Studia humana (SH) is a multi-disciplinary peer reviewed journal publishing valuable
contributions on any aspect of human sciences such as...
read more...
ARTICLES:
The Normative Permission and Legal Utterances
Issue: 9:3/4 (the thirty fifth/sixth issue)
The author proves that rejecting the existence of permissive norms and limitation
of norms to prohibitions and commands alone is possible only with reducing the
idea of a function. The essence of the function is then the ability of the expression
to generate independently the universal norm formation. Such manipulation is easy
on the level of logical analysis, but proves risky from other points of view. If we
want the deontic logic, which we construct, to consider the fact that permission is
pragmatically necessary for the law-maker to convey his normative preferences,
we must solve the consequences of the adopted structure of the function of norms,
which originate on the socio-linguistic level. It appears, however, that due to a lack
of a pragmatic theory useful for lawyers, there is no proof that the pragmatically
strong permission can be expressed by means of a lot of prohibitions and
commands (dos and don’ts). Besides, reducing permissions only to the language of
legal rules is an obligation to accept the structure of an act of communication,
which can find its full motivation in the Husserl’s structure of the direct cognition.
of norms to prohibitions and commands alone is possible only with reducing the
idea of a function. The essence of the function is then the ability of the expression
to generate independently the universal norm formation. Such manipulation is easy
on the level of logical analysis, but proves risky from other points of view. If we
want the deontic logic, which we construct, to consider the fact that permission is
pragmatically necessary for the law-maker to convey his normative preferences,
we must solve the consequences of the adopted structure of the function of norms,
which originate on the socio-linguistic level. It appears, however, that due to a lack
of a pragmatic theory useful for lawyers, there is no proof that the pragmatically
strong permission can be expressed by means of a lot of prohibitions and
commands (dos and don’ts). Besides, reducing permissions only to the language of
legal rules is an obligation to accept the structure of an act of communication,
which can find its full motivation in the Husserl’s structure of the direct cognition.
