Magdalena Michalik-Jeżowska

Habilitated doctor Magdalena Michalik – Jeżowska, professor of the University of Rzeszów
 

Master’s degree in theoretical philosophy at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin (1988- 1993).

Ph. D. in philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology of Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin (1999).

Ph. D. in psychology at the Faculty of Pedagogy and Psychology of Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin (2006).

Habilitation in philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology of Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin (2017). Since 1999 employed at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Rzeszów (formerly the Pedagogical University of Rzeszów).

Research interests: philosophical anthropology, moral philosophy, philosophy of emotions, psychology of emotions and motivation, psychology of morality, social psychology.

 

Issue: 5:3 (The nineteenth issue)

This paper was inspired by two ideas: (1) the concept of emotions as adaptive
mechanisms, which was suggested by Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, and (2) Robert Solomon’s
criticism of the distinction between “positive” and “negative” emotions which
functions in social sciences. In the context of the above mentioned theoretical
perspectives I consider the infamous emotion of pleasure-in-others’-misfortune in
terms of possible benefits for the experiencing subject. I focus especially on
supposed adaptive quality of pleasure-in-others’-aging.

Issue: 8:2 (The thirtieth issue)

In this work, no denying the role, or even more so, the value of rational
thinking, it is assumed that it is not the only effective tool for man to achieve
his valuable goals. It is conjectured here that sometimes irrational thinking is
an equally good (and sometimes even better than rational thinking) means of
achieving them. In the light of these assumptions, the goal of my work is to
indicate the benefits that may be the result of irrational thinking in the
colloquial (i.e. unscientific) domain of everyday human practice. The given
examples of irrational thinking come from research in the field of cognitive and
social psychology and behavioural economics. Their results prove that
irrational behaviours (including thinking) are neither accidental nor senseless,
and on the contrary systematic and easy to predict, they constitute important
arguments for considering the phenomenon of irrational thinking. I also discuss
this issue although only to a limited extent.