Paweł Balcerak

Issue: 7:1 (The twenty fifth issue)

In their work McCulloch and Pitts describe an idea of representing all of
nervous activity in terms of propositional logic. This idea was quickly
challenged. One of reasons for this challenge was rising believe that logic is
unable to describe most of human cognitive processes. In this paper we will
analyse premises of original McCulloch and Pitts proposition. Following that,
we will ask about ability of symbolic (logical) systems to represent human
cognition. We will finish by analysing relation between symbolic and
subsymbolic computing, in hope of bridging the gap between the two.

Issue: 8:2 (The thirtieth issue)

In this paper, I will analyse the relation between a sense of agency and free will. It is often proposed that by investigating the former, we can find a way of judging when an action is voluntary. Haggard seems to be one of the authors believing so. To answer if this assumption is correct, I will: 1) analyse the categories of free will and agency; 2) define the sense of agency; 3) describe ways of investigating the sense of agency; 4) describe models of emergence of the sense of agency; 5) analyse the relation between agency and responsibility. I will end by discussing the actual possibility of using the sense of agency measurements (as described in experimental sciences) as markers of free will.