The aim of the paper is to examine the nature of moral and legal norms in a
broader context: first, taking into account logical and methodological
assumptions, second, in the perspective of psychology of emotions and legal
policy. The basic subject of the research carried out by Leon Petrażycki was
represented by law. Originally, it had a psychological character, not an
objective, eternal, and unchanging one. To fully understand the genesis and
nature of morality and law, Petrażycki addressed the study of mental
phenomena, especially emotional experiences. First, however, he developed
appropriate rules of logic and scientific methodology. Then he developed a
new classification of mental phenomena, among which the fundamental role is
played by bilateral (passive-active) emotions. At some stage, emotions begin
to cooperate with cognitive processes, first of all with imaginations.
Imaginations of acts, such as theft, betrayal, murder, can cause repulsive
emotions, and type imaginations, such as truthfulness, charity, justice can
evoke apulsive emotions. On the basis of such associations, judgments are
created over time, the content of which becomes a basis for fundamental rules
of conduct, that is, for norms. There are two fundamentally different types of
norms: moral norms and legal norms. The norms of the first type are
imperative and represent the nature of validity (they are obeyed), while the
norms of the second type are imperative-attributive and they also always entitle
someone to something, i.e. they give someone a right. This division determines
a fundamental difference between morality and law.