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Special issue: Indian logic
February 13th, 2022
Studia Humana special issue on Indian logic

Interdisciplinary journal Studia Humana invites contributors interested in Indian logic to send paper proposals. In this ussue we are going to explicate a logical-epistemological dimension of traditional philosophical thinking of different darśanas as well as of non-orthodox schools such as Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka.

Suggested topics include, but are not limited to the following:

- Conceptual differences between dharma and dharmin in the darśanas

- Epistemological and cognitive aspects of Advaita Vedānta

- Semantical and epistemological aspects of Mīmāṃsā

- Ontological and semantical aspects of Vaiśeṣika

- Logical theory of Nyāya

- Logical theory of Yogācāra

- Jain logic

- Logical critics of Mādhyamaka

- Argumentation and debates according to one of the schools of Indian philosophy

- Formalizations of epistemological and logical doctrines of Indian philosophy

Authors are asked to send their papers until the end of August 2022 to the following e-mail address:

Accepted papers are scheduled for publication in 4 issue 2022 (November), while all finally accepted papers may be published prior to assignment to the issue as early view.

Instructions for authors:
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February 6th, 2022
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February 15th, 2021
Early view option
September 25th, 2020


Many-worlds theory of truth
author: Alexander Boldachev,
The logical world is a set of propositions, united by common principles of establishing their truth. The many-worlds theory asserting that the truth of any proposition in any given logical world is always established by comparing it with standard propositions in this world – directly or via the procedure of transferring the truth.


Dedicated to Commemorate the 75th Years of India’s Independence. Editorial for a Special Issue on Indian logic

author: Dilipkumar Mohanta,
This special issue on Indian logic consists of nine research papers dealing with different aspects of Indian logic by nine distinguished authors. It is divided into three sections, such as Nyāya logic, Buddhist logic and Jaina logic. The papers deal with the issue of inference and allied concepts from both historical and conceptual considerations. Indian logic followed linguistic model and thereby in India it gives the foundation of epistemology and the development of philosophy of language.

The Concept of Anumāna in Navya-nyāya

author: Raghunath Ghosh,
According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration. But what is to be understood by the term ‘consideration’ or ‘parāmarśa’? According to them, parāmarśa or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained. Parāmarśa has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the hetu or reason in the pakṣa or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the sādhya, the knowledge in the form of parāmarśa is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) and the knowledge of the existence of the hetu in the subject (pakṣa). It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or hetu in the subject of inference along with the cognition of the prabans or hetu as pervaded by sādhya is called parāmarśa (pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate). The invariable co-existence in the form ‘where there is smoke, there is fire’ is known as vyāpti or invariable concomitance. Here the invariable co-existence (avyabhicārī sāhacarya) between the probans and probandum (i.e., smoke and fire) is the definition of vyāpti. The term ‘co-existence’ means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the hetu. To Gangeśa, the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (prayojaka) in ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by Tarka or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called svataḥsiddhaḥ. Gangeśa admits sāmānyalakṣaṇā as a pratyāsatti in ascertaining vyāpti between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him, the super-normal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) has got a prominent role in ascertaining vyāpti. If somebody challenges about the validity of the syllogistic argument in the form “The mountain is fiery as it possesses smoke” (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt), the philosophers of Nyāya and Navya-nyāya persuasion will justify the same with the help of five constituents (avayava-s). The process is called parāthānumāna (syllogistic argument for making others understand). The constituents of a syllogism are proposition (pratijňā), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana).

Buddhist Logic and its Development: Some Remarks

author: Dilipkumar Mohanta,
There are two major ways in which Buddhist logic is developed. The first one is represented by Nāgārjuna-Candrakῑrti tradition through the use of dialectics and the second way of development is found in the works of Diṅnāga and Dharmakῑrti through the use of hetu (probans). This second way of logic has further been developed by the works of Jinendrabuddhi and Ratnakῑrti. The paper is an attempt to show the historical development of epistemic logic as developed by the Buddhist philosophers and their relevance for our time.