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Special issue: Indian logic
February 13th, 2022
Studia Humana special issue on Indian logic

Interdisciplinary journal Studia Humana invites contributors interested in Indian logic to send paper proposals. In this ussue we are going to explicate a logical-epistemological dimension of traditional philosophical thinking of different darśanas as well as of non-orthodox schools such as Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka.

Suggested topics include, but are not limited to the following:

- Conceptual differences between dharma and dharmin in the darśanas

- Epistemological and cognitive aspects of Advaita Vedānta

- Semantical and epistemological aspects of Mīmāṃsā

- Ontological and semantical aspects of Vaiśeṣika

- Logical theory of Nyāya

- Logical theory of Yogācāra

- Jain logic

- Logical critics of Mādhyamaka

- Argumentation and debates according to one of the schools of Indian philosophy

- Formalizations of epistemological and logical doctrines of Indian philosophy

Authors are asked to send their papers until the end of August 2022 to the following e-mail address: Andrew.Schumann@gmail.com

Accepted papers are scheduled for publication in 4 issue 2022 (November), while all finally accepted papers may be published prior to assignment to the issue as early view.

Instructions for authors:
http://studiahumana.com/for-authors.html
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MOST OFTEN READING TEXT:

Many-worlds theory of truth
author: Alexander Boldachev,
The logical world is a set of propositions, united by common principles of establishing their truth. The many-worlds theory asserting that the truth of any proposition in any given logical world is always established by comparing it with standard propositions in this world – directly or via the procedure of transferring the truth.

CURRENT ISSUE:

Logic and Law: A Matter of Values Behind Content and Form

author: Fabien Schang,
This special issue on Logic and Law consists of four research papers and one interview focusing on epistemological reflections on relationships between logic and law, whether in a reductionist or complementary approach. Logic aims to elucidate through formal frameworks, yet it often grapples with the intricate nuances of everyday legal discourse. While law endeavors to delineate permissible conduct within defined jurisdictions, it often encounters challenges stemming from the ambiguity of terms, leading to frequent judicial interpretations and the perception that proliferating exceptions undermines the efficacy of the rule itself.

How Law’s Nature Influences Law’s Logic

author: Jaap Hage,
Classical logic is based on an underlying view of the world, according to which there are elementary facts and compound facts, which are logical combinations of these elementary facts. Sentences are true if they correspond to, in last instance, the elementary facts in the world. This world view has no place for rules, which exist as individuals in the world, and which create relations between the most elementary facts. As a result, classical logic is not suitable to deal with rules, and is therefore unsuitable to deal with legal reasoning. A logic that is more suitable should take into account that law is a part of social reality, in particular a part that consists of constructivist facts, and that rules play a central role in law. This article gives a superficial description of how social reality exists and of the place of law and legal rules in it. It uses this description to argue that traditional techniques to reason with and about legal rules provide a better logic for law than classical logic. These techniques can be accommodated in a logic that treats rules as logical individuals.

Legal Reasoning and Logic

author: Jan Woleński,
This paper investigates the basis arguments of so-called legal logic and their relation to logic in its standard meaning. There is no doubt that legal arguments belong to logic in the wide sense (sensu largo), but their reduction to schemes of formal logic (logica sensu stricto) is a controversial issue. It can be demonstrated that only some legal arguments fall under explicit rules of formal logic, that is, having a deductive character. Most such reasoning is fallible, and its correctness depends on appealing to extra-logical principles taken from legal norms. For instance, if we say, “If it is permitted more, then it is permitted less” (argumentum a maiori ad minus), we assume that the concepts expressed by the words “more” and “less” are already defined.