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The 2nd International Interdisciplinary Conference.

Philosophical Basis for Making Decisions and Non-Classical Logics

On the 140th anniversary of the birth of Professor Jan Łukasiewicz

date: October 7th, 2018


The 2nd International Interdisciplinary Conference.

Philosophical Basis for Making Decisions and Non-Classical Logics

On the 140th anniversary of the birth of Professor Jan Łukasiewicz

1 February 2019

Rzeszów, Poland


This conference is organized on the 140th anniversary of the birth of Professor Jan Łukasiewicz (born on December, 21st 1878 in Lviv (Polish: Lwów), a city in today’s Ukraine, and died on February, 13th 1956), who was a famous representative of Lviv-Warsaw School of Logic with contributions to philosophical logic, mathematical logic, and history of logic.Using some philosophical ideas of Aristotle's De Interpretatione (ch.IX) (namely, his asserting that the application of the law of excluded middle to future propositions like, ‘There will be a sea-battle tomorrow’ should be categorically restricted), Jan Łukasiewicz proposed the first version of many-valued logic (1920). So, he showed that even some features of real world which are out of classical logic such as dynamics can be described and modeled logically still by non-classical systems. This finding that logic and rationality can be detectedeven in non-logical processes is quite typical for the Lviv-Warsaw School of Logic and distinguishes this school from the Vienna Circle (German: Wiener Kreis) focusing only on classical logic and their natural extensions. Hence, the motto of our conference is that rationality can be observed everywhere.Over the past two decades our social world has changed a lot due to new media. One of the biggest changes is communications in social networks which became an important part of our everyday’s life.But new forms of social communication are out of traditional forms of logical analysis of discourse. For instance, in these media the standard referential conception of truth is inapplicable – we cannot check uttered facts, but we can check contexts of uttering. In this way, we are interested to discuss non-classical logics in decision making and cognitions, new forms of communication and decision making, communication in new media. Extended versions of all accepted abstracts will be considered for publication in a special issue of Studia Humana.


Scientific Committee:

prof. dr hab. Jan Hertrich-Woleński, Head of the Department of Social Sciences, University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow

prof. nadzw. dr hab. Sławomir Gawroński, Dean of Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow

prof. UR dr hab. Andrzej Niemczuk, Head of the Department of Contemporary Philosophy, Rzeszow University

Organizing Committee:

dr Andrew Schumann, Chair of the Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow

dr Włodzimierz Zięba, Deputy Director of Institute of Philosophy, Rzeszow University

dr Paweł Balcerak, Department of Contemporary Philosophy, Rzeszow University

dr Konrad Szocik, Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow



The topics of interest include, but are not limited to: 

decision making,

non-classical logics,

logics of cognitions,

marketing communication,

social communication,

communication in new media,

social networks.


We are planning the following two sections: 

Cognitive and logical aspects in decision making

Rationality in communication


Important Dates

Submission of abstracts:

30 December 2018

Notification of abstracts:

4 January 2018 


1 February 2019

Submission of full papers:

15 April 2019

Notification of full papers:

15 May 2019 

Publication of full papers:

June 2019


Submitting an abstract(about 500 words in English) and registration should be made per email:


Within the event, we offer you an opportunity to publish your research papers in Studia Humana (7 points from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education).

After accepting your abstracts by January 13th, 2019, you will receive by e-mail a notification with the account number to which you should pay the conference fee. The conference fee of PLN 300 includes: 1 lunch, 1 gala dinner, promotional materials and an article in a special issue of Studia Humana.


Section: Cognitive and logical aspects in decision making


Jan Woleński

Some attempts toward a revision of classical logic were proposed by Peirce or Vasiliev, but Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logic became the first fully elaborated system departing from two-valued logical system. Łukasiewicz announced his ideas in 1918. He was motivated mostly by philosophy, particularly by the problem of determinism and the logical value of future contingents. Three-valued logic was the first version of many-valued logic. In the 1920s and 1930s, Łukasiewicz and his students (Lindenbaum, Słupecki, Sobociński, Tarski and Wajsberg) constructed logics with finite and countably infinite number of logical values as well as developed them. These investigations were restricted to propositional calculus. The predicate many-valued logic was developed after 1945, among others by Rosser, Turquette, Chang and others.  Łukasiewicz expected that many-valued logic would help in solving some philosophical problem. In particular, he hoped to show that the reality is the model of a definite logical system, two-valued or many-valued; his preference was that the latter possibility holds. In his later works he took a more formal stance. Applications of many-valued logic concern, for instance, linguistic (status of some kinds of statements, for instance, future contingents), logical paradoxes (paradoxical sentences, for instance, the Liar, has the third logical value), design of some technical artefacts (they can remain in neutral states, neither active nor active), artificial intelligence (many-valued logic as a base for computer programs), physics (the logic of quantum mechanics) or probability logic (probabilities are values of statements). The Czech School (notably Hajek) proposed many-valued logic as a tool for analysis of fuzzy systems and phenomena. Although almost nobody shares Łukasiewicz’s view that many-valued logic is a global rival of classical system (in particular, there is no general common interpretation concerning many-valueness), local applications of the former are numerous, remarkable and growing in their scope.


Wiesław Wójcik

The purpose of my work is twofold. On one side I would like to show the historical context in which was born the Łukasiewicz’s idea of multi-valued logics. In addition, I show the importance of logical research on the concept of probability and the very method of logical research for the creation of these logics. Łukasiewicz undertook a logical analysis of the concept of probability in the work of Die logischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. As he wrote, the first ideas to treat sentences of probability theory as indefinite sentences (nowadays propositional functions are used) have appeared thanks to the reading of works on logic algebra. On the other hand, the concept of logical value and its application to determine any degrees of probability was inspired by G. Frege's research. The logical value of a propositional function appears as the ratio of the number of these values of the variable for which the sentence becomes true to the number of all values of the variable. He introduced, based on the concept of logical value, the concept of the probability of propositional functions (the measure of the probability of a given propositional functions is the ratio of the number of objects fulfilling this function to the number of all objects from its domain). An important inspiration for Łukasiewicz was the reading of W. Gosiewski's book The Principle of Probability. In this work, logic algebra was used to examine the basis of the probability theory. Łukasiewicz presented his results for the first time at the seminar of Alexius Meinong in Graz in 1909. Then he discussed these results at the lectures he gave at the University of Lvov in the academic year 1910/11. Logical studies on the concept of probability were part of his wider research on the concept (and principle) of contradiction and the notion of cause and became an important step in the discovery of multivalued logics.


Maciej Tarnowski

Belief, since the early days of philosophy, has been a troubling and complex concept analysed through different metaphysical and methodological stances. One of most interesting features of beliefs, which existence seems to be widely-accepted among philosophers, is that they always need to form a kind of system – this feature usually is referred to as a holism of belief. Following Quine’s useful metaphor (Quine & Ullian 1978) we may speak of given agent’s beliefs as connected in a web – they are tied with each other, form different world-views, make an agent to accept some propositions instead of others, etc. Many philosophers following Hintikka’s (1962) innovative system for logic of knowledge and belief, tried to provide logic, that would describe human reasoning, belief formation and revision with empirical adequacy. The discussion has usually been carried on between the proponents of models based on reasoning in classical logic (e.g. Lewis (1982), Dennett (1987)) and those based on paraconsistent or intutionistic logics (e.g. Priest (1985), Da Costa & French (1989)). We must take note, however, that the existence of accurate logic of belief requires the concept of belief to be normative. There need to exist a necessary correct answer to the question which (given the basic set of subject’s beliefs) belief an agent should have. In his famous „On the Principle of Non-Contradiction in Aristotle” (1910), Jan Łukasiewicz argues for the opposite claim. He expresses a critique of Aristotle’s justification for the so-called Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction and provides an argument for that such principle can be (at most) empirical law of psychology, not a metaphysical or logical constraint. That is because, according to Łukasiewicz’s analysis, it is impossible to treat beliefs both as being psychological entities and having a truth value, since the latter can be a property of logical propositions, not of concrete objects or mental states. If we accept the Łukasiewicz’s claim, that the concept of belief is descriptive, not normative, then accuracy of a logic of belief would only be contingent – and the pursuit of finding such would be hopeless. In my presentation, I would like to provide an extension of Łukasiewicz’s argument, strenghtening it with evidence collected in cognitive, clinical and social psychology, which suggest that human reasoning is content-specific and cannot be emulated with the use of „content free” rules of logic. Further on, I would like to counter some of the main arguments proposed for the normativity of the concept of belief – most notably by Quine (1960) and Hintikka (1962). I would also like to present, how this critique relates to the metaphysical stances of dispositionalism and representationalism in the debate on the ontological status of belief. 1. Dennett D. (1987), „The Intentional Stance”, Cambridge: MIT Press. 2. Da Costa N. C. A., French S. (1989), “On the Logic of Belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 49, p. 431-446.  3. Łukasiewicz J. (1910), “O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa, Studium krytyczne” (On the principle of contradiction in Aristotle. A critical study). Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności.  4. Hintikka J. (1962), “Knowledge and Belief: an introduction to the logic of two notions.” New York: Cornell University Press. 5. Quine, W. V. O., (1960), “Word and Object”, New edition, with a foreword by Patricia Churchland, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2015. 6. Quine W. V. O., Ullian J. S. (1978), „The Web of Belief”, New York: Random House. 7. Priest G. (1985), “Contradiction, Belief and Rationality”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 86, p. 99-116. 8. Lewis D. (1982), “Logic for Equivocators”, Noûs, Vol. 16, p. 431-441.  9. Marcus R. B. (1983), „Rationality and Believing the Impossible”, in: „Modalities. Philosophical Essays”, New York: Oxford University Press. 10.Fodor J. (2008), „LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited”, New York: Oxford University Press. 11. Stalnaker R. (1984), „Inquiry”, Cambridge: MIT Press.


Andrzej Dąbrowski

Many philosophers maintain that analysis is a basic method in philosophy, but analysis is understood by them in a different way. In the paper, I present a method of logical analysis proposed by Jan Łukasiewicz. According to the Polish logician, the subject of philosophy is presented neither by mental beings (objects imagined or objects conceived), nor by concrete beings (existing in the world around us), but by concepts – unreal abstract objects (cause in general, purpose in general, man in general, circle in general, etc). In turn, the method to examine such concepts is a logical analysis. What is the analysis and how it works? Łukasiewicz writes: „To give a logical analysis of some concept, that is, an abstract object, to find all its features and to examine all the relationships that exist among them, with a particular emphasis on necessary relations, and thus with a designation of constitutive and consecutive features” (1907, p. 12). An important element of the method understood in this way is to search for or construct objects falling into the concept under consideration. How exactly the method of Łukasiewicz works, I show on the example of a logical analysis and constructing the concept of cause that Łukasiewicz carried out in the article Analiza i konstrukcja pojęcia przyczyny (1907). 1. Łukasiewicz, J., Analiza i konstrukcja pojęcia przyczyny, [w:] Z zagadnień logiki i filozofii. Pisma wybrane, PWN, Warszawa 1961, s. 9–62.


Piotr Banach

Kategorii niesprzeczności Jan Łukasiewicz poświecił jedno z ważniejszych dzieł pierwszego etapu swojej twórczości teoretycznej: „O zasadzie niesprzeczności u Arystotelesa” – nazywanym okresem filozoficznym. W tym czasie polski logik podejmuje rozważania na temat statusu twierdzeń, które uznane za niepodważalne pełniły rolę nie tylko aksjomatów logicznych, ale też wyznaczały kanon prowadzenia jakichkolwiek działań teoretycznych. W późniejszych latach J. Łukasiewicz coraz bardziej zaczął skłaniać się ku logice. W historii tej dziedziny zasłużył się min. jako twórca pierwszego wielowartościowego(trójwartościowego) rachunku zdań, gdzie mimo znanych obiekcji nie zrezygnował z zasady niesprzeczności i w systemie tym też pełni ona rolę jednego z aksjomatów. Referat który pragnę przedstawić będzie rekonstrukcją poglądów J. Łukasiewicza, jak i próbą wskazania kategorii niesprzeczności w późniejszych jego rozważaniach logicznych. Spróbuję również pokazać jaki miało to wpływ na dalszy rozwój systemów inspirowanych wynikami badań logika ze szkoły lwowsko – warszawskiej.


Bartłomiej K. Krzych

Augustyn Jakubisiak (1884-1945) was a Polish philosopher and theologian as well as a priest and social activist, working and publishing his important works in Paris, where he became associated with the Historical and Literary Society and the Polish Library. The sphere of his research included a wide range of problems, including ontology of time and space, free will of man or social and state issues. That was resulted from his interests, because apart from philosophy and theology. He also studied natural sciences. He also took polemics with the then representatives of the Lwow-Warsaw school, especially Jan Łukasiewicz, whom he met personally. The dispute concerned the so-called logistics (mathematical logic) and its attitude to philosophy. The most important arguments were laid out especially in the following works: in the case of Jakubisiak in the book From Scope to Content, in the case of Łukasiewicz in the texts Logistics and Philosophy and Inthe Defense of Logistics. Jakubisiak criticized logistics for her anti-metaphysical, anti-theological and anti-religious attitude, which is based on neo-positivist philosophy and leads to atheism in its consequences. He also claimed that one should focus on what is concrete, avoid idealization and abstraction (meaning the content of concepts not their scope). Łukasiewicz defended logistics claiming that he possesses his own methods based on intellect and it is an area of independent knowledge (but not completely detached) from philosophy, because he can consider the most important philosophical problems such as finiteness and infinity. Jan Woleński writes that this dispute, basically concerning the reduction of philosophy to the study of language (analytic philosophy), initiated one of the most important discussion on the relationship and relation of philosophy to logic. The debate was of great importance because it also concerned issues related to fundamental metaphysical issues (naturalism – supranaturalism, rationalism – irrationalism) and epistemological issues (realism – idealism, boundaries and structure of cognition).The paper will be a detailed discussion of the logistics dispute between Jan Łukasiewicz and Augustine Jakubisiak.

1. primary sources: A. Jakubisiak, Od zakresu do treści, Warszawa 1936; J. Łukasiewicz, Logistyka a filozofia, „Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1936,39,115-131); J. Łukasiewicz, W obronie logistyki, [in:] Myśl katolicka wobec logiki współczesnej, ed. J. Łukasiewicz, Poznań 1937.

2. studies: A. Andrzejuk, Filozofowie wśród wykładowców PUNO. Sylwetki uczonych, [in:] Filozofia na Polskim Uniwersytecie na Obczyźnie, ed. M. Płotka, J. Pyłat, A. Andrzejuk, Warszawa-Londyn 2014, 23-54; Parerga z logiki praktycznej, ed. W. Suchoń, I. Trzcieniecka-Schneider, D. Kowalski, Kraków 2013; Z. Wolak, Sztuka prowadzenia sporów, „Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce” 1995, vol. XVII, 117-118; J. Woleński, Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska w polemikach, Warszawa 1997; J. Zegzuła-Nowak, Polemiki filozoficzne Henryka Elzenberga ze szkołą lwowsko-warszawską, Kraków 2017.


Wojciech Rutkiewicz

Research conducted by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in early 70’s in the field of decision making has absolutely changed the view of decisions made within risk and uncertainty circumstances. Tversky and Kahneman have presented so called Prospect Theory. According to that, decisions are made with predetermined point of reference. As such, prospect theory contradicts popular among economists and scientists Expected Utility Theory. Allais Paradox or Ellsberg Paradox have shown that Expected Utility Theory formulated in axiomatic version by Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann was not able to predict real human behavior in face of decision problems. Prospect Theory has opened new chapter in field of decision making research. It announced the gap between normative and descriptive aspects of decision making. The former stands for the way decisions should be made and the latter stands for the way decisions are actually made. Heuristics are essential for Prospect Theory. Prospect theorists assume that interpretation of particular decision problem is accompanied by some cognitive effects. Heuristics are complementary to these effects. Basically, there are three types of heuristics: availability heuristic, representativeness heuristics and anchoring. According to Kahneman, heuristics are simplified method for solving decision problems. Using heuristics agent is able to make judgment about occurrence probability of favorable event. This method nonetheless carried risk of systematic bias. This is why Kahneman treats heuristics as equivalent for systematic errors. In the same time when Kahneman has conducted research about heuristics, concurrent approach to decision making process has arose. Herbert Simon has offered the term of bounded rationality. It is kind of rationality that leads to decisions made in accordance with limited cognitive resources. Bounded rationality reinforces descriptive positions and leads to another gap. This time the gap occurs between coherence criterion and correspondence criterion in case of decision’s assessment. Heuristics interpreted as an explanation for occurrence of systematic errors in decision making process must appeal to normative principles such as Expected Utility Theory’s tenets. So, when it comes to decision assessment from ground of Kahneman’s heuristics, agent is compelled to use coherence criterion i.e. assess decision in accordance with normative principles. Simon along with his, let’s say, intellectual successor, Gerd Gigerenzer have used correspondence criterion i.e. they make assessment with reference to context (or environment) in which decision problem occurred. The effect of acceptance of correspondence criterion is an idea of heuristics interpreted as decision strategies adequate to environment in which agent makes decision. This idea is represented by Gigerenzer. In my presentation I would like to characterize two kinds of gaps in field of decision making research: gap between normative aspect and descriptive aspect of decision making process, and gap between coherence criterion and correspondence criterion in case of decision’s assessment. These two distinctions are fundamental for comprehensive presentation of difference between heuristics defined by Daniel Kahneman and heuristics defined by Gerd Gigerenzer.


Paweł Balcerak

It is widely accepted that volition requires no external triggers for action, it requires some internal cause. This internal cause was for a long time hidden from researchers. The only way of studying it was to rely on reports from subjects. In this presentation I will attempt to answer two main questions: 1) Can this internal cause be study by means of neuroscience; 2) Can sense of agency be studied without relying on self-report from subjects. I will finish with the attempt to propose some key features of volition.


Anna Pindych, Eryka Probierz

This study underline the problem of influence of the previous experiences on decision making while specific situation which is criminal trial. Many researches show that previous experiences and exclusive knowledge have influence on problem solving. The distinctions result from differences in knowledge about legal procedures, willingness to take risk, and strategies used to mislead the interrogator and avoid being punished.  The main goal of our research was to study suspects' trail strategies and decision - making process, and to find if criminals are making more rational and coherent decisions while facing criminal trial. A group of 100 participants (50 male sentenced to imprisonment, and 50 male without criminal record) analysed a crime scenario base on a real crime case. Case summary was divided into parts, at some levels described circumstances were important from the legal point of view, and some of them referred to legally irrelevant information, but could have cause emotional reaction. At each step participants were asked to take make a decision, to answer a simple question: „assuming you have committed the crime, what would you do if you were a person who has committed the crime?”. Results show, that subjective probability and utility judgements, as well as emotional cues affect more often decisions taken by inexperienced participants, than individuals serving an imprisonment penalty.


Nataliia Reva

The analogy is one of the favorite tools people use to make decisions. Even the most advanced computers in nowadays learn by analogies. However, is it that infallible to rely on? The goal of my talk is to present the part of the big empirical research on the correlation between logical reasoning and cognitive biases I am working on.  For this presentation, I decided to focus only on analogical thinking. I assume that people who are better in analogical reasoning may also be contingent from the implicit association bias. This bias is a powerful intruder that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions on the unconscious level by cherishing the stereotypes based on specific characteristics such as ethnicity, sex, race, age, and so on. To check this theory, I am working on the first version of the survey that will be launched in January.  To verify the logical abilities of the subjects I ask them to finish the analogical arguments concluding from the two premises. These examples concern different topics including health care, politics, religion, etc. Besides, they will also pass the short verbal and geometrical analogy tests of form A:B:C:?. To rate the association bias level, I will use the Implicit Association Test (IAT), because it is proven to be reliable and internally consistent over the various studies (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Steffens, 2004). I will choose the same topics as for the test on analogy. As the platform for my survey, I will use the Lime Survey, because it is easy to use as well as comfortable to analyze the data at the end. Besides, in my opinion, it is more cheering for people to answer their questions privately when nobody confuses them with unwelcome attention. This way, I expect to get more honest answers.  The scoring will be done in SPSS. The control group will be about 50 students from 16 to 25 years old from my alma mater. I will divide them into two groups (25x25): those who have and who have not learn logic or critical thinking before. I know that this decision narrows down the sample. However, I think that it will be better to rate the different age groups separately. The objective reasons are that I need to be sure that the subjects are about the same level of education and do not have any mental issues, which could be caused by age, like, for example, a memory loss. Although the survey will be in Ukrainian, I will translate some example in English for the presentation. 1. Amodio D., Devine P. Stereotyping and Evaluation in Implicit Race Bias: Evidence for Independent Constructs and Unique Effects on Behavior (2006) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 91, No. 4, 652–661. 2. Gamboa S. In Defense of Analogical Reasoning (2008) Informal Logic, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 229-241. 3. Nosek B., Banaji M. The Go/No-Go association task (2001) Social Cognition, Vol. 19, No. 6, pp. 625664. 4. Rudman L., Ashmore R., and Gary M. "Unlearning" Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes. (2001) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 81, No. 5, 8568


Krzysztof Majczyk

Arystoteles zawarł zasady swojej dialektyki czyli logiki panującej w świecie metafizycznym, w społeczeństwie zarówno w „Topikach”, „O dowodach sofistycznych”, „Retoryce jak i w „De Intepretatione”. Jakkolwiek logika „Topików” odmienna jest od logiki świata fizycznego, zawartej w „Analitykach”, to jednak nazywana jest logiką jednowartościową, logiką na zasadzie czarne- białe. XX wieczne zmagania stworzenia logiki wielowartościowej Jana Łukasiewicza, które ogniskują się wokół sporu z arystotelesowską zasadą wyłączonego środka, bez względu na ich oceny w środowisku filozoficznym, są obecnie nieznane i nieważne, wobec panującej dyktatury relatywizmu poznawczego jak i metodologicznego. Spróbujmy zatem poddać wybiórczej krytyce wybraną, współczesną teorię filozoficznoprawną, np. Teorię emotywizmu Leona Petrażyckiego zarówno z wykorzystaniem dialektyki Arystotelesowskiej jak i logiki wielowartościowej Jana Łukasiewicza. Ponieważ teoria psychologizmu L. Petrażyckiego oparta jest, w sensie poznawczym, na błędzie antropologicznym, dlatego jej konkluzje na gruncie filozofii prawa prowadzą do instrumentalizacji osobowego człowieka oraz do bezprawnych, totalitarnych systemów politycznych, takich jak komunizm czy faszyzm. Przedmiotem referatu będzie przewód, uzasadniający dojście do w/w wniosków, zgodnych niestety z bolesnymi doświadczeniami ubiegłego jak i obecnego wieku. Bardzo interesujący jest wynik analizy metodologicznej relatywizmu poznawczego emotywizmu prawniczego L. Petrażyckiego z perspektywy logiki wielowartościowej J. Łukasiewicza. Wydawałoby się, że metodologia J. Łukasiewicza obejdzie się bardziej łaskawo z polityką prawną L. Petrażyckiego, mającą doprowadzić narody do szczęśliwości na Ziemi. Wykorzystanie obu typów logik do analizy relatywistycznych, pozytywistycznych filozofii prawnych ma niesłychanie ważną rolę w metodologicznej krytyce panujących lub odradzających się, przeważnie relatywistycznych nurtów we współczesnej filozofii prawa. Wyniki tej analizy chciałbym zaprezentować w referacie.


Section: Rationality in communication


Andrzej Niemczuk

W referacie scharakteryzowane zostaną podstawy racjonalności praktycznej oraz najogólniejsze zasady jej funkcjonowania. Najpierw przedstawiona zostanie jej odmienność od racjonalności teoretycznej. Odmienność ta polega na tym, że racjonalność praktyczna funkcjonuje w polu wyznaczonym przez takie kategorie, jak: od strony podmiotu – wolność i szczęście, a od strony przedmiotowej – wartości i świat realny. Scharakteryzowana zostanie także swoistość racji praktycznych i ich odmienność od pragnień psychologicznych. W końcowej części referatu podjęty zostanie problem ewentualnej logiki występującej w racjonalności praktycznej.


Tomasz Goban-Klas

Who are we and how do we relate to each other? Luciano Floridi claims that explosive changes in information and communication technologies change the answer to these basic human questions. When the boundaries between life on the web and offline fail, and we become seamlessly connected to each other and surrounded by intelligent, responsive objects, we all become integrated in the "infosphere". In argues that throughout history, technology has transformed human thought on two levels: self-conception and relation to nature. J. David Bolter in “Turing’s Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age” asserts that the computer is the latest and most radical defining technology, as it has become the dominant metaphor for the human mind in popular culture as well as in more technical fields such as psychology and neuroscience. This metaphor, in essence, is Turing’s man. It is not important, Bolter argues, whether A.M. Turing was right when he predicted that computers would perfectly mimic human intelligence. But “by making a machine think as a man, man recreates himself, defines himself as a machine…as an information processor and of nature as information to be processed”. By trying to build artificial intelligence, we have transformed ourselves into artificially intelligent beings.


Andrzej Adamski

According to the theory of mediatization, the media are present in almost all areas of our lives. More and more aspects of our lives: our work, leisure, politics, organizations, science, economy, and many other parts of culture and society use and rely on the media communication to a greater extent. It is a characteristic ‘media saturation’ of our reality. Additionally, the reference of mediatization to the media convergence should not be ignored as well. Currently, the media (especially the ‘new media’) provide a multifaceted, global, interactive and spatially and temporally compressed transfer of any content, targeted at the global audience.  It is so because the new media diversify and reconfigure the whole pro-cess of information flow from the sender to the receiver and change the key characteristics of the media texts. In case of the old media (analogue) information must have had its physical medium. As for the new media, information that is subject to digitalization, is recorded in the form of a stream of bits, unified, standardized – which causes that it can be freely copied and transferred between different types of receivers. Thus, digital technology plays an increasingly important role in our communication. This process is progressing very quickly and it calls for a scientific reflection on the changes it causes in the society and in our psyche. Some researchers (i.e. Tinworth, Cramer, Goodwin) identify the current state of saturation of our civilization with it as “the post-digital age”. In my topic I want to ask: are they right? How far we depend on the digital media? Could we live without the Internet?


Andrew Schumann

There are well studied the so-called zero-sum (antagonistic) games where one decision maker's gain (or loss) necessarily results in the other decision makers' loss (or gain), i.e. a loss of one player means a gain of other players and a gain of one player means a loss of others. Also, there are well studied win-win (protagonistic) games where all players are involved and can have profit simultaneously (i.e. everyone can gain). Nevertheless, there is a group of games not studied at all – the so-called lose-lose (anti-protagonistic) games where players ever favor other players’ loss over own gain. In other words, in a lose-lose game, I prefer not to win to maximizing my own profit, but to contribute to maximizing the loss of my opponent. Between the groups of zero-sum games and win-win games there is a contradictory relation, but between the groups of win-win games and lose-lose games there is a contrary relation. In lose-lose games there cannot be equilibriums.  They often happen to us in everyday situations. One of the best examples of these games is represented by trolling in social networks.


Anastazja Cheiz

W proponowanym referacie rozważam dwa możliwe podejścia do wyjaśnienia tego, co to jest filozofia i jakie są jej źródła. Pierwsze z nich ma charakter substancjalny i teleologiczny, wyjaśnia istotę filozofii za pośrednictwem kategorii celu i konieczności. W szerokim znaczeniu określam go jako logikę filozofii. Podejścieowo bierze początek jeszcze od Arystotelesowskiej teorii Primusmotor jako transcendentnej substancji, będącej zarazem przyczyną i celem wszelkiego ruchu w tym też aktywności filozoficznej, swoją kulminację zaś zyskuje w Nauce logiki G. Hegla. Filozof niemiecki na podstawie zasady tożsamości tego, co logiczne i tego, co historyczne zredukował filozofię do jej historii, twierdząc, że filozofia rozwija się według zadanych z góry prawidłowości, natomiast pojęcia filozoficzne powstają z konieczności, służąc narzędziami ujęcia odpowiedniej epoki w myśleniu. Epoki historyczne, ujmowane w pojęciach również zmieniają się w zgodzie z określonymi prawami, ostatecznie zmierzając w kierunku wolności absolutnej. Tak zwanej logice filozofii przeciwstawiam psychologię filozofowania – procesualne podejście do badania filozofii, któreswoimi korzeniami sięga jeszcze tradycji Galileuszowego mechanistycznego kazualizmu w wyjaśnieniu naukowym i polega na sprowadzeniu jednostkowych przypadków do hipotetycznie ogólnie obowiązujących praw przyrody, łącznie z prawami „natury ludzkiej”. Podstawowa różnica analizowanych podejść polega na odmiennym traktowaniu pojęcia prawa, które w przypadku logiki filozofii zakładaidee wewnętrznych powiązań i ciągłości filozofii, w przypadku zaś psychologii filozofowania oznacza indukcyjne uogólnienie dokonywane na drodze obserwacji i eksperymentów. Heglowski schemat rozwoju filozofii poprzez dialektyczną triadę orazinne prawa jego logiki w sposób oczywisty różni się od praw w sensie nauk empirycznych. Obstaję zatem przy tezie G. von Wrighta, że prawo w ujęciu idealisty niemieckiego można określić jako związek logiczny, a co za tym idzie,model wyjaśnienia filozofii przez niego zaproponowany przedstawia sobą wspomnianą wyżej logikę (rozwoju) filozofii. Wśród mankamentów logiki filozofii można wydzielić następujące: po pierwsze, nie może onazapewnić wystarczającego wyjaśnienia genezy oraz istoty filozofii, gdyż skupia sięgłówniena jej teleologicznym uzasadnieniu; po drugie, akcentując na następstwie pojęć i problemów filozoficznych, niezdolna wyjaśnić powstanie w filozofii oryginalności; po trzecie, próby wyjaśnienia filozofii za pomocą narzędzi samej filozofii (np. teorii metafizycznej w duchu Hegla) prowadzi do błędnego koła.  Alternatywne podejście, reprezentowane przez psychologię filozofowania analizujęna podstawiekoncepcji J. Pietera, w którego ujęciu idea historii filozofii jako naukizakłada działanie pewnej wewnętrznej logiki rozwoju filozofii, umożliwiając dalszą pracę historyka, która polegać ma na poznaniu łańcucha tożsamości filozofii w ciągu dziejów. Poprzez stopniowe odtworzenie tego łańcucha historyk filozofii usiłuje pośrednio rozwiązać również problem genezy filozofii. Dla psychologii filozofowania z kolei pewien jedyny początek filozofii okazuje się drugorzędną pod względem nowości epistemicznej konwencją historyków. Nie istnieje również żadnego celu filozofii poza procesem filozofowania hic et nunc.Procesualne podejście do rozstrzygnięcia kluczowego problemu metafilozoficznego czyniswoim przedmiotem nie filozofię jako zjawiskohistorycznerządzone pewną wewnętrzną logiką, lecz filozofowanie jako szczególną aktywność psychiczna, niepozbawionąwpływupozafilozoficznych determinant, z których najważniejsze Pieter wyjaśnia za pomocą naturalistycznej metafory nadmiaru. Badanie filozofii narzędziami nauk szczegółowych,wsród których znajduje się psychologia ( psychoanaliza i teoria Gestalt), przezwycięża niektóre ograniczenia podejścia bazującego na logice filozofii, pozostając tym samym w zgodzie z szeroko pojmowanym paradygmatem naturalistycznym we współczesnej humanistyce. Natomiast rozważana opozycja logiki filozofii i psychologii filozofowaniawciąż pozostaje nieodłącznie wpisana w kontekst słynnego sporunaturalizmemztranscendentalizmu.


Paulina Wnęk

Artykuł pokazuje trendy zachowania użytkowników mediów społecznościowych w walce o własne racje. Postaram się dowieść, że powszechna wolność wypowiedzi w mediach społecznościowych, w prawdzie, poszerza wachlarz możliwości argumentacji fanów i antyfanów problemu, ale jednocześnie wikła odbiorców w cyniczną walkę na racjonalne i nieracjonalne argumenty - sztuka polega na odpowiednim doborze mieszanki emocji i racjonalizmu. Jednocześnie, podkreślam wagę emocjonalnego podejścia zarówno do problemu, jaki i do dyskusji samej w sobie. Charakterystyce zostaną poddane zachowania użytkowników mediów społecznościowych.


Konrad Szocik

Religia i komponenty religijne wydają się łączyć elementy racjonalne z irracjonalnymi. Podczas gdy treści przekonań religijnych mogą wydawać się irracjonalne, podzielanie przekonań i zachowań religijnych może być uzasadnione racjami ewolucyjnymi. Celem referatu jest zwrócenie uwagi na możliwość interpretowania religii jako fenomenu racjonalnego z punktu widzenia ewolucji.


Magdalena Hoły-Łuczaj

The presentation aims to bring about the necessity to revisit the concept of moral considerability as an important factor in making decisions regarding non-human beings. Moral considerability is the concept which originated in environmental ethics. Environmental ethics claims that not only our dealings with human beings, but also with nonhuman natural beings should be morally assessed, or, to put it differently, nonhuman natural beings deserve to be considered morally, and likewise to be treated correspondingly. This state of ‘deserving’ is referred to as ‘moral considerability. In the paper, I analyze what are criteria for granting moral considerability for specific groups of nonhuman beings and offer a new approach to it, according to which the limitations in considering morally our decisions concerning other beings should be the possibility to affect them.


Alexander Kuznetsov

The actions of a person in everyday life are influenced by such factors as lack of awareness, personal preferences, mental state, and so on. By this reason, human behaviour is not always amenable to logical explanation and, all the more, to a description in terms of classical logic. For a plausible simulation of human behaviour, it is necessary to consider the influence of emotions on decision-making. The author proposes the use of a number of Abhidharma concepts for building a computer simulation of human behaviour. Abhidharma texts give the formalized conception of atomic mental factors (caitasika) which can affect one’s processes of reasoning and decision. This conception, together with various Abhidharmic theories of discrete Universe and Time, seems to be useful for the development of a computer simulation of human behaviour in a cellular automaton-like environment.


Marek Bosak

Artykuł jest próbą ukazania zależności między treściową zawartością pojęcia decyzji, a przyjmowanym sposobem rozumienia kategorii wolnego wyboru. W tekście ukazane są przykładowe, sformułowane na przestrzeni dziejów, konkurencyjne ujęcia wolności wyboru, które „generują” odmienne zestawy „warunków brzegowych” zaistnienia aktu decyzji. Tekst ukazuje także wybrane konsekwencje teoretyczne, jakie z przedstawianych ujęć mogą wynikać dla problemów podejmowanych w ramach szeroko rozumianej teorii decyzji.


Magda Michalik-Jeżowska

W tej pracy zakłada się, że myślenie może, ale nie musi być racjonalne, zatem racjonalność nie jest jego niezbywalną cechą.To założenie jest warunkiem koniecznym do tego, by móc w ogóle rozważać czy myślenie irracjonalne pełni jakiekolwiek funkcje (a ściśle czy może nie być dysfunkcyjne). Ta wstępna przesłanka uzasadnia także pytanie o praktyczną użyteczność decyzji będących wynikiem nieracjonalnego myślenia. Badaniu i rozważeniu tej kwestii służy niniejsza praca.