts’ cognitive biases, as the
vital and indispensable part of expertise. On the basis of selected managerial
and juridical examples (procedures, standards, norms and institutional
regulations) it analyzes the epistemological issues: the autonomy versus
dependence of expert knowledge as well as the influence of social-cognitive
circumstances on expertise.

The Author: Małgorzata Obrycka,

The conception of the paper is connected with bringing forward the reflection
of Leon Petrażycki on intuitive law. For this purpose I analyze the genesis and
dynamics of this phenomenon on the cultural-historical level, as well as with
reference to issues belonging to the scope of positive law. In addition, I
broaden the research field with the range of problems touching on intuitionism,
morality, and also independent ethics of Janusz Kotarbinski. The starting point
of the methodological optics I assume is constituted by the multi-aspectual
transformations surrounding us in the sphere of axiology. Hence, if the
pedagogical aspects are taken into account, it seems to me justified to
undertake some actions in order to search for the logically consistent, sensible
and universal solutions, which can become an ethical guide-post for the
contemporary human being.

The Author: Krzysztof Majczyk,

Efficient thinking is the foundation of efficient operation. The correct
definition of concepts, especially the basic ones for a given field, in order to
reach the truth, is a condition for the development of science and its social
utility. The Petrażycki’s research methodology of law is a thoroughly modern
method, as it enables effective examination of the accuracy of contemporary
legal theories created after Petrażycki’s input.
A model contemporary theory susceptible to an examination through
the research methodology of law by Petrażycki is the normative theory of legal
rules and non-legal standards by Dworkin. For this purpose some falsifications
will be subject, i.e. selected ad hoc among many others, two important theories
of normative law theory Dworkin. The first one is the thesis classifying legal
norms into two groups of norms, namely legal rules and non-legal standards.
The second one is a thesis about the existence of who are capable of
discovering and issuing lawful and, at the same time, fair (just) court decisions,
which are also the only ones for resolving particular court disputes.
Unfortunately, owing to the seemingly cognitive research methodology
of Petrażycki, both Dworkin’s deformed division of legal norms as well as
Dworkin’s Hercules judges – cannot stand the test of authenticity. Due to the
Petrażycki’s methodology, the legal-normative theory of Dworkin does not
lose an innovative outlook on the existence of social norms, which are being
discovered by judges in the jurisprudence, indifferently to the doubts over their
proper classification (be it non-legal standards or, perhaps, outright standards
supplementing statutory and sub-statutory legal regulations). Moreover,
Dworkin’s theory is placed between naive theories, regardless of whether they
are considered realistically naive theories (towards the Hercules judges) or
nihilistically naive theories (when it comes to the existence of the only
judgments in the given court cases which are also the just ones.)
A few random reflections on the well-known work of Dworkin with the help of
Petrażycki’s methodology serve to provide a new perspective on the
contemporary legal normativity.

The Author: Andrzej Dąbrowski,

The aim of the paper is to examine the nature of moral and legal norms in a
broader context: first, taking into account logical and methodological
assumptions, second, in the perspective of psychology of emotions and legal
policy. The basic subject of the research carried out by Leon Petrażycki was
represented by law. Originally, it had a psychological character, not an
objective, eternal, and unchanging one. To fully understand the genesis and
nature of morality and law, Petrażycki addressed the study of mental
phenomena, especially emotional experiences. First, however, he developed
appropriate rules of logic and scientific methodology. Then he developed a
new classification of mental phenomena, among which the fundamental role is
played by bilateral (passive-active) emotions. At some stage, emotions begin
to cooperate with cognitive processes, first of all with imaginations.
Imaginations of acts, such as theft, betrayal, murder, can cause repulsive
emotions, and type imaginations, such as truthfulness, charity, justice can
evoke apulsive emotions. On the basis of such associations, judgments are
created over time, the content of which becomes a basis for fundamental rules
of conduct, that is, for norms. There are two fundamentally different types of
norms: moral norms and legal norms. The norms of the first type are
imperative and represent the nature of validity (they are obeyed), while the
norms of the second type are imperative-attributive and they also always entitle
someone to something, i.e. they give someone a right. This division determines
a fundamental difference between morality and law.