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Special issue: Indian logic
February 13th, 2022
Studia Humana special issue on Indian logic

Interdisciplinary journal Studia Humana invites contributors interested in Indian logic to send paper proposals. In this ussue we are going to explicate a logical-epistemological dimension of traditional philosophical thinking of different darśanas as well as of non-orthodox schools such as Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka.

Suggested topics include, but are not limited to the following:

- Conceptual differences between dharma and dharmin in the darśanas

- Epistemological and cognitive aspects of Advaita Vedānta

- Semantical and epistemological aspects of Mīmāṃsā

- Ontological and semantical aspects of Vaiśeṣika

- Logical theory of Nyāya

- Logical theory of Yogācāra

- Jain logic

- Logical critics of Mādhyamaka

- Argumentation and debates according to one of the schools of Indian philosophy

- Formalizations of epistemological and logical doctrines of Indian philosophy

Authors are asked to send their papers until the end of August 2022 to the following e-mail address:

Accepted papers are scheduled for publication in 4 issue 2022 (November), while all finally accepted papers may be published prior to assignment to the issue as early view.

Instructions for authors:
Special issue: argumentation logic
February 6th, 2022
Special issue: space philosophy and space ethics
February 15th, 2021
Early view option
September 25th, 2020


Many-worlds theory of truth
author: Alexander Boldachev,
The logical world is a set of propositions, united by common principles of establishing their truth. The many-worlds theory asserting that the truth of any proposition in any given logical world is always established by comparing it with standard propositions in this world – directly or via the procedure of transferring the truth.


Why is the Teleological Argument so Popular?

author: Marcus W. Hunt,
Why are teleological arguments based on biological phenomena so popular? My explanation is that teleological properties are presented in our experiences of biological phenomena. I contrast this with the view that the attribution of teleological properties to biological phenomena takes place at an intellective level – via inference, and as belief or similar propositional attitude. I suggest five ways in which the experiential view is the better explanation for the popularity of such teleological arguments. Experiential attributions are more easy, impactful, and implastic. The experiential view accommodates cases of conflicting attributions, and it makes sense of the readiness with which we follow such teleological arguments. I respond to objections and explain how my view builds on existing answers to this question found in the philosophical literature.

Black Forest Melody: Between Philosophical Kitsch and Identitarian Ideology: Heidegger’s Pastoral World-View in the Memorial Address. Trial on a Classification

author: Gregor Becker,
Martin Heidegger is still subject to controversial discussions about his political views. The question in the centre of the discussions is not if he was politically on the far right, but how far right he was, and also how far right his philosophy is. However, the details of Heidegger's political approaches in his work are largely disguised and hidden behind Heidegger's typical writing style, which has remained undefined for so long. There is a short essay in Heidegger's work that may shed light on the roots and details of his ethnic-identity thinking: “Memorial Address”.

Response to Hewitt on Abortion

author: Walter Block,
The defense argument in favor of abortion sees the fetus as an invader, a trespasser, someone against whom violence is justified, since this very young person (the fetus) has initiated violence against his mother. Hewitt [30] rejects this argument. The present paper maintains the justification of this defense argument. My perspective is based on the private property rights of the mother. She owns her person. It is as if her body is her house, and a trespasser has invaded it. Surely, she has the right to evict such a person. This analogy is relatively easy to see in the case of rape. The unwanted fetus, now occupying a part of her body is in effect a intruder. If she really owns her body, which I contend she certainly does, she has a right to expel this person from her property. I also argue that voluntary sexual intercourse does not constitution an “invitation” for the pre-born baby to occupy her premises for nine months.