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The article in the issue 0:0:

The date of the publication:
2020-09-21
The number of pages:
0
The issue:
0:0
Commentaries:
0
The Authors
Mustafa Khuramy, Erik Schulz, Matti Häyry, Konrad Szocik, Katarzyna Wilk,

Currently a philosophy student, researching meta-ethics; specifically arguments for moral realism and against epistemic error theory.

Currently an undergraduate philosophy student at ASU, generally interested in meta-ethics and theories of justification.

ARTICLE:

No Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument

Many moral realists have employed a strategy for arguing for moral realism by claiming that if epistemic normativity is categorical and that if this epistemic normativity exists, then categorical normativity exists. In this paper, we will discuss that argument, examine a way out, and respond to the objections people have recently raised in the literature. In the end, we conclude that the objections to our way out will do little in the way of motivating those who already do not believe in categorical normativity, thereby severing the power the aforementioned parity argument is designed to possess.

Commentary:

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