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Special issue: Indian logic
February 13th, 2022
Studia Humana special issue on Indian logic

Interdisciplinary journal Studia Humana invites contributors interested in Indian logic to send paper proposals. In this ussue we are going to explicate a logical-epistemological dimension of traditional philosophical thinking of different darśanas as well as of non-orthodox schools such as Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka.

Suggested topics include, but are not limited to the following:

- Conceptual differences between dharma and dharmin in the darśanas

- Epistemological and cognitive aspects of Advaita Vedānta

- Semantical and epistemological aspects of Mīmāṃsā

- Ontological and semantical aspects of Vaiśeṣika

- Logical theory of Nyāya

- Logical theory of Yogācāra

- Jain logic

- Logical critics of Mādhyamaka

- Argumentation and debates according to one of the schools of Indian philosophy

- Formalizations of epistemological and logical doctrines of Indian philosophy

Authors are asked to send their papers until the end of August 2022 to the following e-mail address: Andrew.Schumann@gmail.com

Accepted papers are scheduled for publication in 4 issue 2022 (November), while all finally accepted papers may be published prior to assignment to the issue as early view.

Instructions for authors:
http://studiahumana.com/for-authors.html
Special issue: argumentation logic
February 6th, 2022
Special issue: space philosophy and space ethics
February 15th, 2021
Early view option
September 25th, 2020

MOST OFTEN READING TEXT:

Many-worlds theory of truth
author: Alexander Boldachev,
The logical world is a set of propositions, united by common principles of establishing their truth. The many-worlds theory asserting that the truth of any proposition in any given logical world is always established by comparing it with standard propositions in this world – directly or via the procedure of transferring the truth.

CURRENT ISSUE:

Cuneiform Šumma Sentences: Conditionals or Implications?

author: Hany Moubarez,
For a long time, it was believed in Assyriology and related disciplines that šumma sentences, or grammatical conditionals, which appeared in cuneiform texts and tablets of astrology, exorcism, law, extispicy, oneiromancy, medicine, and divination, were linguistic expressions of logical conditionals. F. Rochberg (2010; 2016) extended this belief, suggesting that they are even material conditionals. Andrew Schumann (2017; 2020; 2021) followed this, claiming that, as a result, we can trace the origin of symbolic logic in cuneiform writings, through which it moved to Greece. In this paper, after presenting this approach, I will challenge it by showing that šumma/IF sentences and similar constructs in cuneiform literature are arguments or implications that suffer from the same confusion between conditional and implication that Quine (1953/1966) highlighted when criticizing C.I. Lewis. Keywords: logic, conditional, implication, cuneiform texts, argument, Babylonian science, šumma

Autonomy in Stratified Structures

author: Rafał Dzierwa,
This article proposes a minimalist concept of autonomy that is consistent with determinism, but negates fatalism. Drawing on Nicolai Hartmann's stratified ontology, it argues that autonomy is achieved not by suspending physical laws, but by introducing new, higher-level determinations unique to individual entities. The tension between general laws and individual autonomy is resolved by emphasizing the unique properties and individual laws that apply to each entity. The article also explains how this minimal autonomy makes sense of setting goals and attempting to achieve them, demonstrating that even within a deterministic framework, individuals can have meaningful influence over their
actions and outcomes.
Keywords: autonomy, stratified ontology, determinism, individuality, philosophy of mind

No Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argumen

author: Mustafa Khuramy, Erik Schulz,
Many moral realists have employed a strategy for arguing for moral realism by claiming that if epistemic normativity is categorical and that if this epistemic normativity exists, then categorical normativity exists. In this paper, we will discuss that argument, examine a way out, and respond to the objections people have recently raised in the literature. In the end, we conclude that the objections to our way out will do little in the way of motivating those who already do not believe in categorical normativity, thereby severing the power the aforementioned parity argument is designed to possess.
Keywords: Moral error theory, Meta-ethics, Companions in guilt, Nihilism.