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Preface: Reflections on Emotions

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Abstract: Preface to the special issue ‘Reflections on Emotions’. Many academic disciplines have offered important explanations of various aspects of emotion. In the Preface I try to present a wide range of research and stress that study on emotions had its origins in philosophy.

Keywords: emotions, history, philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, economy, sociology, cognitive science, neurobiology.

1. What are Emotions?

Emotions are an integral part of human beings. They are very important in everyday life: at work, at school, at home, in art, in research, and in every action and conversation. They provide us with effective operation and success. Emotions often are helpful. Often, but not always. Today we know a lot about emotions, however, we still have much to discover. For example, we do not know exactly what emotions are.

There is no definition of emotion that would bind all researchers. Before the eighteenth century philosophers had used such terms as ‘passion’ or ‘affection’, and by those they meant among other things: ‘strong feelings’, ‘lust as opposed to reason’, ‘attraction’, ‘enthusiasm’ or ‘inclination’. Emotions were treated as mental states. Presence of the cognitive element, the detailed content or intentionality (directing to a formal object) were underlined. On the other hand psychologists often put stress on the physiological change or the tendency to act. Here are a few selected definitions:

emotion, as conceived by philosophers and psychologists, any of several general types of mental states, approximately those that had been called “passions” by earlier philosophers, such as Descartes and Hume. Anger, e.g., is one emotion, fear a second, and joy a third. An emotion may also be a content-specific type, e.g., fear of an earthquake, or a token of an emotion type, e.g., Mary’s present fear that an earthquake is imminent (...) [3, p. 222].

emotion [from Latin *e*, out + *movere*, move, agitating motions] Aristotle claimed that emotion, which he called passion [Greek *pathos*, being acted upon] is a process or motion. Emotions are complex mental states with various degrees of intensity. Unlike

moods, they are about some real or imagined objects. They give rise to actions or reactions. In this respect, they are associated with the will, but are distinguished from feeling in general because not all kinds of feeling are action-causing. Emotions are accompanied or expressed by bodily symptoms or external behavior. Typical emotions include love, anger, fear, joy, anxiety, pride, contempt, compassion, and indignation, and can occur alone or in combination [4, pp. 205-206].

emotion *n.* a transient, neurophysiological response to a stimulus that excites a coordinated system of bodily and mental responses that inform us about our relationship to the stimulus and prepare us to deal with it in some way [13, p. 179].

emotion *n.* a complex reaction pattern, involving experiential, behavioral, and physiological elements, by which an individual attempts to deal with a personally significant matter or event. The specific quality of the emotion (e.g., fear, shame) is determined by the specific significance of the event. For example, if the significance involves threat, fear is likely to be generated; if the significance involves disapproval from another, shame is likely to be generated. Emotion typically involves feeling but differs from feeling in having an overt or implicit engagement with the world [20, p. 362].

A brief survey of philosophical and psychological dictionary definitions reveals that emotions are numerous, diverse and hard to grasp. So, perhaps the best what we can do is to define them by the idea of the family resemblance. Audi puts it *expressis verbis*: ‘The various states typically classified as emotions appear to be linked together only by overlapping family resemblances rather than by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions’ [3, p. 222], but that conclusion may be premature.

2. Multiple Disciplines Concerning Emotions

Since childhood we have been learning to recognize and control our emotions. To gain knowledge and understanding of them it is important to have contact with belles-lettres, novels (especially the psychological ones) and drama. Literature describes the internal experiences of heroes; raising, development and acting on their sensations and emotions. The latter may be seen essentially in stories of interpersonal relations and in various ways of experiencing the world. Many people learn about emotions mainly on the basis of literature. On the other hand, there are a lot of research domains that are focused merely on exploring emotions, and they have relevant tools for that.

Contemporarily emotions are mainly a subject of psychology. It searches for their nature and structure; analyzes the course and phases of emotional development. Their kinds and functions are analyzed in detail. The influence of emotions upon human health is examined. On the other hand psychiatry deals with etiology, pathogenesis, symptomatology, mental hospitals and emotional disorder treatment (anxiety, depression, affective disorder). Psychology explores the connection between emotions and cognition, motivation and deciding. It is worth mentioning that the latter is also a field of economic study, where they are linked to the role agents play within the market [7, 8, 9, 16]. Economists and managers search for the possibility to control and use emotions in production and trading.

Essential knowledge referring to how emotions make history is delivered by history of emotions included by the general history. It searches for emotional standards that are obtained in various social groups in various eras, and how and why given institutions and social activities promoted one emotion and depreciated and/or forbade others. The sociology of emotions is concerned with the social conditions of emotions, their dynamics, development, individual, common and organizational work on them. Political researchers indicate the important role of emotions in state, nation, international community, and culture functioning [5, 19]. Cultural anthropology studies emotions in the context of social and cultural differences.

For the last quarter of the century neurobiology also has explored emotions [6, 11, 14]. Damasio studied brain damage cases and showed that when regions processing emotions are harmed then, even if cognitive abilities remain untouched, the results are problems in decision making and in impulsive disregardful interpersonal behavior.

Structurally, one can distinguish the following possible elements of emotions: pleasant or unpleasant feelings, physiological and neurological states, cognitive and/or appraisal dimensions, behavioral tendencies, facial expression. Emotions may not be reduced to merely one of these components, e.g. to physiological, motivational or cognitive one. All the elements have to be taken into account, elaborately described and explained, and interrelations between them have to be examined. Cognitive science seems to be well-suited for this purpose as an interdisciplinary domain (that includes such areas of research as cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, neurobiology, artificial intelligence, cognitive linguistics, and anthropology), and especially cognitive neuroscience and/or embodiment approach. On the other hand, cognitive neuroscience concerns emotions merely as far as they influence cognition. In recent time, many investigators have been focused on affective states only, as the result the affective neuroscience has arisen [2, 17].

The science of artificial intelligence also concerns emotions [1, 10, 15, 18]. If we want to design humanoid robots to be similar to humans and credible for them emotions have to be included. It is so, because emotions are necessary for intelligent behavior. Those investigations stemmed from the need to have a more adequate idea of artificial intelligence, artificial thinking (there are reasons to consider that real thinking is emotional, and emotions are cognitive and rational), and the need of a more accurate and effective decision making model.

If someone is really interested in affective states, before starting advanced interdisciplinary studies, first maybe they should be familiar with the long history of philosophical investigations concerning emotions. Many thinkers have dealt with these topics in many contexts, usually in moral, social or political, but also cognitive and esthetical one.

3. Philosophy of Emotions

This volume focuses on the philosophical studies of emotions. The philosophical tradition of research on emotions is long and the contribution to the understanding of the nature of emotions is large, rich and multiple. The first two articles give some insight into the history of the study of emotions. Andrzej Dąbrowski, in his paper, *Emotions in Philosophy – Past and Present Research*, begins with a short historical overview, from ancient to modern times. In the article, *Ancient Doctrines of Passions: Ethics, Poetics, Rhetoric*, Agnieszka Iskra-Paczkowska and Przemysław Paczkowski present Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of emotion. One could ask: why is the history of philosophy important to study? More generally speaking, there are at least three great reasons why the history of philosophy is important indeed. First of all, discovering the historical sources is intellectually exciting. Second, the history of philosophy helps us to better understand contemporary philosophical disputes and the genesis of contemporary scientific problems. Furthermore, it helps us to better understand the nature of human beings, contemporary society and culture.

Philosophical questions are the most fundamental and the most difficult to answer. Cezary Mordka's paper *What are Emotions?*, raises important questions about emotion: What is emotion as such? What is the structure of emotion? What functions do emotions? Many philosophers in the history of philosophy have regarded thinking and feeling (cognition and emotion) as distinct and have studied it in a strict isolation. In the last decade, many scientists have indicated close links and interactions between both items. Robert Zaborowski, in his paper *R. G. Collingwood's Views on the Feeling – Thought Relation and Their Relevance for Current Research*, reconstructs Collingwood's position on that dichotomy. It seems that the dichotomy is not as sharp as it is often taken to be. Collingwood nuances his position and Zaborowski makes a case for the interconnectedness of feelings and thought in Collingwood's passages he focuses on. Magdalena Michalik-Jeżowska, in her article *About the benefits of pleasure-in-others'-misfortune. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev's depiction of*

emotions as adaptive mechanisms, considers emotions of pleasure caused by someone's bad luck. She focuses especially on adaptive quality of pleasure-in-others'-aging.

People like to have a full control over their behavior and life, even in their emotional life. Formerly many scientists emphasized that emotions are passive and appear independent of us. Today we know that we can control emotions. We can control also their course and strength. In this context of the self-regulation, Anna Pietrzak and Aleksandra Tokarz, in their paper *Procrastination as a Form of Misregulation in Context of Affect and Self-regulation*, elaborate on role of emotionality in specific domain of self-control that is responsible for reaching important goals. Procrastination is brought in this paper as an example of self-regulatory lapse resulting from prioritising present affect over general well-being.

Dominika Dziurawiec, in her paper *'The Godfather': A Translator's and Writer's Subconscious and Conscious Skills in the Process of Evoking Reader's Emotions*, analyzes the influence of particular words on a reader. She investigates the possibility that a translator evokes emotions in a reader, by the means of translation only. She focuses on Italian words occurring in *The Godfather* by Mario Puzo. Next article is about love – this feeling always fascinated philosophers. In her contribution, *The Tectonics of Love in Leo Tolstoy's 'Resurrection'*, Anna Głąb examines Tolstoy's view of love using some de Sousa's distinctions. The last article entitled *Presumptions in Communication* is devoted to some conditions and presumptions in speech interaction and it is written by Andrei Moldovan.

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Emotions in Philosophy. A Short Introduction

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Abstract:

In recent decades, there has been a renewed attention to the emotions amongst scientists of different disciplines: psychology, psychiatry, neurobiology, cognitive science, computer science, sociology, economics, and many others. There are many research centers and scientific journals devoted to affective states already existing. However, studies of emotion have a very long history – especially in philosophy (anthropology, ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, and rhetoric). Philosophers first raised many important questions about emotions and their contribution to the discovery of the nature of emotions is very important. The aim of the article is the reconstruction of the views on emotions of particular thinkers in history of philosophy.

Keywords: passions, emotions, ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, modern philosophy.

1. Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

Directly and straight the problem of emotions was dealt with by Plato [50, 51, 52, 53; see also 14, 79] and Aristotle [2, 3, 4, 5; see also 14, 54]. They studied it within their anthropological theories, especially when the soul was concerned. Plato put forward the opposition of the immortal and rational soul and irrational body. All desires and emotions he localized in the body. He saw nothing positive in greed and passion, ‘because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it’ [50, 66b].

Later he offered a more elaborate division. In the *Republic* he divided human soul into three parts: reason, spirit and appetite, and treated them as three different subjects. The former seeks for knowledge and understanding, the second for immediate sensual satisfaction, and the latter helps the two others. Though Plato put stress on the difference between the rational and non-rational parts, he did not think that spirit and appetite were irrational. What is more, according to Knuuttila, he considered emotions a detailed kind of cognitive phenomena:

Plato treats its emotional responses as cognitive. As the seat of admiration, honour, and pride, it can help the rational soul in its striving to reach knowledge and to behave in accordance with the true vision of the nature of human beings and their place in the

universe. But in a disordered soul its passions nourish exaggerated aggression and vainglory [43, p. 8].

Emotions were important from the point of view of many philosophical disciplines pursued by Aristotle, especially in ethics, rhetoric and poetics. The basis of those considerations was his theory of man and soul. According to him, the soul was the unity of three parts: rational, sensual and vegetative. The rational part presupposed the activity of passive and active reason, and was responsible for rational cognition; on the other hand, the sensual part presupposed senses, emotions and imagination. A basic principle of his ethics was that the man sought for the highest purpose—happiness—with his whole soul. It means that emotions—as a part of it—had to be engaged in that pursuit. However, they belonged to the lower part of the soul, so they were subjected to the reason [see 3].

Aristotle claimed that emotions have a very important role in various forms of social life, attitude education, political debates, and seeking for happiness:

In his ethics and politics, Aristotle took it for granted that human beings are rational and social by nature and that a good human life involves developing human rational abilities and participating in various forms of social life (...). He thought that there is a great variety of emotions connected with social institutions and human practices, topics discussed in practical philosophy, and that it is worthwhile analyzing the cognitive content and motivating functions of emotions (...). Socially learned emotional paradigms played an important role in Aristotle's theory of moral education: its main question was how to train and instruct young people to join in the emotional patterns of culture in such a way that the habits of feelings and emotions contribute to a good life [43, p. 25].

Aristotle postulated that emotions were cognitive—they were based on beliefs and assessments. When a subject stood toward a situation, his emotions informed him about the meaning and value of the situation for his life. 'If someone smiles at you in a friendly way, and you feel warm to that person, it is because you evaluate the smile as a gesture of affection' [48, p. 42]. The human system of emotions was the map of our values. Additionally emotions were accompanied by pleasant or upsetting subjective experiences: 'Emotions are the things on account of which the ones altered differ with respect to their judgments, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain: such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries' [5, 1378a].

This was connected to another important property of emotions—they provoked the subject to act—they influenced our decisions and conduct. When physiological changes (often mentioned by Aristotle) were added to that characteristic you obtained a fourfold theory of emotions. It included four elements: (i) cognitive (assessing), (ii) sensational, (iii) behavioral, and (iv) physiological.

A detailed analysis of emotions can be found at Stoics [28]. The early ones preferred the cognitive approach, and maintained that emotions were assessments referring to the world, other people and oneself. However, Stoics treated them as basically inaccurate, as they were usually based on inadequate knowledge of the reality and/or erroneous opinions concerning oneself (Zeno of Citium). Some claimed a more radical thesis that actually emotions were judgments (Chrysippus) [see 27]. Whether emotions were judgments or were based on them, all Stoics believed that they were disturbances of soul and we should have eliminated them from life.

Stoics asked, how to achieve happiness in life. Their answer was simple: *living in accordance with nature*. Thus the ideal was to live according to the nature, and also it was the life of virtue, for the reason guaranteed the man not only to know the truth but also to know the good. The worst obstacles in rational life included desires and passions, for they governed people and also deceived them. According to Zeno, the passion is an unreasoning movement of the soul that is contrary to the nature. He maintained that there were four basic kinds of passion: sorrow, fear,

desire, and delight [see 24, VII, 111]. Many various emotions belonged to those four kinds. Nevertheless stoic *apatheia* did not mean entire lack of feelings. That was because, save violent and strong emotions, there were also good emotions (*eupatheiai*), and they were not against the reason. Joy, reasonable desire, sympathy or love are suitable there. Stoics were very much interested in them.¹

In Middle Ages, Christian thinkers were influenced by their religious doctrine, but on the other hand, they referred to previous theories of emotions, especially to Plato, Aristotle, and Stoics. When Saint Augustine held that there was a specific level of emotions in the soul, he alluded Plato. In his opinion the soul felt emotions through the body. That resulted with the thesis that beings having no body—as God or angels—did not experience emotions. On the other hand, Augustine made many valuable remarks. For instance, as one of the first he put forward the problem of emotional memory. He discusses memories of emotions: ‘The same memory contains also the affections of my mind, not in the same manner that my mind itself contains them, when it feels them; but far otherwise, according to a power of its own’ [7, 10.14.21]. An interesting answer to that question has been given only by modern cognitive psychology; a particular emotional memory subsystem in the brain has been indicated.

The Augustine’s theory was referred to by Thomas Aquinas. He distinguished the cognitive and the passion sphere (underlining their close relationship). He divided the latter into volitional and sensual ones. Emotions belonged to the sensual passion sphere. The cognitive meant directing to an object, and the passion relied on active movement. An emotion was a kind of desire or movement. Movements were caused by sensual data. An emotion was an act of receiving the content from senses (external or internal) connected with becoming aware that it was pleasant or upsetting, useful or harmful. For emotions were to a degree in the body, Thomas took into account the aspect of physiological changes. As Peter King notices:

Aquinas’s theory of the emotions (*passions animae*) is cognitivist, somatic, and taxonomical: cognitivist because he holds that cognition is essential to emotion; somatic because he holds that their physiological manifestations are partially constitutive of emotions; taxonomical because he holds that emotions fall into distinct natural kinds which are hierarchically ordered [41, p. 209].

Medieval analyses of emotions were often a part of consideration concerning internal experience and formation based on Christian spirituality. Many important questions were raised in connection with mental faculties (especially the will) and logical competence. An impulse was given by early-medieval Latin translations of philosophical and medical works. Besides Augustine and Thomas, emotions were dealt with by Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham [43, pp. 177-286].

2. Emotions in Early Modern Philosophy

In the modern era, emotions were pondered on mainly in the junction area of epistemology and metaphysics (analysis of the human mind) and also of ethics and axiology (the problem of having any contact with the sphere of values). In that manner emotions were considered by Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Spinoza, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Kant and many others [see 1; 21]. Below I will refer only to a few of them.

Both Descartes and Spinoza were rationalists but their ontological positions and views about emotions were different. The former maintained that emotions are bodily appearances, though they are closely connected to the soul. The latter held that they are purely cognitive phenomena, i.e. thoughts. On the other hand, studying in detail their theories does not seem to be so far one from another. Descartes defined emotions-passions ambiguously as perceptions, impressions or affections caused, maintained and amplified by some movement of animal spirits (Latin *spiritus animales*, French *esprits animaux*) that had place in the brain, and they were able to wander

throughout whole the body by nerves. Here is the relevant passage: ‘the perceptions, sensations, or commotions of the soul which we relate particularly to the soul and are caused, maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits’ [22, art. 27].

Since Descartes stressed the bodily aspect of emotions, one can say that his theory anticipated modern neurophysiological theories. On the other hand, since this definition relied on the view that passion was perception (so it was a mental state), the theory should be treated as a variant of the cognitive approach. From the point of view of Descartes’ ontological dualism of substance, there is no doubt that passions and any feelings belonged to the mental substance. Some readers maintain that the identity of a passion was fixed by its sources, and, firstly, they appeared in the body, especially in the brain [see 55]. Finally it is probable that emotions went on in the borderland between the body and the mind: ‘Descartes has attempted to create a hybrid psychology, giving space both to immaterial and to material aspects of the ‘mechanism’ of cognition and emotion’ [36, p. 68].

Additionally it is worth to mentioning the functional aspect of Descartes’ theory. The aim of passions was to prevail on the soul that it needed what they made the body ready for: to run away in fear, to fight in courage. According to Descartes simple and basic passions were only six: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness. Any good and evil in our live depended on them, mostly.

Spinoza held that our cognitive states and emotions belonged to the same kind of mental states (that is why he is often found a continuator of stoic tradition). What is important, he formed his philosophical approach in opposition to Descartes. He regarded him and criticized in the same time; he claimed that Descartes’ theories were full of inexactnesses and errors. In his opinion they had little to contribute to science about affections:

I know, of course, that the famous Descartes, although he too believed that the mind has absolute power over its own actions, nevertheless sought to explain human affects through their first causes, while also showing how a mind can have absolute dominion over its affects. But in my opinion, he showed nothing but the cleverness of his intellect, as I shall show in the proper place [66, Preface to Part III].

First of all, Spinoza did not accept Descartes’ idea of the body and soul dualism. In his opinion there was only one living nature (substance, God), and it was full of movements, and the body and the soul were its integral parts. The mind came out of the substance equally as the body did. What happened to the mind, happened to the body, and what happened to the body, happened to the mind.² According to Damasio, Spinoza ‘...suggested that the body shapes the mind’s contents more so than the mind shapes the body’s, although mind processes are mirrored in body processes to a considerable extent’ [17, p. 217]. Nevertheless, shortly after he notices that ‘On the other hand, the ideas in the mind can double up on each other, something that bodies cannot do’ [17, 217].

As an affect Spinoza meant a movement of the body:

D3: By ‘affect’ I understand states of a body by which its power of acting is increased or lessened, helped or hindered, and also the ideas of these states. Thus, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these states, the affect in question is what I call an ‘action’; otherwise it is a ‘passion’ [66, III, 3].

According to Spinoza, affections were passive or active, and only the latter ones express our true nature, increase the experience of consciousness, control and activity. Passive affections had the power over the subject, and he had no control over them. Active ones stimulated the subject to act. Further, affects were able to appear gradually or suddenly. They might have been strong or weak (so they were gradable). Active ones were able to inspire broadly various activities: ‘Different men can be affected differently by one object; and one man can be affected differently at different times by one object’ [66, III, P51, p. 70]. In the realm of affections, there were no simple and easy mechanisms to predict effects or reactions.

Spinoza enumerated a long list of definitions of various emotions. Most of them he added a comment. Here are the first ten ones:

1. Desire is a man's essence, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given state of it, to do something.
2. Pleasure is a man's passing from a lesser perfection to a greater.
3. Unpleasure is a man's passing from a greater perfection to a lesser.
4. Wonder is an imagining of a thing in which the mind remains fixed because this particular imagining has no connection with any others.
5. Disdain is an imagining of a thing that makes so little impact on the mind that its presence moves the mind to imagining what is not in it more than what is.
6. Love is a pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
7. Hate is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Explanation: The things to be noted here can easily be seen from what I have just said in explaining 'love'.
8. Inclination is pleasure accompanied by the idea of a thing that is the accidental cause of the pleasure.
9. Aversion is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of something that is the accidental cause of the unpleasure.
10. Devotion is a love of someone whom we wonder at [66, III, p. 76-78].

I have already mentioned the strong similarity of Spinoza's and Stoic thought. Both believed that men were a part of nature and that we were governed by the system of the world as all the other units. Stoics maintained that our nature was a part of the nature of the universe, whereas Spinoza claimed that it was not possible that man was not a part of nature. Free will, in the meaning of choice between two available options, was determined by causal chains. Stoics believed that the free will of a man was limited, and first of all it relied on knowing the reality. Freedom meant also to cast out emotions, appetites, and desires. Decidedly emotions did not give freedom or happiness to a man. According to Spinoza, the will was not a free but necessary cause. Human activity was directed also by emotions but Spinoza (contrary to Stoics) did not see anything wrong in it. The challenge for a man was to know and accept the nature of things, his own emotionality included. To liberate meant to understand the source and nature of emotions and accept them.

What Kant did for theoretical and practical philosophy was groundbreaking, but not so much in the area of emotions. They were quite far from his main interest. He did not develop any coherent theory of them. Instead he echoed numerous negative views concerning emotions, that is, that they were impetuous, obsessive, antisocial, selfish, and even evil. On the other hand, he made many important and positive remarks about emotions, and the conclusion was that you should not have them ignored, especially in moral life (these remarks are limited to the 'critical' period; are not concern to later works, e.g. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*).

It is known that Kant's ethics was rationalistic, formalistic, and universalistic. The former feature—I will talk about the rationalism only here—relied on that any moral action had to be based on reason and duty. That was a view different from for example emotivism (that ascribed the basic role to emotions). When studied in detail it occurs that Kant did not ignore emotions and feelings, but reversely, he thought that a man should have been open and sensitive to the affective sphere (*Gefühl, Affekt, and Rührung*). You can find the affirmation of that sphere in later Kant's works, especially in his *Critique of Judgement*. Generally according to Kant emotions and feelings helped us to recognize our moral duties toward oneself and especially toward others. 'Without a sensitivity to moral feeling, we are likely to ignore the moral dimension of our lives entirely' [74, p. 9].

Shaftesbury was interested—as many other English philosophers of the 18th century—in the essence of the moral experience. In his opinion the source and the basis of morals lay in human nature, and that was composed of psychic powers mainly. Among them, Shaftesbury distinguished the moral sense—the feeling of righteousness—as a discrete psychic ability. The sense allowed to differ good from evil, and feelings were important in that. He claimed that there were three kinds of

feelings. First, there were natural feelings leading to do other people good, sympathy belonged to them. The second were natural egoistic feelings, and the third—unnatural ones, as for example pleasure of unhappiness (i.e. malice, jealousy). The harmony between feelings of the first and the second kind was the virtue, and bad was to indulge in feelings of the third kind. Egoistic feelings were not the source of evil themselves. The bad was to disturb the harmony. Shaftesbury's moral sense was mainly of emotional character; however, it was connected with reason too. In that idea Shaftesbury combined in a detailed way the intellectual intuition and the moral experience. He influenced Francis Hutcheson, and by that way David Hume and Adam Smith. Shortly about Hume is then.

Hume's studies over emotions (more strictly 'passions') were a part of his investigations concerning human nature. He strived to explain the raise and development of feelings by a few simple principles, the principle of association included. Additionally he used a few categories, as cause, object, and first-person subject (ego). Unlike Descartes he treated feelings as mental *par excellence*; started his considerations with a few divisions.

According to Hume, all perceptions were divided into impressions and ideas. Further, impressions were divided into sensual and reflexive. The former arose in mind without any previous perceptions, by things acting upon external organs. Reflexive impressions came out of the former ones or of our ideas. Generally pleasures and annoyances of the body, desires, passions, feelings and emotions belonged to them (at Hume's the term 'emotion' meant a movement and referred to everything that caused a change). Reflexive impressions were divided into two kinds: gentle and violent. The first kind includes the feeling of beauty and ugliness in actions, external objects, and art; the second includes love, hate, sadness, joy, pride, and humility. He underlined that division was far from precision.

Besides, Hume divided feelings into direct and indirect. The former resulted from experiences of pleasure or pain. Such emotions like hunger, thirst, desire, and also disgust, sadness, hope, fear, and despair belonged here. The latter were more compound and arose upon connections between impressions and ideas, and strictly upon the double relation between them. Indirect feelings were: pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hate, jealousy, mercy, malice, nobility, and other connected to those.

There is a well-known (and difficult to interpret) Hume's saying: 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them' (38, p. 415). That view puts Hume in opposition to strong rationalism (in theory of action) claiming that the reason directs the activity, even if sometimes it has to collaborate with the will, and it is the reason who establishes goals and schedules means to obtain them, permanently monitors the activity and assesses the results. Instead, according to Hume, the superior and directorial function in activity was assigned not to reason but to emotions and desires, since the reason was—as Hume comprehended that—passive and powerless toward the activity sphere. His concept of reason was very narrow. As reason he meant the tool that enabled correct reasoning, and the power to tell truth from false. Partly—as I think—it explains why Hume thought the reason was a slave.

3. Emotions in Modern Philosophy

The variety of problems that philosophers deal with is widely vast. The basic questions are: what are emotions? Do they comprise a natural kind? What are the differences between them and impressions, sensations, affections, feelings, moods etc.? Are there any specific moral and/or aesthetic emotions? What is the role that the body, the brain, the mind, the external environment, the society and the culture play in emotional formation? What is the influence of emotions upon cognitive processes (attention, perception, memory, imagination, thinking)? What is their relation to consciousness (and to unconscious processes and states)? Are they intentional? Are they represented in the mind and in what way? Are they rational? (And if so, in what meaning?) What is the essence of their motivational function (emotions and activity)? What emotions are for—what

are their functions? What is their role in morality? What is their role in creating and receiving a piece of art?

Instead of presenting problems connected with emotions, even a very brief one, next I offer a short characteristic of three kinds of a theory and research concerning emotions: phenomenological, cognitive, and physiological.

Phenomenology. The development of phenomenology was strongly influenced by Franz Brentano. His studies were focused on psychic and moral life of a man. He distinguished three basic kinds of psychic phenomena: presentations, judgments, and emotions. In his opinion, all they were intentional, that is, directed to an object. Their character was mental, intentional, and also cognitive—moral knowledge stemmed from the emotional sphere of man (later the idea was taken up also by Max Scheler). One of Brentano's pupils, Edmund Husserl also analyzed emotional phenomena, though they were not the main his focus. M. Scheler, E. Stein, M. Heidegger and J. P. Sartre concentrated on emotions more than others [see 35].

According to Scheler, people were not rational but rather emotional beings. Emotions accompanied a man from his birth to his death and appeared in every layer of his existence, first of all in his axiological and moral life. He believed that ethics should have been based on the internal experience of reality, and that was not only objects but values too. It was not possible to reduce values to anything more basic, e.g. something material. Emotions helped to know values—we grasped them directly in emotional experiences. In sensations their specific content and worthiness was revealed. Moreover, Scheler was interested in stratification of emotional experiences. He distinguished sensual, vital, psychic, and spiritual emotional states. The most important was his distinction between emotional states (*Gefühlzustand*) and feeling something (*Fühlen von Etwas*): (1) feeling one's own body, (2) feeling one's own experiences, mental states, (3) feeling values. Besides he differentiated two kinds of intentional acts: (1) acts of prioritizing or shutting out values and (2) acts of love or hate. The latter were fundamental axiological experiences [see 61, pp. 32-344].

In her thesis *On the Problem of Empathy*, Stein focused on the titular problem of feeling-in (*Einfühlung*) and emotions. The latter were the result of mutual interaction between two basic elements: somatic and psychic. In reference to the body Stein observed that it was constitutive in two ways: as the experiencing living body (*Leib*) and as an externally perceived physical body (*Körper*). A body was my own body if I received it through impressions (of warm, pain, light etc.). In a living body, there were plenty of impressional areas. Those impressions delivered information about the world that surrounded us. They comprised the foundation for a kind of feelings (anxiety, joy, sadness). According to Stein there were also feelings—psychic feeling—that were not connected to the body, but came from somewhere in the depth of the subjective ego. The most important in that approach was that some energy was inscribed in emotions and it caused an expression or an action. A feeling, according to its pure nature, is not closed in itself: but it is as if full of energy that has to be discharged. That discharge may go on in different ways 'Feeling in its pure essence is not something complete in itself. As it were, it is loaded with an energy which must be unloaded' [68, p. 51].

Sartre's concept of emotion was a part of his philosophy of consciousness. According to him, consciousness was experienced in the body (it was characterized by corporality—it existed only, if it was embodied), and in time (it was characterized by temporality—it existed only, if it went on in time). The emotional consciousness was the pre-reflective consciousness of the world. That was one of the ways to experience the world, and more, it was 'transformation of the world' [60].

Heidegger studied emotions and moods within his ontology. He distinguished beings (things) of the world from human existence. The latter stood toward them and toward the mysterious Sein. Human being was experiencing and opened to the world. Moods (care, fear) connected a man with the being encountered in the world and determined its ways of existence [see 35].

Typical feature of phenomenological (and similar) analyses was to refer the idea of pre-theoretical experience.

The cognitive perspective. Cognitive theories, proposed by E. Bedford, J. Marks, W. Lyons, M. Nussbaum, R. Solomon and many others, explain emotions by thoughts, beliefs or judgments. There have been plenty of philosophical arguments presented to defend that approach. Some researchers claim that the simple argument is that we use rational-cognitive vocabulary in emotion assessment: ‘rational’, ‘justified’, ‘legitimate’, ‘sensible’, ‘adequate’ etc. Supporters of cognitive theories assume—though it is not always fully intended—that emotions require concepts and beliefs, and also more or less clearly the somatic and the cognitive spheres are distinguished. The latter is located somewhere above changes in the body. Those changes are not relevant to emotion arising. Proponents of various cognitive theories underline such properties of emotions as: intentionality, cognitive character, conceptualization, dependence on thoughts, beliefs or judgments, ability to event assessment.

A variant of cognitive approach is the theory by W. Lyons [see 44]. The author of *Emotion* presented it in the context of criticizing classic theories: affectional, behavioral, psychoanalytical, and different cognitive ones. In his opinion, all positions that omitted the cognitive component were false, for emotions to a degree were based on beliefs and knowledge. However, you could not have them reduced to the cognitive element—such answers were wrong. Exploiting some results by E. Bedford, A. Kenny and L. Wittgenstein, Lyons offered his own causal-evaluative concept of emotions. He strived to reconcile physiological approach with a cognitive theory where evaluation had an important role. He maintained that emotions arose when physiological changes were caused by evaluative activity. The evaluation was not an objective cold assessment but a subjective one. He took into account the affectional and behavioral aspects, too.

The next (strong) variant of cognitive theory is—favored by analytic philosophy—propositional approach (actually it was at Stoics already). The idea to treat mental phenomena as propositional attitudes came out of formal language analyses offered by B. Russell. Propositional attitudes are internal intentional states of a subject—simple thoughts as beliefs, desires, feelings, expressed in language by the subject: ‘*P* claims that *x*,’ ‘*P* fears that *y*,’ ‘*P* loves *z*’ etc. In every such a sentence you can distinguish a verb, connective ‘that,’ and a sentence having the content *x*. When they apply that approach to emotions they assume that emotional attitudes are intentionally directed to an object. And also it is assumed that the subject possesses a language and some cognitive-conceptual structures. If ‘*S* fears that a dog bites him’ then it is necessary that *S* possesses the concept of a dog as a living being with teeth, and that in some situations that animal may attack a man. If ‘*P* loves *Z*’ then *P* has to be convinced that *Z* is beautiful, sensitive and intelligent or that she has some other features that attract him. In that theory emotions are treated as an element of rational thinking (cognition), and basic compounds of that are concepts and beliefs.³

The physiological-somatic perspective. Commonsense forces us to assume that when one perceives some objects or situations then it stimulates his emotional states and that those states evoke changes in the body. Contrary to this, James’ physiological theory claimed that somatic changes were the immediate result of the fact causing the stimulus and that an emotion was when one felt those changes when they appeared [see 39].

Contemporarily, Jesse Prinz declaims against cognitive theories and stands for the physiological-somatic approach [see 55]. From his point of view, emotions are closely connected to changes in the body—they are automatic embodied assessments, and they carry out the evaluation upon the delivered information: ‘Emotions are gut reactions; they use our bodies to tell us how we are faring in the world’ [55, p. 69]. An important element of his theory is a kind of perception—perceiving somatic changes. Emotions are perceptions and representations—they represent core relational themes. Let me give some more details about his theory.

The word ‘embodied’ signalizes a close correlation with the body, and even more—the genesis of emotions. According to Prinz, bodily changes evoke emotional states. Emotions are perceptions of stimulated states of the body (somatic changes) that are expressed in assessments. To assess *X* means to grasp *X* as a form of representation. Therefore, if emotions are evaluations, they

have to be representations. However, they do not represent usual objects or events. Next to common and particular objects, Prinz assumes formal ones, and they are what is represented. A formal object is a property by which an object or an event triggers emotions. For example, the death of a child may be the cause of one's sadness. That death is a particular object (an objective fact), and in the same time, for it is the reason of one's sadness, that is a formal object of the sadness. It means that a state of mind (sadness after a child's death) has two kinds of object: (1) a particular object (a child's death) and (2) a formal one (loss of a child). The sadness represents the loss—elimination of something precious. Emotions represent relative properties. Prinz calls them core relational themes. The core relational themes of sadness are the loss, fear (or fright) is about danger. He took that expression from Lazarus, though he did not agree with him that core relational themes corresponded with assessments in the head. They were something external, and they did not comprise an internal structure of emotions or any mental states [see 55, p. 65].

In the conclusion of the third chapter, Prinz wrote: To qualify as an appraisal, a state must represent an organism-environment relation that bears on well-being. On the view I have been defending, emotions qualify as appraisals in this strict sense. They represent core relational themes.

I have also argued that emotions monitor our bodily states. Emotions represent changes in organism-environment relations by tracking changes in the body. They appraise by registering patterned physiological responses. This, I said, marks a major reconciliation. The tradition that associates emotions with appraisals is generally presumed to be at odds with the tradition that identifies emotions with changes in physiology. I am suggesting that this division is spurious. Emotions are states that appraise by registering bodily changes. I call this the embodied appraisal theory. Loosely speaking, palpitations serve as evaluations. Theodore Roethke said: 'We think by feeling.' Or one might say, heading the lessons of chapter 2, we feel instead of thinking. Feelings can obviate the need for cognition, because feelings carry information. The discrete motions of our bodies convey how we are faring in the world [55, pp. 77-78].

Today philosophers that systematically study the nature of emotions are A. Ben-Ze'ev, M. Brady, J. Deigh, C. DeLancey, J. Deonna, R. de Sousa, P. Greenspan, P. Goldie, R. Gordon, P. Griffiths, B. Helm, W. Lyons, K. Mulligan, M. Nussbaum, K. Oatley, J. Prinz, Roberts, A. Rorty, M. Salmela, M. Stocker, Ch. Tappolet, F. Teroni, R. Wollheim.

Many of them offer more or less sophisticated theories. One of the most elaborate is the Roberts' one. In his approach, emotions are kind of synthetic constructions, and he calls them 'construals.' It is not easy to explain what they are. Mostly by their immediateness they are similar to sensual perceptions—kind of impressions. However, they are not impressions purely sensual, as an impression caused by light falling at retina, for they possess intellectual-conceptual aspect, too. In his characteristic, Roberts enumerates many properties of construals. Here are some of them:

1. Construals have an immediacy reminiscent of sense perception. They are impressions, ways things appear to the subject; they are experiences and not just judgments or thoughts or beliefs [...].
2. Though they are impressions, they are not, or not merely, sense impressions, that is, impressions of the sort produced by light hitting the retina, air vibrations exciting the ear drum, and so on.
3. They involve an "in terms of" relationship: one thing is perceived in terms of something else. Construals are "constructive," "synthetic," and "organic," bringing together a variety of elements in some kind of integration.
4. They are "subjective," that is, highly dependent on special qualifications of the subject; but some of them can be true or false.
5. They admit of a focus on one or two of the elements, with the rest of the construct in the "background," and the focus can be quite shifty, producing kaleidoscopic variations on a construal.
6. Opposed construals of something tend to exclude each other, but for an adept it is sometimes possible to engage two opposite construals at the same time.

7. They need not be states of consciousness.
8. They often, but not always, have an “emotional” character, and the difference between the two kinds of cases is made by the presence of concerns, personal interests, and attachments of the subject for (to) something in the construed situation.
9. They come in degrees of depth of impression or impact of strikingness.
10. They come in varieties of interplay of mental event types.
11. They are sometimes subject to voluntary control, and they sometimes are not.
12. The language of construal or seeing-as is not native to the experience except in special cases where the experience is taken to be optional or not to bear on truth, or the speaker is denying, doubting, or analyzing the experience [56, pp. 75-76].

This overview—it has to be cursory—reveals that philosophical research concerning emotions has been conducted in various contexts and included many questions of different kinds. More details you can find in literature of the subject [contemporarily quite wide already, e.g. 21; 30; 58]. Some problems have been solved, some—eliminated as pseudoproblems, and some wait to be sorted out. Those philosophical analyses are not pointless. They are important not only for the development of philosophy itself—theoretical (as epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of science), and practical one (as ethics, axiology, social and political philosophy)—but also for other disciplines of science. Finally they are also important from practical point of view—they influence economic, social and political life, and also culture and civilization.

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Notes

1. Sensations (and the accompanying physiological changes), that were connected with emotions, were treated as movements preceding emotions. The concept was used in later stoic theory of first movements (*primus motus*) or pre-emotions (*propathēia*, Latin *antepassio* or *propassio*).
2. Of course as usual there are many various interpretations of the relation between body and mind and *vice versa* in that theory.
3. P. Griffiths criticized the propositional attitude theory: 'In this book, I reject propositional attitude theories in two ways. First, I reject them on a substantive level. I show in chapter 2 that all major variants of the program face substantial objections and that the research program as a whole has a range of standing problems on which it has made little progress. Second, and more important, I reject them methodologically. The adherents of propositional attitude theories have relied almost entirely on conceptual analysis to derive their account of emotion. I suggest that these epistemological foundations will no longer bear the weight' [30, p. 2].

Ancient Doctrines of Passions: Plato and Aristotle

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Abstract:

The subject of this essay is a discussion of the doctrines of emotions of Plato and Aristotle. According to both them it is impossible to oust the passions from the good, i.e. happy life. On the contrary, emotions are an important component of human excellence. We investigate this question with reference to Plato's doctrine of the soul and his concept of a perfect life, and Aristotle's ethics, poetics and rhetoric.

Keywords: ancient philosophy, passions, ethics, rhetoric, poetics.

1. Foreword

According to popular opinion, Greek philosophers have evaluated negative emotions as a source of moral evil and a factor increasing the affliction of man [for example: 22 – *sub voce* 'passion' (*pathe*)]. This, however, is true mainly with regard to the Stoics, who proclaimed the ideal of *apatheia*—the absolute ousting of emotions from the spiritual life of man. Plato and Aristotle had declared a different view on this issue: not only did they believe that it was impossible to eradicate the passions from the human life, but they also perceived (and analyzed) the role played by emotions in the good (i.e. happy) life. Their ideas are the subject of this article. We will try first to reconstruct the conception of emotions which occurs in the Platonic doctrine of the soul, and then that which is characteristic for Aristotelian ethics, poetics and rhetoric.

2. Emotions in the Platonic Doctrine of the Soul

In Plato's dialogue *Phaedo* (94 d-e) [17] Socrates evokes a passage from *The Odyssey* (XII, 18-19) [12] describing the inner conflict of Ulysses: "but he smote his breast in self-rebuke, saying: 'Be patient, heart. You stood in grimmer trial'".

This Homeric dialogue appears in the *Phaedo* in the context of the discussion on the nature of the soul and its relation to the body. Lust, anger and fear are treated there as the *passions of the body* our soul is able to tame, and which we can control when we employ the art of medicine or gymnastics. But in the *Republic* (441 b-c) [20] the very same passage serves as an illustration of the inner conflict of the soul between its two parts: the rational and irrational [10]. We could say therefore that the doctrine of emotions has evolved in Greek philosophy. But we must emphasize that Greek philosophers have always treated emotions as important categories, without which it is impossible to understand fully the nature of man or explain human activity. Thus the doctrine of emotions has become an important element of ancient psychology,¹ ethics, the detailed theory of motivation and something that Greeks called *psychagoge*, and the meaning of which was the art (*techne*) of acting on the soul (of listener, viewer, reader).

The doctrines of emotions to be found in Plato and Aristotle include many issues also tackled by modern scholars—from the question of the material substrate of consciousness to the analysis of the motivation of human actions. However, these issues were explored from a different perspective than today and the purpose of these studies was different: it is impossible to ignore the metaphysical foundations of ancient psychology, just as we cannot overlook the ethical intention of any ancient theory of action. The psychology of Plato and Aristotle is not the science of the nature of consciousness but of the nature of the soul—its relation to the body and the function it fulfils. Their theories of emotions are a consequence of prior metaphysical settlements, but that means that Plato and Aristotle do answer the question about the material substrate of mental states. Plato, who considered *psuche* as distinct from the body, ultimately assigned feelings and passions (such as lust, anger, courage) only to the soul, namely to its lower parts: appetite and passion. Whereas Aristotle, who defined the soul as an act of the body, not as a distinct substance, ascribes to the theory that affects can be described in two distinct ways: as an action of the soul or movement of the body. “Dialectically” defined, anger is a lust for revenge, while “materially” —it is ebullition of the blood (*De an.* 403 a30-b1) [2]. According to Aristotle, metaphysical categories of potentiality and actuality entirely explain the relationship between the material substrate of mental states and their manifestations; that is between the physical and mental events (some authors claim even that he did it in a more sophisticated way than modern theories [11]). To every action of the soul corresponds some physical organ which enables this action, the only exception is the *nous*, the highest type of mental cognition, who has no physical organ.²

The evolution of philosophical views on emotions was closely connected with the debate over intellectualism, which took place in the fourth century B.C. Plato’s dialogues *Protagoras* and *The Republic* and Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* were the main stages of this debate. In *Protagoras* (357e ff.) [19] Socrates argues in favor of the thesis, which ancient Greeks found to be equally paradoxical as modern readers do today, that all human action aimed at some end are: a/ conscious, b/ intended to achieve the good. Desire for the good (good for us equates to happiness) is an irremovable part of our nature, so we do ill unconsciously. The paradox lies in the thesis that all wrong-doings—such as the crimes of the tyrant Archelaus described in *Gorgias* (471 a-d) [16] do not arise from the desire for the wrong, and the compliance with harmful passions is not a result of weakness of will or immediate lack of self-control, but it results from the intellectual error in appreciation of what is good. Our desires and passions, according to Socrates, always include some conscious component, they are associated with some conviction, and they can be consequently judged as true or false – such is also true of perceptions. In the case of visual illusion I may *know* that object A is smaller than B, but because A is closer to me, I *see* it as a bigger. What I know and what I see stand in contradiction. Passion—according to the theory presented in *Protagora*—also includes an opinion on the desired subject, independent of rational knowledge and opened to perspective’s misconception: closer pleasure appears as bigger and we have for it a stronger desire, even though we know that it is smaller than other pleasures which are deferred [15].

As we have seen, in *Protagoras* the yielding to passions (affects, emotions) was interpreted as a cognitive error. In *The Republic*, in turn, Plato is trying to present an ethical intellectualism in less paradoxical form—as explaining psychical conflicts rather than negating them. The anecdote

about Leontius (439 b), who feels simultaneously a desire and disgust against the same thing, is a starting point and a premise for the thesis of separate parts of the soul, each of which fosters its own kind of passion.³ *Akrasia*, therefore, is interpreted in the primary sense as a conflict of different desires. This conception of soul does not, however, reject intellectualism, because conflict of desires is ultimately resolved in the intellect. Plato distinguishes the rational and the irrational part of the soul. Desire of the first he calls Eros,⁴ and desire of the other—*epithumia* (*Republic* 580d ff.). They differ by their objects: Eros is a love for good, and *epithumia* is a desire for actual things, unconnected with evaluating them as good. *Akrasia* is a situation in which a desire (in the instance of Leontius it is his desire to look upon the dead bodies) wins a battle with Eros (a reasonable belief that this view is not good for him). But how is this possible? Only when lust will persuade reason to suffer, that is: to appreciate the object of lust as its own—as the good. Ultimately, *akrasia* is a cognitive error, a mistake of reason.

It is true that Plato yet distinguished a third part of the soul—*thumos*, but some scholars say, that the only justification for this step was his intention to be consistent in the analogy between the soul and the state [for example: 15]. *Thumos* always takes the side of reason in conflict with lust, so it is considered as a rational part of the soul, and its desire (*boulesis*)—as an element of the characteristics of Eros.

Desires of the soul are certain *passions*. Plato assumes that there are passions that help a man to achieve the Good and there are the others that prevent him from doing so. Speaking strictly: *only* with Eros, the passion which had been defined in the *Symposium* as a divine element in our soul, can a man achieve the Good; that is, he can realize his true nature. Also, all other passions and desires are not essential obstacles in this task⁵. They can be obstacles only when they succeed in attracting Eros, when, for example, a desire for sensual pleasures or material goods develops into a love of these things. But if Eros does not mistake its proper object (i.e. the Good) with objects of the other desires, these desires can provide access to and be a way to achieve the real Good—Plato describes this way in the *Symposium* [21]. One should estimate, therefore, that there is nothing more distant from the Plato's concept of the perfect life than the Stoic ideal of *apatheia*. A correctly felt passion—the love for the Good (*philosophia*)—defines the excellence of a man.

3. Aristotle's Ethics

In Aristotelian ethics, Plato's conception of emotions has developed into the theory of proper action, founded on psychology and logic.⁶ The practical end of ethics is to form in a man such dispositions and traits of character that enable him to conduct himself in order to attain *eudaimonia*—a happiness in a sense of success [13]. Right dispositions are virtues, wrong ones are vices. For Aristotle a virtue is a disposition to right acting and being properly affected—*praxeis kai pathe*—the second word can be understood as feelings, passions and affects (*NE* Book II) [5]. *Pathe* comes from *paschein*, the word which originally meant a misfortune decree of fate. Aristotle mentions as instances of *pathe* fear, anger, desire, pleasure, pain—however, in the sense of experiencing these feelings. Actions and feelings (*poiein - paschein*; in general: doing and being done, *Categories* 9. 11 b1 ff) [1] are different modes of human existence, in the same sense they are different modes of the Being or of the pronouncement of the Being. So ethics is a practical science of how to act properly and how to feel properly, and because feelings are a domain in which there can be an “excess”, a “deficiency”, and the “right measure”, the practical end of ethics is to train a habit for proper emotional responses. Ethics eventually turns out to be a sentimental education, and this remained its characteristic until the end of antiquity [14].

Moral virtue is a proper emotional response to external circumstances. The virtuous man has control over the irrational part of his soul—over his anger, fear, love, lust, jealousy, ambition, envy, hatred, pity, i.e. he feels emotions in the right way and for the right reasons. It is not an incidental control over them, or restraint which comes from the ability that Socrates had called *enkrateia*, but it is a habit of proper response, backed up by lengthy training. In the purely external, i.e. behavioral, aspect, there is, to be sure, no difference between a self-controlled man and virtuous one—both

have the ability to proper action. But only a virtuous man has the ability to proper feeling and only he can derive pleasure from good activities (*NE* 1104 b23) [24]. Hence, virtuous man is not one who acts good, but someone whose proper conduct is the result of his good character [14]. Virtuous man is distinguished by the lack of that internal conflict between the rational and the irrational part of the soul, which was mentioned at the beginning of this article. His choices are characterized by consistency in the aim for good and they are not accompanied by a suppressed desire for something different.⁷ The self-controlled man, on the other hand, though he also makes good choices, must conquer a desire of the lustful part of his soul. The relationship between desires and rational choices, and the pleasure choices give, are the premise for the classification of states of character in the *Nicomachean Ethics* : (1) heroic excellence; (2) ordinary excellence; (3) *enkrateia*; (4) *akrasia*; (5) badness of character; (6) brutishness (*NE* 7.1) [24].

The state of character is nothing else than the way in which we experience emotions. The vice (5) is a condition in which emotions are felt improperly—too much or too little. Vice is pushing us to wrong actions, but it is not accompanied by a consciousness of evil or by compunction. *Akrasia*, a moral weakness (4), is less bad than the vice, because the vehement man, feeling wrong emotions and acting badly, knows he is not acting properly, and suffers as a consequence. *Enkrateia* (3) is the condition of the soul in which one can act properly in spite of all his improperly felt emotions—the rational part of his soul controls the irrational. Virtue (2), as the opposite of the vice, means the proper feeling of emotions, and good choices, accompanied by pleasure. There are also, according to Aristotle, the extreme states: the highest excellence (1), God’s likeness (*NE* 1145 a15; *Pol.* 1284 a3 [6]), and the worst defect (6), which makes the human an animal.

Many times in this text we have invoked the Aristotelian phrase “properly felt emotions” and we have asserted that, according to Aristotle, ethics teaches the proper feeling of emotions. What does this mean? Aristotle believes that virtue, the excellence of the soul, is an internal disposition to feel emotions in the right way—neither too much, nor too little. “Too much” ought to be understood as “too often”, “too violently”, “in inappropriate situations”, etc. Because there are a great range of emotions (fear, anger, pity, envy, lust, etc.), and for *each* there are a state of “excess”, “deficiency”, and “right measure”, there are also many different virtues and—at least—twice as many vices (in respect of each emotion—one defect is “too much” of this emotion, the other is “not enough”). It seems at the same time (although some statements of Aristotle apparently contradict this),⁸ that there are no emotions one should not feel in any way, that is, for which there is no right measure [24]. In his statement of the multitude of virtues, however, Aristotle has not diverted far from the views of Socrates and Plato (who proclaim the unity of virtues), because he believed that a man who has a virtue to the full degree (understanding virtue as supported by *phronesis*), also has all the others (*NE* 1110 b18).

Because there is only one right measure in the affections, and wrong are many, it is extremely difficult to be a virtuous man; it is possible to be a defective man in many ways, a good man—only in one (*NE* 1106 b29). We ought to point out, however, that the right measure is not a practical guide for moral conduct in specific situations, it has also nothing to do with the mean in the purely mathematical sense. The right measure defines a virtue: virtue is a disposition (*hexis*) to refer to the passions properly. Properly to the person, not to the object: there is, for example, no proper measure in eating cheese (cheese was, in ancient Greece, the primary component of the diet of the Olympians), there is, in contrast, the proper measure for each particular player (*NE* 1106 b1). And in his case this measure is the same as the virtue of temperance. Let us summarize: virtue means the ability to feel passions (a fear, courage, desire, anger, pity, etc.) at the right time, for the right reasons, to the right people, for the right end, and in the right way (*NE* 1106 b18).

Moral excellence, as well as moral weakness, according to Aristotle, lies within our power (*NE* 1113 b4); we are responsible for what men we are. In particular, we are responsible for the way in which we experience emotions, feelings and desires. It sounds paradoxical: being affected is not, after all, a matter of our free choice, Aristotle himself says that emotions are *apohairetic*—if something angers us, worries us, or arouses our desire or love, it happens to us without our will

(*Catt.* 9 a23; *Met.* 1046 a13 [4]). We can, however, develop the habit of proper experience of emotions, the habit of the emotional response to different circumstances, which is neither too sharp, nor too sluggish. The proper response to a danger is to protect our health or life, or that of the people whom the danger threatens. It is the result of some fear for the preservation of the most important goods in this situation. This properly felt fear is courage, an emotional response of the soul, leading to good actions (sometimes we put our own life at risk—when it derives from worrying about the loss of the greater good).

This can be learnt, says Aristotle. The virtues are *hexeis*—this means that they are neither natural (innate), nor something opposite to the nature. They are habits that we can develop through the process which Aristotle calls *ethismos* (a custom): we become brave by doing brave actions (*NE* 1103 a28).⁹ Because our actions are definitely a matter of choice, ultimately so too is virtue—not in a simple way, but by the actions we choose [14]. We choose actions; these form our habits; habits form our character; and a formed character means proper feeling of emotions. Moral (*scil.* emotional) education has, according to Aristotle, a great deal in common with training in the arts (*technai*). Children, based on the example set by wise adults, repeat some virtuous actions, for example, daring deeds. It is not yet the courage, just as practicing is not the same as the ability to play a musical instrument. The child is not able to judge what is appropriate in a given situation—he knows this only from adults. However, in course of time, experience creates in us a more general knowledge (although not the same as in the theoretical sciences) about the requirements which virtue (for example the virtue of courage) puts before us in similar circumstances. Moral education leads us to establish the habit of feeling a given emotion in the way which a given occasion demands: e.g. avoiding anger when it is appropriate, and feeling it when it is appropriate. This conception was a standpoint which Aristotle took in a long dispute between poets, tragedians, sophists and philosophers about the source of virtue: from nature, habit or teaching [23].

4. Poetics

Aristotle's doctrine of emotions has also its expression with reference to the arts based on the use of words—poetics and rhetoric. They are united by the same end, i.e. arousing pity, fear, anger and other feelings in the soul of the viewer or listener. The only difference is the need to explain the position which is characteristic of rhetoric and needless in tragedy.

In terms of tragedy, it contributes to the refinement of emotions, to “spiritual efficiency”, to finding pleasure in right things. Interestingly, however, the principle of right measure does not apply to the experience of the aesthetic: the pleasure by which the experience of beauty is accompanied, even if it occurs in excess, does not make a man licentious, as its deficiency does not make a man frigid (*NE* 1117 b30; *EE* 1230 b31 [3]). It is the only affection in case of which the lack of measure does not equate to a defect in character.

Poetry (and *mimetic* arts in general) forms our habits, it is able to make our life moral and satisfactory, and thus it is able to give us happiness (Cf. *Pol.* 1339 b18). Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not discern the “negative charm” of poetry. This difference between Plato and Aristotle can be seen apparently when we confront their ideas about happiness. According to Plato, poetic imitation enhances those habits which should be limited—instead of becoming better and happier, we become worse and less happy (*Republic* 607a). But according to Aristotle poetry gives us real pleasure and entertainment, and it causes some spiritual purification. It contributes to our happiness—the feeling of happiness consists in fact of beauty and delight (*Pol.* 1339 b20). Aristotle's definition of tragedy specifies its end—accomplishing by way of the evoking of pity and fear the catharsis of such feelings (*Poet.* 1449 b27) [7]. It is difficult to say whether *katharsis* relies on *purging* of feelings, or *purification* of feelings [9], in any case, the viewer should achieve through it an inner harmony.

In the structure of tragedy the most important thing is the story or plot, and there are two elements through which it most strongly influences the feelings of the recipient: the reverse of fate (*perypeteia*) and the recognition (*anagnorisis*, *Poet.* 1450 a33). Another important element of the plot is *pathos*—a painful, irreversible and fatal incident (1452 b10). For arousing the viewer's

emotions the construction known as *muthos* is necessary, so that viewer could believe. The poet should therefore present such incidents that are feasible, based on probability or necessity (*Poet.* 1451 a38), but also that are able to evoke pity and fear. This effect can be better achieved the more inconsistent are events with the expectations of the audience, yet still retaining the element of feasibility. The surprise effect is significant—it decreases when events are ruled by the coincidental or when they occur spontaneously, and increases when events give the impression of being intended (*Poet.* 1452 a4). The two components of the story—*perypeteia* and *anagnorisis*—should logically result from events for the proper emotional effect. Aristotle examines the different types of plot and their impact on the feelings of the audience. Feelings associated with watching the tragedy can be aroused in two ways: by “stage setting” or by the incidents only. The second way is evidence of greater poetic craftsmanship and it is of a higher quality, it lets us to feel pity and fear by contact with the text, there is no need to watch a performance in the theater. It is important because the “stage settings” can wake up feelings with no connection to the tragedy, dismay for example. And in the tragedy we ought to look only for those pleasures which are proper for it (*Poet.* 1453 b10).

The second element of tragedy on which the emotional response of audience depends is the construction of the hero. He should not be spotless (“pre-eminently virtuous and just”) because his defeat would cause an outrage rather than pity and fear. He should also not be depraved because his fall could give pleasure. The emotional tie (pity) with the tragic hero is a result of the undeserved misfortune of an innocent man, someone whose defeat is the result of a “great mistake” (*hamartia*), and not of moral fault. The fear, in contrast, derives from the misfortune of a man who is like us (*Poet.* 1453 a4). The drama of the hero is best rendered by a poet when he is able to convey the emotions of the hero, and to set the audience in an emotional state that corresponds to the tragic situation. A close relationship between the protagonists is the norm for the tragedy, especially in the case when the offender is not aware of his kinship with the victim (like Oedipus)—*anagnorisis* gives the audience a shocking impression (*Poet.* 1453 a3). But the case arousing the strongest emotions is the situation in which the hero recognizes his victim just before committing a deed and this prevents him from taking action (like Meropa or Ifigenia; *Poet.* 1454 a5). For the creation of an emotional tie with the hero his character is also important: nobility, a similarity to human behaviour in general (this gives common ground with the audience), a consistency (even an inconsistent hero must be consistent in his inconsistency; *Poet.* 1454 a16).

5. Rhetoric

Now, let us move on to rhetoric. Rhetoric is a practical skill and, at the same time, a large system of rules and methods to guarantee success in the field of persuasion through words. The rhetorical argumentation cannot adhere to the formal discipline of sciences, because its conditions are not certain but probable. Indeed, Aristotle himself criticizes those authors who analyze the strategies of emotional influence on the listeners, but in *Book II of Rhetoric* [8] he discusses in details the methods of arousing feelings. In the ideal situation, when a rational rhetor speaks to rational listeners, emotional influence is not needed. In social practice, however, even an expert is not able to convince the entire audience, especially those who lack competence in logical argumentation. In this case, the arguments need to be based on the common experience (*Rhet.* 1355 a25). Since the aim of rhetoric is practical, it is necessary to adapt a strategy to the realities of political life. There are three ways to impact on the listeners: by evoking ethical resonance, emotional resonance, or by rational arguments (*Rhet.* 1356 a1). We are most interested in this second. The speech has to act on the emotions of the listeners (it has to move), the rhetor should have knowledge of human characters and the ability to analyze emotions: to identify the nature of each emotion, its properties, sources, and the way it can be aroused (*Rhet.* 1356 a20). In other words, he should have the knowledge necessary to determine what is convincing for a particular type of men (what is good for them). In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle analysis the emotions man can feel: anger, contempt, disregard, gentleness, fear, courage, sympathy, friendship, hatred, hostility, shame, shamelessness, kindness, pity, indignation, envy, and ambition. He draws a map of human emotions: some of them he assigns

to a noble man (ambition), others to someone ignoble (envy), some of them he considers as typical for young people (passions), the other for the mature (distrust and suspicion).

6. Conclusion

The philosophy of the ensuing era was dominated by stoicism, which proclaimed a radically different idea: that our emotions are the only cause of human disease. And if it would be a certain exaggeration to say that stoicism has become the lay religion of the aristocratic Roman society, then it would be no exaggeration to say that it became one of the most important elements of education and moulded the mentality of the era. As we have emphasized, the Stoics proclaimed ideal of *apatheia*. However, at the same time they were writing the treatises whose practical aim was to teach the proper emotional attitude in different situations and circumstances, such as: *About anger, About love to children, About happiness, About cheerfulness, About brotherly love, About loquacity, About snooping, About the lust for wealth, About false shame, About envy and hatred*. It can be said, therefore, that stoicism in the Roman era proclaimed two ethics: a theoretical one referring to the Socratic ideal of the sage, and practical one which was in fact the legacy of Aristotle and his doctrine of how to be properly affected. The first declared an unobtainable ideal, in which passion should be completely ousted from spiritual life; the other spoke to the common man and taught him how to form character by practicing the control of passions such as desire or fear, and by competent directing of affects such as anger.

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Notes

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1. In some sense, the term "psychology" is anachronistic with reference to ancient philosophy, meaning in fact rather the doctrine of the soul.
 2. A possible conclusion of this thesis is the immortality of the *nous*. Aristotle, however, does not deal with this issue.
 3. Leontius wishes to see the bodies of killed prisoners, but he is also afraid of this nasty view. Eventually he yields the temptation but condemns himself for this.
 4. But not in the traditional sense of the word, rather in the original metaphysical sense which he has presented in the *Sumposium*, where philosophy is presented as '*erosophia*'.
 5. Due to the limited framework of this article we do not discuss extremely important concept of *mania*. Plato writes about it in the first place in the *Phaedrus* [18].
 6. Example of which is the theory of the practical syllogism.
 7. It is probably something significant for the era in which Seneca and St. Paul were living, that they both saw this attitude as an ideal unattainable for earthly man—you have to be a sage or enjoy the grace of God to cope with it.
 8. *NE* 1107 a9. The passions which Aristotle enumerates—the joy of failure of other people, shamelessness, and envy—are rather extreme states of other emotions. Hence Aristotle's suggestion: there is no right measure in excess or deficiency (1107 a 25-6).
 9. Hence the title *Ethike* for Aristotle works.

What are Emotions? Structure and Function of Emotions

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Abstract:

This paper attempts to coin a stipulative definition of “emotions” to determine their functions. In this sense, “emotion” is a complex phenomenon consisting of an accurate (reliable) determination of the state of affairs in relation to the state of the subject and specific “points of adaptation”. Apart from the cognitive aspect, this phenomenon also includes behavior, physiological changes and expressions (facial expression, voice, posture), feelings, and “execution” of emotions in the nervous system. Emotions fulfill informative, calibrating, identifying, existential, and motivating functions. Emotions capture the world as either positive or negative, important or unimportant, and are used to determine and assign weightings (to set up a kind of hierarchy). They emerge automatically (involuntarily), are difficult (or hardly possible) to control and are (to some extent) influenced by culture.

Keywords: emotion, feeling, action, brain, nervous system, expression, cognition, function, significance, positive, negative.

And the Lord *was sorry* that he had made
humankind on the earth, and it *grieved* him to his heart
Old Test. 6, 5-7.

1. Introduction

The word “emotion” may carry a meaning that consists of two elements: “e” and “movere”, where “e” denotes “from”, and “movere” means “to move”. In the context of this analysis, the etymology of this word is worth mentioning if we assume “e” denotes something which is “outside” or “external” [36, p.750] which is connected with “moving out from one place to another [10. P.19] or, in other words, if we assume it refers to an action.

According to the Webster dictionary, emotion is defined as follows:

[...] conscious mental reaction (as anger or fear) subjectively experienced as strong feeling usually directed toward a specific object and typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body [38].

The synonyms for “emotion” include the following words: “affect”, “exultation”, “excitement”, “enthusiasm”, “fascination”, “ferment”, “racing thoughts”, “fever”, “fire”, “revival”, “agitation”, “passion”, “concern”, “agitation”, “rapture”, or “fascination”. These expressions do not really contribute anything new, just like it would be pointless to analyze emotions by simply listing their attributes. A more detailed consideration is essentially necessary.

2. Are Emotions Non-Apprehensive (Non-Cognitive)?

Before any scientific research on emotions was initiated, emotions were investigated from a philosophical perspective (i.e. they were ‘researched’ in the historical sense of the word). However, philosophers did not simply delve into the subject of emotions – the meaning and significance of emotions were relevant only against the backdrop of universal (systemic) concepts. Philosophers almost always delivered profound analyses that were rooted into an individually preferred theoretical framework. With the absence of an experimental base, or the opportunity to broadly discuss the subject and to expose their concepts to criticism, the philosophers of the past arrived at very many different conclusions in the subject of emotions. As a starting point of my analysis, let me first refer to one of many philosophical concepts in order to provide a wider background illustrating the specifics of contemporary conclusions. Due to the time distance, I will now present a simplified outline of a concept by Saint Thomas Aquinas.

The models of emotions proposed by this philosopher is firmly entrenched in his metaphysics, but there is no need to discuss it in too much detail; it suffices to outline the cognitive system of a human the way St. Thomas saw it. Within the powers vested in humans (the powers of the soul), St. Thomas accounted for the following five genera of powers in the soul: (1) vegetative powers, or the ability to survive and reproduce, (2) the locomotive power, (3) sensitive, or the ability of sensual cognition (external senses and four internal senses: the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers), (4) the intellectual, or the ability of thinking and reasoning, (5) and the appetitive (*appetitus*), to which “feelings, emotions, and artifacts” belong. St. Thomas believed that desire (*appetitus*) may come from nature itself (*appetitus naturalis*), as well from sensual cognition (*appetitus sensitivus*), and finally from the intellect (*appetitus intellectualis seu voluntas*, or the act of will).

There are two types of appetites arising from sensual cognition. We distinguish *vis concupiscibilis* or sensitive concupiscible appetite related to the good as such that is perceived through senses, and *vis irascibilis*, or irascible faculty, an appetite to fight against obstacles, or the drive to conquer. This differentiation is all the more important since, as St. Thomas explains, the manifestations of these powers or appetites are referred to as passions (*passiones*).

Passions – in the context of the division introduced by Saint Thomas – are acts of the sensitive appetite. They are sensitive rather than apprehensive since they belong to the sphere of desires (cognition is vested in senses and the intellect, whereas will is in the realm of mental passions).

According to St. Thomas, each passion consists of three components:

1. Perceiving good or evil through senses: “For we have stated that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain “ [32, p. 14]. “Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power” [32, p. 14].
2. The emergence of the sensitive appetite movement (*omnis motus appetitus sensitivi*) with the propensity to act.
3. Bodily transmutation manifested by flushed cheeks, trembling, expression of the eyes, etc.

Appetitive “movements” (element two) is the essence of passions, although the element of “bodily transmutation” or “the perception of good or evil” through senses is also important; in other words, all that is sensual is perceived either as pleasure or pain. Passions are separate from reason; reason takes actions being indifferent to the consequences for the life of the subject – it only accounts for the value of truth. It is to conclude that passions are essentially motivational (appetitive) [30, p 11] rather than apprehensive (cognitive). The appetitive sphere is closely linked to physiological organs, hence “anger makes blood boil around the heart” [32, pp. 10-11] (Antoni Stępień, a neo-Thomist, distinguished between three types of emotional experiences: (1) experiences of emotional contents, (2) emotional states, and (3) emotional acts or emotions *sensu stricte* [29, pp. 3-9]).

To recap, the concupiscible power is the drive for pleasure, to the sensible good or evil generally recognized as either pleasure or pain.

In the realm of the appetite, if a specific good is perceived through senses, then the entity feels movement towards, affinity to, focus of passion on this very good. The perceived good determined, transforms the passion and attacks it. This first preference, determination, focus of passion to a specific good is called love [15, p.6].

Where “evil” is perceived, we feel repulsion and are driven away from it. If the perceived object – a good that carries a pleasure – is not in our possession, we feel longing or desire. If the good is obtained, it brings us joy. If we constantly feel threatened through aversion, sensible hatred or detestation emerges, and if we are exposed to it in general – only sadness.

It is also sometimes, or rather generally the case that the object to which the inclination or aptitude leads us is difficult to obtain, and hence St. Thomas introduced the notion of concupiscible power. If evil evokes aversion and is difficult to conquer, the concupiscible power will give rise to daring or fear. If evil is directly present, daring is immediately followed by anger. Where this powerful feeling leads us to obtain what we long for, it will be transformed into joy. Otherwise it will turn into sadness [32, p. 22].

Emotions (from Latin *passions*) are sensible (or predominantly sensible) and appetitive processes (*desire*), in other words they prompt us to act and to evaluate our actions, and are non-apprehensive (non-cognitive) since they do not have their own object and do not reveal the truth as such, they perceive an object from the pleasure/pain perspective and have a physiological (bodily) component. They are considered either as natural or concupiscible.

If this standard characteristics of emotions is considered correct [33, p. 46], which is defined by very quickly emerging, involuntary behavior or reaction to an perceptually identified and evaluated object correlated with the state of the body and the surrounding environment, and if we consider the function of emotions, such as anger, as ascribed to them in evolutionary psychology [5], it can be concluded that contemporary analyses do not go beyond the model devised by St. Thomas.

However, can it be established with certainty that emotions are non-apprehensive conditions? Do they have inherently motivational characteristics?

R. Zajonc was one of the first and most dedicated contemporary supporters of the thesis that emotions come before thinking, that they precede cognition [39]. Zajonc argued that preferences (or “liking something”) can emerge before cognition, without any conscious perception of events. When subjects were experimentally exposed to stimuli they did not consciously recognize, after which their preferences were openly tested, they were found to prefer patterns they had been exposed to (below the threshold of cognitive awareness) although – obviously – they could not explain why. The effect of “exposure” was broadly confirmed in many laboratories [2].

The thesis that emotions are not a part of cognition has a long historical tradition.

Many theorists claim that emotions are not cognitive, arguing that only sense-data and cognitive reflection belong to the sphere of reason. Others purport that emotional processes do not have any “object” (they are not about something) and they do not generate any lasting information about the world “as it is”, therefore they are not cognitive (for example, a rainy morning is not

“sad” in itself). Also, emotions are automatic (involuntary), whereas cognitive processes are controlled. Additionally, emotions and perceptive processes as well as thinking are controlled and processed by different areas of the brain. Also, it is important to note that, if an emotion emerged *after* acts of perception and thinking, there would be many situations where it would not be effective, i.e. an individual would otherwise fall prey to a predator (which is not the case).

In fact, emotional states may impair cognition (fear makes things look twice as bad as they are), while people who run amok cause detriment to themselves and reject all rational arguments.

In this context, it is worth noting that the mere finding that emotions are non-cognitive by nature since they are different and separate from senses or the activity of thinking prejudices the question of the actual nature of emotions. However, this prejudice should not be rejected as completely unfounded. The processes of thinking (that can be expressed by invoking the notion of “material”, “operations”, or “rules of thinking”) – through which ideas, schemes, and judgments are developed – are focused on capturing general patterns of the world. Emotions play a different role, which does not necessarily mean they are non-cognitive.

3. Cognitive Approach to Emotions

It goes without saying that under certain circumstances, emotions may impair the process of reasoning, but cognitive processes are also susceptible to error (including so-called rationalizations), and there are plenty of books written about hallucinations and perceptual illusions.

In terms of cognition in the sense of a controlled and conscious process (being aware of and being conscious), quite obviously the problem emerges of informatively unconscious access to the world.

Many publications and reports argue that humans have a perceptive and categorizing access to the world in the sense that they are able to read words they are unaware of seeing (lexical decision task) [22, p. 550]. J. Marshall and P. Halligan described a series of experiments suggesting that reliable access to the external environment in conditions of unilateral neglect [11, pp. 13-21] (i.e. absence of conscious access to some data) is in fact possible.

Humans are able to learn complex information unconsciously and even more effectively than in conscious learning [26, p. 5].

T.D. Wilson coined the notion of adaptive unconsciousness and provided many examples to prove that it allows to assess the environment, to clarify and interpret it in order to be able to act quickly and unconsciously, which brings substantial benefits to the subject [35, p. 22].

Therefore, it is not the type of access (conscious or not) that determines whether something is cognitive or not. How is it determined?

The trouble is the following: there are many definitions of the words “to cognize” or “knowledge”. In the absolutist approach (foundationalism), cognition was described as self-explanatory and controlled, and the outcomes of cognition were recognized as necessary and/or certain, generally important (for every cognitive subject), free of question-begging (*petitio principii* [30, p. 78], and obvious. In the traditional approach to the notion of “knowledge”: „[...] *S* knows that *A* wtw (a) *A* is true; (b) *S* is convinced that *A*; (c) *S* has sufficient grounds to reasonably believe that *A* [...]” [37, p. 25].

In the broad meaning of the concept of relativism, however, knowledge is any content that is changeable relative to conditions and the historical moment, and allows to fulfill a particular objective; it is based on a specific ontology, it is not translatable into other languages and meets the specified common conditions for its assessment (intersubjectively). Neopragmatism, as expressed in R. Rorty's thinking, claims that to understand cognition, one has to understand the social institution of justification for belief, and thus there is no need to view it as accuracy of representation [27, p. 153]. There are plenty of examples to provide, but they do not bring us any closer to the notion of “cognition”.

Without looking deeper into the question of superiority of one concept of “cognition” over another, let me recognize cognition as a set of acts or actions that produce a specific outcome, and

the outcome itself. The outcome will be referred to as a ‘cognitive’ result (by analogy, the acts that have led to the emergence of this outcome will also be called ‘cognitive’) as long as they accurately reveal the *state of affairs* (in the broadest sense of the word). The medium that carries this conviction is irrelevant, although it is most commonly language-based, nor does it matter whether the outcome has emerged from intended acts, conscious or unconscious.

What is more, the outcome may be accurate (i.e. cognitive) in many different ways. It can be either a confirmation that something exists, that it has specific properties at a given moment, or a more general characterization of the surrounding environment. The trouble is that we usually obtain the entire spectrum of “results” across all different levels. To recognize something as “colorful” brings within the entire spectrum of different “contents” (phenomenal variability). The same applies to categorical identification. Unless we have some compelling criteria, the problem of cognitive value has to be tackled in a different way. Unfortunately, there are no assumptions to rely on. So let us assume that I, the subject, exist somehow and that I do not exist unconditionally. And if so, I must have a generally reliable contact with the surrounding environment; in other words, my convictions and beliefs about the state of affairs must be accurate. The accuracy of these results are relativized against the discussed theoretical level. It is different in the case of a basic contact (for example, where a color of a particular apple is captured), and in the case of general sentences (e.g. dogs bark) or theory (e.g. the theory of evolution). At the simplest level of capturing the surrounding environment, for example when discussing colors, or in simple categorizations, the accuracy of our convictions is demonstrated indirectly, although actually we never have access to the world “as it is in itself” (as a consequence of phenomenal variability). This can be seen in two subjects, one of whom captures an object as “yellow honey”, and the other one describes it as “grey honey”. An object is unable to have two contradictory features (i.e. it cannot be yellow and grey at the same time), then, even if a subject mistakenly perceives it as “grey”, the question arises: how can the subject perceive an *object* as grey? The answer is: he/she cannot. If both observations are the same in qualitative terms (i.e. they refer to a “color”), it can be concluded that the object *never* deals with light “itself”, but has informative access to light. The value of this access can be measured “with what the subject allows to use”. At the basic level discussed here, a systematic error is equivalent to the ultimate disappearance (death) of an object. Hence, contents are perceived from an epistemological perspective, indirectly, and are accurate to the extent which, for example, allows the perceiving subject to survive.

However, what is the role of emotions? In other words, how is the sentence “this honey is sweet and yellow” different from the sentence “this honey is *pleasantly* sweet and yellow”? Or what is the difference between sentences: “this dog barks” and “this dog barks *dangerously*”? Does the difference elicit an inclination to take action?

First of all, the quality of being “dangerous” or “pleasant” is not determined *in principle* by referring to the *type* of subject who perceives something to be either dangerous or pleasant. For example, a subject made of marble would not even consider itself to be in *danger* of being bitten. It is not only the reference to the type of subject that matters but also the time (moment) when this reference is made. Does the sweetness of a particular substance guarantee it will be pleasant permanently? It can be recognized without detailed research that the way the pleasant taste of food is perceived will change depending on whether the subject is hungry or not. Neither danger nor pleasure is a quality of the world itself.

Still, it can carry information about a specific property in relation to a particular *type* of subject and its state. What is this state about? In fact, this is any state that fulfils a presumable rationale (principle). Let us refer to this rationale as a “point of adaptation”. The most general (abstract) points of adaptation are survival and reproduction; and for humans also the aspirations arising from the pursuit of a welfare model adopted by individual subjects. These most general “points of adaptation” are the (alleged) rationales or functions of what is happening in detail. Hence, a specific *non-pleasure* of hunger or *love* for somebody are cognitive contents (information) about the surrounding environment, addressed to a specific subject because of the “point of adaptation” assigned to it (in this case, it involves survival and the drive to reproduce). In this

approach, emotions can be seen against the wider backdrop. Emotions, just like “[...] our physical organs owe their complex structure to the information in the human genome, so, I believe, do our mental organs. We do not learn to have a pancreas, and we do not learn to have a visual system, language acquisition, common sense, or feelings of love, friendship, and justice” [24, p. 41].

I capture emotions as adaptations, and these emotions are the result of progressive advancements in the mechanism of DNA replication, in the process of natural selection. I assume genes are replicators that preserve high accuracy of the copied information; hence, any sections of the chromosomal material that can persist for generations become units of natural selection.

Replicators are one of the observed forms through which nature itself strives to maintain stability. Just like a soap bubble strives to become spherical in shape since this is how a stable configuration of thin layers filled with gas looks like. Salt crystals take a cube shape as it is the most stable form to accommodate atoms of sodium and chlorine [7, p. 29].

4. Structure of Emotions

This is the hypothetical context in which emotions emerge. Emotions understood as informative contents are beneficial for the subject; in a metaphorical sense, replicators are also the beneficiaries of emotions, and finally, the stability of natural structures can be maintained. This is not a thesis of biological reductionism as it should be borne in mind that humans pursue their own concept of welfare (in relation to specific emotions).

Therefore emotions (at the first glance) are embodiments of the surrounding environment that carry specific information, relative to the state of the subject by virtue of the existing rationale (points of adaptation).

They are based on other data (contents), astutely expressed by D. Weiner: “Emotions are processes that use selected information from the environment as harbingers of possible events that may occur in relation to them [33, p. 80].”

An emotion can be distinguished from other cognitive processes, each of which has its own specifics. The specificity of emotions means that they divide the world into a positive and a negative, something no other power or information processing can do. An emotion constitutes that something is “important” and, as a result, it makes this something “more or less important” to set up a hierarchy of actions. Subjects (entities who take actions instead of just being subjected to actions) may, in theory, take an infinite number of activities, but emotions introduce an element of radical simplification. In this approach, emotional disorders, and specifically reduced intensity or lack of emotions will have serious consequences for the subject.

A patient studied by A. Damasio (who had sections of his prefrontal cortex removed, more specifically the ventromedial frontal cortex) was physically competent and the majority of his mental abilities remained unscathed. However, his emotions have changed dramatically as compared to the period before injury. He has lost the decision-making ability, he was unable to effectively plan for the future, or to learn from his mistakes. Psychological and neuropsychological tests have demonstrated outstanding intellectual capabilities of the patient. He excelled in memory tests based on interference procedures, while his perception, memory, learning ability, language, and arithmetic skills remained intact. *However, his decisions and behaviors were only based on reasoning*, and the patient was therefore unable to assign any value to the options he was faced with (he felt equally strong rationale behind all choices). He would lose sight of the main goals by devoting his attention to detailed tasks [6, pp. 53, 69]. Similar dysfunctions of the decision-making processes and diminished emotional responsiveness were observed in other patients following prefrontal cortex damage. They tended to be stiff and stubborn, they were unable to organize the future or take care of their work. They were characterized by stereotypical manners, lack of sexual drive, elevated pain and pleasure threshold, and complete absence of curiosity.

Emotions not only introduce the idea of things being “positive or negative”, they also prioritize things according to the value they assign, they also involve action (behavior) as their intrinsic characteristics.

As for some emotions (fear, love, rage), behavior is promoted automatically, or involuntarily. Other types of emotions can be controlled to a certain extent (except for the fact that they emerge), but this can result from the activation of a stronger emotion that controls the first one (i.e. containing anger for fear of revenge). This approach can be exemplified with the ancient concept of will as *liberum arbitrium*. A subject can control some emotional states (means) but does not choose the final goals of achieving a happy life. I do not preclude the possibility that a subject (a human) takes actions “because he/she wants to”, but he/she also has to face the consequences. In the case of emotions, controlling emotions or the lack of such control is irrelevant; instead, functionality, or effective problem solving, is what matters. Hence, if a subject is not able to control justified anger and the accompanying retribution or revenge, no matter the costs, then the emotional state becomes an effective deterrent.

Emotion cannot be identified without proper behavior (the problem of ‘beetles’ discussed by Wittgenstein). Emotion is not an “expression” of something internal but a kind of “acquisition” of the means we are lacking.

Appropriate behavior is not merely a feature of the phenomenon of emotions but also of other mental activities, such as thinking or acts of will. We do not say that somebody thinks because there is a silent private process going on inside him that is never revealed to the outside world. Accordingly, we do not say that a person categorizes correctly when he reaches out for a cigarette case rather than a salad plate at the dinner table. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, a person must do a lot to be considered a thinking person. Likewise, as for emotions, it is difficult to claim that a person loves somebody unless we see specific actions taking place.

However, with reference to Putnam’s arguments about the superactor and superspartan, there are frequent cases where there is no action, but other aspects of emotions are activated instead. I will refer to conditions like this as quasi-emotions or q-emotions, as opposed to stricte-emotions or s-emotions, the outline of which is slowly beginning to emerge. Still, even q-emotions inherently involve the propensity to act.

Physiological changes are an important element of emotions – an element, not a symptom. Fear is accompanied by faster heart rate, lowered body temperature, pale skin, and panting. Blood flows into large skeletal muscles, such as muscles of the lower extremities, to make it easier to escape. Blood is drained from the face and the face turns pale. Interconnections between brain areas that control emotions initiate the process of hormone secretion to force the body to remain vigilant, to make it more sensitive to all external stimuli and reactive, while attention is focused on the imminent danger. Sensitivity to pain is reduced, which is very practical when the body can be injured. W. B. Cannon believed that feedback, especially between the brain and other organs, is a process which is too slow and too non-differentiated to determine the exact emotion we feel at a particular moment. Today, we know that internal organs secrete steroid hormones and peptide hormones during emotional arousal (instead of adrenalin, as Cannon argued) that get to the brain with blood. Therefore, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the activation of various emotional systems in the brain leads to a variety of different patterns with which hormones are released from internal organs, which could translate into a multitude of biochemical feedback patterns between hormones and the brain, and each of them would cause unique consequences, specific to particular emotions.

Physiological changes are correlated with expression (of the face, posture, tone of voice).

[...] when I clenched my jaws and lowered my eyebrows, I tried not to be angry, but I felt anger. I am not in the state of anger, but I have noticed that my thoughts keep coming back to the events that made me feel angry; I knew that this is an experiment, but I felt I was losing control over everything [10, p. 123].

Expression delivers a reliable signal to the surrounding environment that the subject is in an emotional state and that this emotional state may have some consequences; for example, that the subject can be dangerous or friendly. Ludwig Wittgenstein asks:

‘*We see emotions*’ – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) about joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other prescription of the features. – Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face [36, p. 225].

Visibly being angry can cause others to fear and allow the subject to achieve their own objectives. Thus, an emotion is not just a condition that carries information but also a means to communicate this condition.

In search of mechanisms explaining the development of facial expressions, researchers have come up with three main concepts. Facial expression can either originate from sensory reactions (T. Piderit, A. Pepier), from electromechanical laws governing the functioning of nerves and muscles (Spencer), or reactions which have led humans to accomplish their goals in the process of evolution [10, p. 97].

P. Ekman demonstrated that facial expression of people across different communities is highly similar, and accordingly, disgust is recognized by 92 percent of Americans, Brazilians, Argentineans, and Japanese (90 percent). Likewise, a large percentage share of people is able to correctly identify surprise, sadness, anger, or fear.

Apart from actions, physiological changes and expression, emotions also include *feelings*. This notion is only rarely evoked in contemporary concepts of emotions.

In a psychology textbook by J. Streal and D. Dolinski, “feelings” are not listed in the index. Feelings are not even mentioned in the book by P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson, and in the book by K. Oatley and J. M. Jenkins, *Understanding emotions*, feelings are referred to only three times. This limited use of the term “feelings” may be attributed to the fact that feelings are highly subjective (subject-oriented) and they sometimes cannot be captured and communicated in an intersubjective manner. In the meantime, despite the theoretical campaign lasting over a century, the word “feelings” is still present in the language we use.

While speaking about emotions, we have feelings in mind *that psychologists describe as a subjective element of emotions*. Emotion is much more complicated [...] We mistakenly believe that emotions are only what we feel inside [20, p. 25].

I think the term “feeling” also characterizes emotions (although it may refer to a different time perspective) and has its own function and role, despite being private. Here, a feeling will mean a consciously accessible (qualitative) aspect of emotions. This is a type of synthesis (or simplification) of other aspects of an emotional phenomenon, especially in terms of subconsciously processed information. The true essence of feelings is the addressee or, in this case, the subject himself, meaning that the aspect of intersubjectivity or communicativeness is of secondary importance. A feeling appears in an unintentional manner, and therefore is a synthesized and simplified “product” of unconscious cognitive processes.

If the cognitive contents (information) are the fundamental aspect of emotional processes, these contents need to have an “executor”. Although cognitive results stem from the activity of the mind (and are figuratively located in the brain), the facts that make them cognitive are not located inside the brain. By invoking the arguments of F. Dretske, cognitive contents (representations) should be distinguished from the facts about the cognitive (representative) system. Therefore, cognitive contents are about something (that is not located in the brain), although they have their executor in the brain, just like information about temperature is not “located” in the scale or the mercury level in the thermometer, which are in fact the “executors” of this information. In systems of emotions, there is no single “executor” of emotions in the brain (or in the nervous system). When we analyze fear (which is one of the best investigated emotions), there is a relative clear network of

active interconnections through which fear is conditioned. B. Kapp argued that the central nucleus of the amygdala is actively linked with areas of the brain that are involved in changing the heart pace and other vegetative reactions [14]. It also controls reactions such as freezing, jerking, or changes in blood pressure. Therefore the amygdala is perhaps the “executor” of fear. It is provided with lower-tier inputs from the thalamus areas connected with the modalities of feelings, higher-tier inputs from the sensory cortex, and the highest-tier information (about the general situation) from the hippocampus [17, p. 197]. The amygdala is particularly sensitive to stimuli that have been evolutionally preprogrammed for a particular species. Amygdala axons reach out to various areas of the cortex. When the amygdala is agitated, these areas of the cortex are activated, which allows to focus attention on these factors (with the aid of short-term memory). The amygdala was also demonstrated to be connected to long-term memory networks, including the hippocampus and areas of the cortex that cooperate with the hippocampus. The amygdala is also linked with the anterior cingulate cortex, one of the co-partners that controls the working memory circuits, and the orbital cortex that is believed to be involved in creating memory of rewards and punishments. With this network of interconnections, the amygdala affects the informative contents of the working memory. Working memory consists of a general system and a few specialist systems (of interim information processing) that are combined to act as an “executor” of long-term memory. In general terms, the contents of working memory are our current thoughts, what we focus our attention on [see 17, p. 322] (i.e. the background of our feelings).

However, the discussed interconnections do not fully explain why informative data from senses, memory, or categorizations become emotionally relevant. Apart from interconnections between the amygdala and the cortex, there are different channels indirectly affecting the information processed. Of particular significance are interconnections that influence the arousal system. When it is activated, the cells of the cortex and the thalamus responsible for informative inputs become more sensitive, which results in higher alertness, better perception (or increased performance of sensory inputs), memorization and brain activity related to understanding or drawing conclusions. Very strong agitation reduces these abilities.

As for activation in response to stimuli that is considered dangerous, a particularly important role is played by the connectivity between the amygdala and the system containing acetylcholine, situated in close proximity to it, in the forebrain. Activation is caused not only by emotional stimuli, but any new situation we are exposed to. Activation of the amygdala automatically translates into the activation of neural networks responsible for controlling behavior and physiological changes. Reactions of the autonomic nervous system and the hormonal system combined can be perceived as visceral reactions, i.e. reactions of internal organs and glands (viscera). Whenever they arise, the body generates signals that are returned to the brain. Emotional reactions are accompanied by numerous feedback loops, many of which are fast enough to be specific for particular emotions. Finally, a feeling emerges as a conscious aspect of perceptions of information, a kind of synthesis of the processed information.

What is really worth pointing out is that these mechanisms combine the “executor” level with the actual action, physiological reactions, information, and feelings.

LeDoux pointed out that an exact identification of danger is not necessary in order to generate fear; instead, a perception (or information) of some key features of an object is sufficient, as identified by the primary somatosensory cortex and the amygdala [see 17, p. 156].

It is also worth mentioning that fear in humans has a genetic component that determines the type of the subject’s nervous system, the specifics of mental processes and physiological functions.

However, what we actually do, think or feel in the given situation is determined by other factors instead of genes, including by social factors [see 17, p. 160].

To conclude this fragment, emotion is a complex phenomenon composed of key (non-accidental) elements: the moment of accurate (reliable), anticipatory perception of the state of affairs, proper behavior, physiological changes, expression and feelings, while the overall phenomenon is “executed” by the corresponding states of the brain.

I also entirely agree with W. James, who argues that an emotion, for example fear, is very difficult to comprehend without the accelerated heartbeat, shallow breathing, lip twitching, legs turning to jelly, or stomach cramps. Little is left of anger without violent actions, the fluttering feeling in the chest, increased flow of blood to the brain, flared nostrils, or grinding of the teeth. What is left of rage if the face remains peaceful, the breathing is regular, and the body position is relaxed? [see 12].

5. Emotions and Their Functions

Still, there is more to this than the mere structure of an emotional phenomenon. Emotions perform a wide range of functions. Let us discuss some of them. First and foremost, emotions have a *calibrating* function. Emotions calibrate the activity of other powers, authenticate them, which leads to the general conviction that emotions are real (reliability).

The problem of veridicality of the senses cannot be solved for a simple reason: “Our senses are numb – although Descartes and other philosophers discuss the testimony of the senses, our senses in fact tell us nothing, neither the truth, nor falsity” [1, p. 415].

The multitude of data we are faced with as a consequence of phenomenal variability of sensory perception or the manifold of categorization attempts could be solved (in terms of selecting either of the elements) using an assumption-free, non-contestable theory of cognition. Unfortunately, none such (universally accepted) theory exists. Yet there is another way. A subject (under the supervision of emotions) correlates specific facts (as for humans: sensory data, concepts, or perceptions) with a particular action and its consequences to create a personal model of the surrounding environment. This model is (more or less) functional since it allows the subject to accomplish goals or fulfill needs. Jerome Bruner notices:

If a given perceptual hypothesis is rewarded by leading to food, water, love, fame, or what not, it will become fixated; [...] the fixation of "sensory conditioning" is very resistant to extinction. As fixation takes place, the perceptual hypothesis grows stronger not only in the sense of growing more frequent in the presence of certain types of stimulation but also more perceptually accentuated. Perceptual objects which are habitually selected become more vivid, have greater clarity or greater brightness or greater apparent size [4, p.105].

This argument is correlated with the hypotheses about neuronal mechanisms relating to learning. We learn mainly “under the supervision” of emotions. We learn what offers some *positive consequences* instead of absorbing everything we are faced with.

B. Korzeniewski explains that the “neuronal drive structures” continuously signal the central “evaluative factor” in the brain – the reward system – whether they are stimulated or not. By giving higher priority to the appropriate synaptic connections (reducing their excitability threshold), this system boosts (or increases the throughput of) the associative structures whose development or activation was associated with satisfying a particular drive; it can also inhibit (block) these associative structures by reducing the priority of connections as soon as the drive is satisfied. In the present state of research, it is difficult to clearly identify the overall “evaluative system” in the brain.

It is commonly associated with the dopaminergic system, or a network of neurons extending all over the brain, whose axons are known to release a neurotransmitter called dopamine. Dopamine is released after a specific drive is satisfied (hunger, sexual intercourse), which is accompanied by pleasure. There is also the noradrenergic system (linked with a neurotransmitter called noradrenalin) that has an excitatory effect on most of the brain. In very many neurons, the noradrenergic system adds an additional excitatory signal to the combined signals at the base of the axon, thereby accelerating the brain function and the response to a specific situation. The serotonin system overlaps with the former two systems and is responsible for the regulation of the mood [16, pp. 82-87].

Emotions also perform a specifically existential function. By that I mean the way emotions unveil the surrounding environment and the consequences of this perception for ontological decisions. Some of them make us perceive the world as “hostile”, “abhorrent”, or “important”. The object perceived is directly seen as “extrinsic” for the subject, either threatening or obnoxious. Emotions connect us with the world (and with ourselves as a psycho-physical entity) in a way which is particularly drastic, primal and completely different than the testimony of cognitive perception or progression, which is particularly visible when something happens to the subject, when something is imposed on the subject, or if the subject is troubled by something.

In this happening, imposing, or troubling, the adversity demonstrates the importance of reality that the subject is not capable to oppose. This real being is “given” in a way that any skeptical or idealistic questioning of reality is silenced [13, p. 236].

Moreover, an emotion has the power to make the subject distinctive (in a way that the sensual or conceptual data do not) and to identify the subject as an important one (in terms of time allocation and the actions taken).

It may be said that through emotions, the subject’s concern about himself, arising from the perception of the world as strange and unfriendly, provides the basis for future ontological distinctions, and in particular for the various forms of existence. One may conclude that, without emotions, the subject would not be able to conceive the idea of the world as something different (than the subject himself).

The Cotard delusion is an interesting case to exemplify the significance of the subject. This is a mental illness that generates a strong, non-modifiable delusion of non-existence, of being dead, or loss of some parts of the body.

[...] in subsequent stages (of the Cotard delusion) patients start denying their own existence, some of them cannot even use the personal pronoun "I". One patient referred to herself as "Madame Zero", stressing her absence, while another patient of Doctor Anderson’s said about himself: "There is no use for this. Wrap it and throw it in the trash [9, p. 47].

Humans perceive and think, but they cannot access the emotional thetics I mentioned earlier.

However, the emotional system has many more functions to fulfill. Let us investigate the case of the Capgras delusion. It reveals an emotional unity with the world in the aspect of “being known”, it also has a fundamental meaning for recognizing the identity of specific individuals (including the subject himself). The Capgras delusion is where a person holds a delusion that they are not themselves, but their identical-looking impostor, or that relatives (or other acquaintances) look the same, but are strangers.

This delusion demonstrates that the perception itself, remembering a person or an object, is trapped in the emotional recognition of the “known”, which has consequences for the acceptance of the person’s identity (as my wife, my kids, or finally myself as me). The perceptive system functions properly, just like the conceptual system (individuals with the Capgras delusion agree that the “impostors” look exactly like their relatives or themselves).

Therefore, perception, the conceptual system (and memory) are not enough to identify somebody or something. Apparently the subject not only has to determine the general “what” but also that this something is *hecceitas* for the subject. Perhaps there is no point in remembering the individually of this tomato, but it worth to remember that I live here. I think the scope of this thesis can be extended to the entire surrounding that we perceive using the emotional categories: known or foreign. If this system fails, I will not recognize myself as myself and I will not recognize my child as mine. Wittgenstein was (partly) wrong. Yes, I do not learn that I am myself – I learn myself.

6. Kinds of Emotions

Finally, I would like to present three types of emotions and their cultural setting. There is no defined, universally accepted categorization of emotions (even in terms of basic or primary emotions). S. Tomkins identifies eight basic emotions (anger, interest, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, joy, shame, surprise), P. Ekman – six emotions (anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise), R. Plutchik created a wheel of emotions in which mixed and new emotions emerged, whereas D. Evans slightly modified the meaning of emotions to distinguish between joy, distress (not sadness), anger, fear, surprise, and disgust.

Moreover, there are multiple and vague names of emotional states: affections, feelings, agitation, moods [see 25] or passions.

In general, emotions presented in this approach will be addressed in the context of adaptive problems, and they will vary depending on the problem they solve – struggle for existence (e.g. fear), winning or keeping a partner (e.g. envy), children upbringing (concern), family relations (e.g. boredom), references to other members of the community (e.g. anger), position in the community (e.g. pride), and acquisition of knowledge (e.g. curiosity). These are the most general frameworks of emotions. In another sense, I distinguish (as above) a full emotional episode (s-emotion or stricte-emotion) provided that it consists of the following: informative estimation, feeling, behavior, physiological changes, expression, and the neuronal “executor”. A quasi-emotion is where behavior, expression, or even feelings are missing.

Also, humans (and only humans) experience not only emotions, but also something that may be referred to as super-emotions. They cannot only be amazed (surprise) when their expectations are not fulfilled, they also experience super-emotions when they are amazed by the mere fact that the world exists. They are not only bored by the repeatability of daily activities, they can also be bored with life itself, experienced through adaptive emotions. They are not only curious to get to know the surrounding environment for practical reasons but also with “the way everything connects with everything else”. There is another classification of emotions into adaptive emotions and superadaptive emotions.

Emotions are characterized by sign, content, and object, but most importantly they constitute the meaning (significance), which involves various levels of *intensity* measured by qualitative experience (feeling) and behavior. In terms of duration and intensity, emotions are classified into affective emotions, which are intensive and short (up to 0.5 s), proper emotions (intensive, lasting from 0.5 s to 4 s, according to P. Ekman), moods (background emotions) that are permanent, weak, and change from positive to negative and vice versa. Elevated mood translates into mania (up to 6 months) or depression (up to 6 months). Finally, there are passions and obsessions: intensive and ultra strong¹ emotions that may continue for many years.

The power (intensity) of emotions is to a greater or lesser extent essential to recognize the richness of “shades” of emotions². A separate issue (which I will not discuss here) is the question of emotional disorders, which we may interpret analogously to disorders of other aspects of the mind (related to perception, memory, or intellect).

Nomenclatures for the classification of emotions and the resulting cultural background may be the source of difficulty.

Are St. Thomas’ “passiones” equivalent to emotions? Their meaning is determined in conjunction with the category of “sensitive appetite” and the “irascible faculty”. Are these appetites equivalent to contemporary motivations? I believe that this is not just a scholastic problem. A. Wierzbicka argues that the words denoting emotions are culture-bound, and there are no emotion-related notions among universal concepts [34, pp. 1-23]. She also explains that a large share of psychologists, such as P. Ekman or C. Izard, indiscriminately use the English language to name basic emotions. However, are the words anger, “gniew” (in Polish), “Wut”, or “colère” equivalent? Moreover, in her book *Unnatural Emotions*, C. Lutz explains that the term “emotions” should also be deconstructed. Using this term in everyday language and in the language of science, C. Lutz posits, strictly depends on the social network. “Emotion” has no essence: it is universal, natural

rather than cultural, it carries an intensive meaning, it is unimaginable, unquantifiable, and irrational. This is not just a “label” of something taking place inside. C. Lutz does not claim that there are so-called “social emotions” (directed at other people) or that emotions are subjected to social influence. The very idea of emotions, she explains, is a type of social construct. “And while emotions are often seen as *evoked in* communal life, they are rarely presented as an *index* of social relationship rather than a sign of a personal state” [18, p. 4]

When emotions are de-essentialized, they can be captured as a cultural and interpersonal process of naming, justifying, and convincing in interpersonal relations. The emotional meaning is a social product rather than an individual one, “an emergent product of social life”. *Unnatural Emotions* is an attempt to show how emotional meaning is fundamentally structured by individual cultural systems and the physical surrounding. The claim is made that emotional experience is not precultural but *permanently* cultural. The complex meaning of the emotional dictionary can be attributed to its importance of expressing human values, social relationships, and economic circumstances. Speaking of emotions is speaking about society, about power, politics, relatives, and marriage, about normality and deviations.

However, with respect to the above, if emotions are a cultural product, the issue arises as to whether animals (non-cultural, but socialized) are emotion-less? Don't newborns or deaf-mute people feel emotions? J.Panksepp and J.Burgdorf observed that young rats emitted ultrasonic sounds while playing (50 kHz). This chirping could be heard only when rats were playing or received rewards. When the rats were tickled, the chirps were even more audible [23]. Were they showing emotions?

Panksepp believes that it would not be anthropomorphic to say that the young rats were laughing, and their reactions reflect the positive effect, an evolutionary prototype of human joy, an equivalent of simple laughter of social character observed in babies when they play [19, p. 29].

The “meaning” of emotions in the cultural aspect and the function of culture itself (if any) are unclear.

And how are some emotions recognized across different cultures? When emotions are analyzed from the cultural approach, it is not entirely impossible to translate (be it only a rough translation) the emotional nomenclature used by various communities, or the intercultural recognition of emotions.

When analyzing the basic emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise, and their equivalents in the Malay language: *marah*, *bosan*, *takut*, *gembira*, *sedeh*, and *hairan*, Boucher and Barndt demonstrated that both cultures were able to correctly identify situations of fear and joy (80 percent compliance) but were less skilled in recognizing anger (53 percent compliance) [3, p. 274].

It is worth noting that the emotion recognition rates were relatively high if we assume that emotions can be a cultural construct. In a study by K. R. Scherer conducted in thirty seven countries worldwide, seven basic names of emotions were identified, such as fear, disgust, joy, sadness, anger, guilt, and shame [28].

Here are apparent differences across cultures in the frequency with which emotions are expressed, discussed, and the extent to which emotions influence behavior. In the Western culture, emotions are to a large extent outside volitional control but are essentially allowed to be expressed, whereas in Japan, many emotions and states of the body are cultivated or controlled, depending on the circumstances.

Of course, there are many emotions specific for particular cultures, but in essence they are translatable. For example, Lutz translates the emotion of *ker* found in Ifaluk as “happiness/excitement”. P. Ekman demonstrated that the major cultural differences lie in the public expression of feelings. Some emotions can be identified without any training, some can only be recognized in a cultural context. There is nothing strange about this.

7. Conclusion

Taking into account the general considerations outlined above, a stipulative definition of “emotion” can be coined. I understand the term “emotion” as a complex phenomenon accurately (reliably) describing the (anticipated) state of affairs, which is reliable in terms of the state of the subject and specific “points of adaptation” (standards). “Emotion” is functional, it emerges automatically (involuntarily), it is difficult (or hardly possible) to control and is (to some extent) influenced by culture.

Emotions go hand in hand with perceptive, intellectual, and memory processes; the beneficiaries of emotions are the subjects of emotions and, to put it metaphorically, the replicators when considering the final element of maintaining stability in nature. Emotions also perform existential, identifying, calibrating, and motivating functions.

Emotions capture the world as either positive or negative, important or unimportant, and are used to determine and assign weightings (prioritize). They are a kind of *gestalt* from the cognitive perspective (at the level of conscious feelings), actions (behavior), physiological changes, expression, and the executor (the nervous system).

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Notes

1. The notion of “passion” has been used in psychological literature in the context of love and love-related emotions, such as desire or envy. Generally this expression is used to describe the initial phase of love or infatuation, a specific form of psychosis (Bilikiewicz 1989). In the historical context, passion also meant the lust for power, hazard, greed.

What are the characteristic features of passions? To name just a few:

Intensity (highly intensive), irresistibility (impossible to ignore), insatiability, self-confirmation and wishful thinking, sharp decline in the case of love, certainty of accomplishing goals, limited controllability. W.Łukaszewski, [in:] *Namiętności, Smak słowa*, Sopot, 2011, pp. 14-21.

Anger: fury, outrage, resentment, wrath, irritation, indignation, spite, hostility, pathological hatred, madness.

Sadness: despair, anguish, melancholy, self-pity, despondency, gloom, deep depression.

Fear: alarm, apprehension, nervousness, concern, dismay, distress, uneasiness, intimidation, anxiety, dread, panic; in psychopathological form – phobias and panic attacks.

Content: happiness, pleasure, relief, blissfulness, bliss, joy, fun, entertainment, pride, sensual pleasure, pleasant thrill, ravishment, delight, satisfaction, euphoria, satisfaction of whim, ecstasy, and an extreme emotion – mania.

Love: acceptance, fondness, trustfulness, kindness, closeness, devotion, attractiveness, infatuation.

Surprise: amazement, astonishment, bewilderment, wonderment.

Disgust: contempt, scorn, unfriendliness, revulsion, loathing, distaste, aversion.

Shame: guilt, embarrassment, awkwardness, guilty conscience, humiliation, regrets, disgrace.

2. J. Panksepp, J. Burgdorf, "*Laughing*" rats and the evolutionary antecedents of human joy? [in:] *Physiology and Behaviour*, 79, 2003, pp. 533-547.

R. G. Collingwood's Views on the Feeling – Thought Relation and Their Relevance for Current Research

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Abstract:

Current research in affectivity is often dominated by perspectives on the feeling/thinking dichotomy. In the paper first I reconstruct Collingwood's position on this point as it is presented in his *Religion and Philosophy*, *The Principles of Art*, and *New Leviathan*, and then compare it shortly with Bergson's view. In total five of Collingwood's different readings of the feeling/thought relation are brought to light. Finally, I opt for a view that takes feeling and thought to be complementary and inseparable, and I try to explain why and how they are better treated in this way.

Keywords: Collingwood, feeling, thought, feeling/thought linkage, feeling/thinking relation.

1. Introduction

For years, my principal area of interest was early Greek philosophy and language. In my research I arrived at what can be called the idea of the feeling—thinking linkage.¹ This is the view that neither reason nor emotion can exist in isolation from one another. The early Greek language does not have the words to speak about pure reason or pure emotion.² Contrariwise, several terms, such as *thumos*, *phren* (or *phrenes*), or *noos* (*nous*), are both thought—and feeling-related.³ The idea of a feeling—thinking linkage, with a focus on its being different to the common feeling—versus—thinking dichotomy⁴, comes up frequently in current philosophy and psychology. Yet rarely, if at all, do modern researchers refer to early ancient philosophy in this regard. But there are several other philosophers who come close to the idea of a feeling—thinking linkage and who do not refer to their predecessors and are not referred to by their successors with respect to this idea. One of them is R. G. Collingwood.⁵ In what follows I shall examine three works by Collingwood, and then attack the issue of a thinking/feeling relation more directly.

2. Analysis

In his reply to R. S. Peters' *Emotions and the Category of Passivity*, C. A. Mace calls attention to the fact that:

[o]ne of the simplest of statements to this effect [*scil.* emotional states are complex upheavals involving elements of passivity and elements of activity] is that of Collingwood's: "Emotion is not a totally separate function of the mind independent of thinking and willing [...] There is no emotion which does not entail the activity of the other so-called faculties of the mind" [10, p. 141].

The quote is borrowed from Collingwood's first book *Religion and Philosophy* [4, p.10]. Yet the statement seems to be made *en passant*. It is placed at the very beginning of the book, in the first chapter, where Collingwood discusses the *general nature of religion*. First, Collingwood observes that:

certain views of religion [...] place its essence in something other than thought, and exclude that faculty from the definition of the religious consciousness. [...] or again that it is a function of a mental faculty neither intellectual nor moral, known as feeling [4, p. 4].

Thus, having isolated the notion of an intellectual faculty, Collingwood passes on to *that faculty of the mind whose function is feeling* [4, p. 10].⁶ He carries on by saying that:

[t]he term feeling seems to be distinctively applied by psychologists to pleasure, pain and emotions in general. But emotion is not a totally separate function of the mind, independent of thinking and willing; it includes both these at once. If I feel pleasure, that is will in that it involves an appetite towards the pleasant thing; and it is also knowledge of the pleasant thing and of my own state. There is no emotion which does not entail the activity of the other so-called faculties of the mind [4, p. 10].

From the above it is not clear what the difference between feeling and emotion is. It seems there is no difference, because "[t]he term feeling is applied to emotions in general", and Collingwood himself follows this use since he speaks about "the faculty of the mind [...] feeling", then about "emotion [...] not a totally separate function of the mind", and, again, about "the term itself [...] [t]he word feeling" [4, p. 11]. It looks as if *term* means *word* (or *its sense*), and *emotion* and *feeling* are to be understood synonymously⁷, with the difference that feeling is used in a verbal form (feeling pleasure, and as a parallel to think-ing or will-ing), and emotion as a substantive. We can be sure of this since in what follows we read:

[...] Moreover the term itself is ambiguous. The word feeling as we use it in ordinary speech generally denotes not a particular kind of activity, but any state of mind of a somewhat vague, indefinite or indistinct character. [...] In another commonly—used sense of the word, feeling implies absolute and positive conviction coupled with inability to offer proof or explanation of the conviction [4, p. 11].

Next, more important than synonymy of *feeling* and *emotion* in Collingwood is his proviso: *not a totally separate*. We can infer that there is a separation between emotion (feeling), thinking, and willing, but not a complete one. The nature of this incomplete separation is not determined, however. The extent of *partly* is not elucidated and, therefore, we do not know how much feeling is *a separate function of the mind*. Finally, and crucially, the passage explicates the nature of the dependency of feeling, thinking, and willing, which is not mutual. Thinking and willing hinge on feeling, since the latter includes the former and, again, the latter entails the former.

In *The Principles of Art*, published 22 years later, Collingwood is more explicit on affectivity than in *Religion and Philosophy*. Indeed, one finds there a chapter entitled *Thinking and Feeling*, including subchapters *The Two Contrasted*, *Feeling*, *Thinking*, and finally *The Problem of Imagination*. According to Collingwood, there is a contrast between feeling and thinking that we are

aware of from our experience. He states that: “Thinking and feeling are different” [...] [5, p. 160].⁸
This is so for three formal reasons:

[...] not only in that what we feel is something different in kind from what we think, nor also because the act of thinking is a different kind of act from the act of feeling, but because the relation between the act of thinking and what we think is different in kind from the relation between the act of feeling and what we feel [5, p. 160].

If so, there is, I think, a slight difference to be noted in Collingwood’s approach to relation between feeling and thinking: while in 1916 he conceived feeling as entailing thinking (= C1: feeling includes thinking), in 1938 feeling and thinking are pictured as contrasted (= C2: feeling and thinking are different). If I am right, a change occurred in Collingwood’s view. A few pages later, we find the following:

Feeling appears to arise in us independently of all thinking [...] our sensuous—emotional nature, as feeling creatures, is independent of our thinking nature, as rational creatures, and constitutes a level of experience below the level of thought. [...] it has [...] the character of a foundation upon which rational part of our nature is built [...] Feeling provides for thought more than a mere substructure upon which it rests [...] [5, pp. 163–164].

Let us call this view, namely that feeling provides a base for thought, C3, which in terms of containing/contained can be reformulated as C3.2: thought includes (as its foundation) feeling. If this reformulation is correct, it now looks as if Collingwood holds, from a diachronic perspective, two reverse opinions, for claiming that *feeling includes thinking* is not at all the same as claiming that *feeling includes thought*. One may wonder if we are here dealing with two different views that make Collingwood inconsistent or are evidence of his change of mind, or with two different approaches, or, finally, perhaps with two different senses of feeling (because of different uses of feeling and emotion in both works).

Something similar to Collingwood’s latter claim, though in somewhat different terms, had been expressed by Bergson, barely six years earlier: “Not only emotion is a stimulus, because it incites the intelligence to undertake ventures and the will to persevere with them. We must go further. There are emotions which beget thought [...]” [2, p. 31].

To be exact, Bergson’s and Collingwood’s theses stand in a similar relation to each other as a weak versus a strong thesis. In fact, [t]here are emotions in Bergson is weaker than [t]here is no emotion in Collingwood’s sentence [t]here is no emotion which does not entail the activity of the other so-called faculties of the mind since the latter means that *all* emotions, not just *some* of them, entail thought.

Yet, to be more exact, in the above quote Bergson says two things that are apparently not identical. His claim that *emotion is a stimulus, because it incites the intelligence to undertake ventures and the will to persevere with them* seems to refer to (*all*) emotions (= B1), while his claim that [t]here are emotions which beget thought, even if it goes further by replacing *incit[ing]* with *beget[ing]*, refers to *some* emotions *only* (= B2). This is why I am not convinced that the second claim goes further. Certainly B2 goes further than B1 with respect to recognizing as stronger the influence of emotion on thought, but B1 goes further than B2 in embracing emotions without qualification, this is, as it seems to me, *all* emotions.⁹

When compared, Collingwood’s and Bergson’s theses remain in various relations:

- C1 ((every) feeling includes & entails thinking) \approx B2 ((some) emotions beget thought), because (i) entails = begets, but (ii) every \neq some,
- C3.2 ((every) thought includes (as its foundation) feeling) = B1 ((every) emotion is a stimulus & incites the intelligence).

And as for Collingwood himself:

- C1 ((every) feeling includes & entails thinking) \neq C3.2 ((every) thought includes (as its foundation) feeling),
- C1 ((every) feeling includes & entails thinking) \approx C3 ((every) thought includes (as its foundation) feeling) in view of universal quantifier and the concept of containing, though C1 and C3.2 are opposite because of what contains what.

However, in another chapter of the same book we are told by Collingwood that: “There is no need for two separate expressions, one of thought and the other of the emotion accompanying it. There is only one expression” [5, p. 267].

With that we arrive at a new thesis (= C4: thought and emotion are one expression). It says that both emotion and thought are inseparably linked, since, for example, when “expressing the emotion the act of thought is expressed too” [5, p. 267]. It looks as if emotion and thought form a kind of dyad in which neither element has any superiority over other in any respect.

This is not Collingwood’s last word. In 1942, shortly before his death, he published *The New Leviathan*, where we find another claim that makes things even more complex. We are now told that: “[...] man’s mind is made of thought; but here comes something else, feeling, which seems to belong somehow to mind. [...] Feeling is an apanage of mind [...]” [6, 3.73 & 4.19, pp. 17–18]. Belonging as an apanage—unlike belonging as a constituent—is explained by Collingwood thus: “[...] the way in which an estate belongs to a family or a mooring to a boat or a card in the library catalogue to a book” [6, 4.16, p. 18].

If so, this means that, indirectly, feeling is an apanage of what makes up the mind, that is, of thought/s. And if this is correct, there is no more symmetry between feeling and thought, for thought is not an apanage of feeling.¹⁰ But does this mean that feeling is conceptually a part of thought (= C5)? If so, C5 is close to C3.2 but different from C2 and C4, of which both, in turn, are to some extent opposite each other, since the former is about feeling and thought being different while the latter about their being one. Hence there are two conceptual levels:

- on one level feeling and thought are symmetrical, whether similar (C4) or dissimilar (C2),
- on another level, which is more specific, feeling and thought are asymmetrical and (i) the difference is detailed, (ii) this detailing pertains to opposite kinds of inclusion based on the different aspects of inclusion taken into account, to wit feeling including thinking (C1) and thought including feeling (C3.2/C5).

And this, I think, is a solution that combines Collingwood’s five claims, provided I am right in distinguishing them as five, i.e. C1, C2, C3 (C3.2), C4, and C5. In order to avoid contradiction, similarity and dissimilarity as well as thought’s subordination to feeling and feeling’s subordination to thought should be understood as bearing on non-identical aspects of either symmetry or asymmetry. But in suggesting this I neglect the fact that C1 is dated 1919, while C2, C3.2, and C4 are dated 1938, and C5 is dated 1942.

One of Collingwood’s editors, W. J. van der Dussen, makes the following point: “[...] it is nevertheless not correct to interpret Collingwood as making an absolute distinction between thought and emotion. On the contrary, in his view emotions contain thought and thought emotions” [8, p. 265].

This is excellent. However, given the variety of Collingwood’s theses, as I have shown above, it is not clear what van der Dussen relies on here (there is no reference to support the claim, which is inserted among quotes from *The Principles of Art* and *New Leviathan*). Moreover, note that van der Dussen’s proposition (= D) contains, in fact, not one but two claims: about there being no absolute distinction between thought and emotions (= D1) and about the mutual incorporation of emotions and thought (= D2).¹¹ While D1 may refer to C4¹², D2 echoes C1 and C3.2/C5. Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned}
 D &= \\
 D1 + D2 &= \\
 C4 + C1 + C3.2/C5.
 \end{aligned}$$

Since C2 is left out, I would suggest, in order to offer a fuller interpretation, including all five claims, the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 C \text{ (Collingwood)} &= \\
 \text{symmetry of feeling and thought} &= C2 + C4 \\
 + \\
 \text{asymmetry of feeling and thought} &= C1 + C3.2/C5.
 \end{aligned}$$

This means that I follow the same interpretative pattern as van der Dussen, that is, I combine several works by Collingwood, with the difference that van der Dussen omits C2. Second, I suggest that at least two (or better, three) of them should be mentioned. Finally, it will be prudent to remember that this interpretation is constructed with no regard to the diachrony of the works taken into account.

3. Synthesis

Let me now pass on to my main point. I take a step beyond theses about the inclusion of feeling in thinking and vice versa and set forward another idea about the linkage of two equally important elements that are inseparable. Feeling and thinking are linked symmetrically, in a coordinate, not subordinate way (= Z).¹³

Now, it is essential to bear in mind that epistemic and ontic approaches are not interchangeable. For it can be the case that if the realms of feeling and thought are hardly distinguishable (= Z1), this might be for various reasons: it can be difficult or impossible to distinguish them epistemically, while they are different ontically (= Z1.1) or it can be impossible to distinguish them epistemically, because they are not different ontically (= Z1.2). If the former, either the distinction is not known but it will be known, or at least could be known (= is knowable) (= Z.1.1.1)¹⁴, or it will never be known, even though there is a distinction between thought and feeling (= is unknowable) (= Z.1.1.2). If they are not different ontically (Z.1.2), they are inseparable epistemically, which means that because the distinction between thought and feeling is non-existent ontically, it is only of conceptual character.¹⁵ A fortiori, a pure thought and a pure feeling as such are unknowable.¹⁶ Feeling and thought are dissociable only as analytical constructs but do not exist *in crudo*, namely feeling (alone) and thinking (alone). Thinking without feeling and feeling without thinking may appear useful in certain steps of analysis, but should not be considered as existing as such. If they are distinct but inseparable, the proportion of feeling and thinking in diverse cases of linkage varies. They form a kind of atomic linkage, like Descartes' *no mountain without valley*.¹⁷ There is a mountain and there is a valley, but there is no borderline between them (or even a zone where a borderline could be drawn, because it depends on the environment and other neighbouring mountains and valleys) and only higher/the highest and lower/the lowest points can be indicated. All in all, we are confined to simply setting hypotheses as long as we are limited epistemically. From the ontic point of view the hypotheses are as follows¹⁸:

ontically	epistemically
thought and feeling are ontically two symmetrical and foundational—but separable—elements of the mental	there are epistemically two concepts that correspond to two elements that can be treated in isolation
thought and feeling are ontically two symmetrical and foundational—and	there are epistemically two concepts that should not be treated in isolation

inseparable—elements of the mental	
ontically there are no such things as thought and feeling—there is only one atomic function or act	they are only pure concepts we use to describe one function or one act, but this is inaccurate; the fact that we are used to describing it so results from our deformed epistemic perspective

From the epistemic point of view we have the following hypotheses:

epistemically	ontically
feeling and thought are difficult to distinguish epistemically; the distinction is not known but it will be known or, at least, could be known (= is knowable)	whereas feeling and thought are different ontically
feeling and thought are difficult to distinguish epistemically and the distinction will never be known	whereas feeling and thought are different ontically
feeling and thought are only concepts, or empty concepts	because feeling and thought are not distinct ontically

As long as there is no way of deciding about these hypotheses I suggest giving a formal description of any function or any act. Its structure is this¹⁹:

$$\text{a function/an act} = x \cdot \text{feeling} + y \cdot \text{thinking}$$

where:

$$0 < x < 1, 0 < y < 1, \\ \text{and } x+y=1$$

or, if I am wrong and in extreme cases there is such a thing as pure thought/pure feeling:

$$0 \leq x \leq 1, 0 \leq y \leq 1, \\ \text{and } x+y=1.$$

4. A Short Conclusion

In this paper I intended to analyse Collingwood's views on the thinking/feeling relation because of their relevance for current research in philosophy of affectivity. I interpreted a variety of his positions as mirroring difficulties in grasping the ontic dimension of this relation. For example, his focusing once on the priority of feeling over thinking and once on the priority of thinking over feeling can be seen as an anticipation of the current expressions *emotional intelligence* and *intelligence of emotions*. As it is, these two expressions are used independently, the first by one group of authors, the second by another. My impression is that they speak about the same or a similar phenomenon. But why rather this than that expression is preferred I don't know. In this context Collingwood's approach—if I may take his various claims as parts of one approach—is comprehensive. The surprising fact, however, is that neither contemporaneous nor succeeding authors who tackle the feeling/thinking relation refer, to my knowledge, to each other. Is this a reflection of simple ignorance or something else—say, that each of them understands the distinction differently and, consequently, I am wrong in identifying them as proponents of the thinking/feeling linkage? I consider answering this question valid insofar as it not only concerns the history of

philosophy but also and more interestingly, it seems to me, may contribute to advancing the philosophy of affectivity. If the latter is plausible, Collingwood is an important figure who offers an inspiring vista for treating the feeling/thinking relationship.

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Notes

1. E.g. [16], [17], [18], [21], and, above all, [15]. One of the reviewers of [15], G. Boys–Stones [3, p. 127] wrote: *The conclusion – that Presocratic psychological models were not the dichotomies of reason and emotion with which we are familiar from Plato onwards – is not all that surprising [...]*. Yet, I must say I still meet hostility, criticism or, at best, incomprehension of this idea. I suppose that this unwillingness stems from a strong predominance of another approach, that of the reason/emotion dichotomy.
2. But even after the terminology had been established this view was supported, e.g. by [13, 1025D] (see below).
3. To quote just one work, available also on line: [25, esp. pp. 22–36].
4. A. Heller, [9, p. 191] calls this dichotomy *characteristic of everyday thinking [...] practically a lieu commun*.
5. There is more to say about R. G. Collingwood's views on affectivity. A systematic treatment of feeling is developed in: [6, pp. 18–39 (*IV Feeling & V The Ambiguity of Feeling*)]. In [5] Collingwood seems to adopt a hierarchical approach to affectivity, e.g. p. 164: *This level of experience [...] I propose to call the psychical level. & pp. 232–233: The higher level differs from the lower in having a new principle of organization; this does not supersede the old, it is superimposed on it*. Compare Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann (for analyses and interpretations see respectively [19] as well as [20] and [23]).
6. Compare [11, ch. 3, § 6, p. 55]: *Of the first leading division of nameable things, viz., Feelings or States of Consciousness, we began by recognizing three sub-divisions; Sensations, Thoughts, and Emotions*.
7. Which will not be the case in [5, p. 160]: *[...] a general activity of feeling specialized into various kinds [...] not, clearly, of quite the same kind as sensation; to distinguish it, let us call it emotion. & p. 164: I shall in this book use the word 'feeling' [...] not as a synonym for emotion generally*. Contra [5, p. 239]: *What is expressed is [...] an emotion [...] This feeling [...]*. See also [14, §68 and §488] giving joy [*Freude*] as an example of, respectively, feeling [*Gefühl*] and emotion [*Gemütsbewegung*].
8. See also [5, p. 157]: *the contrast between thinking and feeling*.
9. This ambiguity is inherent to the French text, [1, p. 39]: *[...] l'émotion est un stimulant, parce qu'elle incite l'intelligence à entreprendre et la volonté à persévérer. [...] Il y a des émotions qui sont génératrices de pensée [...]* – the first sentence having no quantifier and with the definite article can be read as *toute, chaque* (all) and *il y a* amounting to the existential quantifier.
10. See also [6, 41.33, p. 344]: *It ought not to surprise you to be told that emotions may turn into thoughts or that thoughts may originate as emotions*.
11. Let me mention that this thesis is not ideally symmetrical, because there we meet *emotions contain thought and thought emotions* instead of, for instance, *emotion contains thought and thought emotion* or *emotions contain thoughts and thoughts emotions*.
12. Van der Dussen's proviso *absolute (distinction)* may correspond to Collingwood's *totally (separate)* ([4, p. 10]).
13. This is more general and as such close to C4 (but also to C2 since I don't claim that feeling and thinking are identical). For a more specific sense of Z see what follows.
14. See [13, 1025D]: *it is not easy to conceive any emotion [πάθος] of man devoid of reasoning [λογισμοῦ] or any motion of thought [δianoίας κίνησιν] without desire, emulation, or joy or sorrow added*.
15. As remarked by A. Heller, [9, p. 23]: *If we should not take this functional difference seriously, then the question: "what does it mean to feel?" would be synonymous with the question: what does it mean to think [...]*?
16. See [24].
17. See [7, V, 52].
18. See [22].
19. See [18, p. 81].

**About the Benefits of Pleasure-in-Others'-Misfortune.
Aaron Ben-Ze'ev's Depiction of Emotions
as Adaptive Mechanisms**

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Abstract:

This paper was inspired by two ideas: (1) the concept of emotions as adaptive mechanisms, which was suggested by Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, and (2) Robert Solomon's criticism of the distinction between "positive" and "negative" emotions which functions in social sciences. In the context of the above mentioned theoretical perspectives I consider the infamous emotion of pleasure-in-others'-misfortune in terms of possible benefits for the experiencing subject. I focus especially on supposed adaptive quality of pleasure-in-others'-aging.

Keywords: emotion, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, pleasure-in-others'-aging, adaptation, aging, *Schadenfreude*.

1. Introduction

Pleasure in-others'-misfortune is a phenomenon well known to people of all times, as well as its antonym – sympathy or indifference “located” between them. Although this pleasure has never been a source of pride, today it seems to be regarded as more inappropriate than in the days of our distant ancestors.¹ On the other hand, because of the growing self-awareness of our culture, we are now more open to free from prejudice consideration of sources, functions and the moral status of this emotion.

Because of its infamous character, pleasure derived from others'-misfortune has rarely been the subject of in-depth theoretical considerations focused solely on it. It has been most commonly discussed in the context of other related emotions – compassion, envy and jealousy. Two books devoted to this emotion deserve to be distinguished: *When Bad Things Happen to Other People* by Johna Portmann (2000) and *Schadenfreude Understanding Pleasure at the Misfortune of Others* edited by Wilco W. van Dijk and Jaap W. Ouwkerk (2014). The first of the highlighted publications is a philosophical analysis of pleasure in-others'-misfortune in the context and discussions with the views of philosophers such as Aristotle, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The other is an interdisciplinary² edited volume devoted to the presentation of the current state of research on this emotion.³ From the point of view of my work, three first parts of the book are the most important: *Schadenfreude as a justice-based emotion*; *Schadenfreude as a comparison-based*

emotion and Schadenfreude as an intergroup phenomenon. The results of psychological research presented in these passages in an interesting way correspond to the approach to pleasure in others'-misfortune suggested by Aaron Ben-Ze'ev. However, the research by Wilco W. van Dijk and Jaap W. Ouwerkerk⁴, which showed that attention to positive self-esteem is an important motive generating the experience of pleasure in others'-misfortune are the closest to my considerations of pleasure in others'-misfortune. Since the mentioned studies provide empirical support for the analysis of pleasure in others'-misfortune presented in this work I will refer to them in the next passages of my work.

The idea to consider the infamous emotion of pleasure-in-others'-misfortune in terms of possible benefits was inspired by the concept of emotions as adaptive mechanisms which was suggested by Israeli philosopher Aaron Ben-Ze'ev [2, chapter 2] and the criticism of the distinction between "positive" and "negative" emotions which functions in social sciences by American philosopher Robert Solomon's [14, *Myth Six. Two Flavors of Emotion, Positive and Negative*].

According to the first concept emotions are reactions to specific ("local") changes in the subject's situation aiming at adapting him to this change. In this way, situationally provoked fear is an adaptive response in the face of particular danger concentrating on remedying it, e.g. through escaping from it. In terms of the Israeli researcher emotions are also a "response" to much deeper changes, connected with the randomness of human existence, i.e. to existential changes. Ben-Ze'ev focuses on death, the most important change of this kind, for me, however, a different kind of existential change – old age is more interesting.

On the other hand, Solomon rightly pointed out that treating the opposition "positive"/"negative" as the proper criterion for the division of the entire class of emotion is a serious mistake, because this additional definition is not as straightforward as it might seem. It means that the distinction between what is positive and what is negative hides other polarizations.⁵ Reference of substantially various meanings of these additional definitions to emotions varied in content reveals that unequivocal qualification of a given type of emotion (or a particular emotional manifestation) from the point of view of their positivity and negativity is not possible.⁶

Inspired by the Ben-Ze'ev's functional approach to emotions and taking into account the equivocal valence of emotions in terms "positive"/"negative", I began to wonder what role *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* could hypothetically play, which could also weaken the negative public image of that, in my opinion, very human emotion. This article arose from this idea.

In the recently conducted research on the moral nature of pleasure in others'-misfortune we can, following A. H. Fischer [4, pp. 309-310] differentiate two approaches. The first concentrates on the motives of this emotion, while in the other attention is focused on social implications of pleasure in another person's misfortune. Although both the concept of emotions (including pleasure in others'-misfortune) as adaptive mechanisms proposed by Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, and my considerations of a special kind of pleasure in others'-misfortune (pleasure in others' aging) fit in the first of the distinguished research perspectives, it does not mean that the other approach is depreciated here. Unfortunately, certain important issues related to the latter research approach do not have sufficient support in research. What I mean here is the question about potential destructiveness of pleasure in others'-misfortune. There is little research on the influence of that pleasure on its „objects"⁷ (that is, a person afflicted by a misfortune giving pleasure to some else). Although it seems a plausible presumption that an overt expression⁸ of pleasure in others'-misfortune probably intensifies the discomfort experienced by the misfortune person, this assumption has not yet been sufficiently verified empirically.⁹

On the other hand, as philosopher John Portmann indicates, the destructiveness of pleasure in others'-misfortune is not necessary prejudged by the overt expression of this emotion. He maintains that people as capable of both compassion and pleasure in others'-misfortune and indifference to what happens to others, are also aware that showing compassion and hiding indifference and even more pleasure at others'-misfortune is the best insurance policy. Because this

policy guarantees us help and support in need, we pretend sometimes that we are worried by the fate of others when it is indifferent to us and/or when we are happy because of someone's bad luck. The problem is that judging from our own attitude, we have a strong premise to suspect all other people of pretending appropriate emotions (compassion) and/or hiding inappropriate ones (pleasure in others'-misfortune). Although the assumption of universal social benevolence is considered naive, all of us in some way need to believe that other people do not wish us harm. This circumstance, I think, may be an argument supporting the assumption about the potential social destructiveness of pleasure in others'-misfortune.¹⁰

I cannot agree with Arthur Schopenhauer, who considered *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* a devilish emotion, worse than alleged "human" envy¹¹ [11, pp. 99-100], although I share certain moral distaste associated with the nature of this emotion. It is difficult to contradict Ben-Ze'ev when he writes that „it would appear to be morally more perverse to be pleased with another person's misfortune than to be displeased with another person's good fortune" [2, p. 374]. Perhaps such bad public perception of that emotion is related to the duration attributed to it. It seems that *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* is often not considered a short-term emotion (lasting seconds or a few minutes), which we could compare to an unwanted thought imposing itself like an involuntary reflex. Instead, it seems to be seen rather as a kind of excessively prolonged vindictive satisfaction with the fact that someone is in a worse situation. Such long-term pleasure may be perceived as stubborn and unchangeable, and thus it can be easily identified with a moral defect rather than (to some extent unconscious) "a moment of forgetfulness". Although the duration of specific pleasure in others'-misfortune may vary greatly, in my opinion, a short (lasting seconds or minutes) experience of this emotion is more frequent and thus more typical.¹² Ben-Ze'ev emphasizing the "transient" character of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune*, in contrast with envy [2, p. 377] seems to indicate, just like me, that the moral condemnation of this emotion is excessive. If, indeed, the moral qualification of that *pleasure* is too strict, we have a valid reason to reconsider this emotion.

For many past and modern philosophers¹³ the unequivocally negative assessment of this emotion is treated as a mistake. Often, like St. Thomas [15, issue 94] they focus on whether the object's misfortune was deserved by him or not¹⁴ and they treat the decision on that matter as an important criterion for the moral evaluation of the specifically occurring case of satisfaction-in-others'-misfortune.¹⁵ Similarly, an unjustified association of that emotion with cruelty is often pointed out.¹⁶ Due to the passive nature of pleasure in others'-misfortune, the propensity to harm someone or take revenge on someone should not be seen as an expression of this emotion, but rather as possible long-term consequences connected with a prior experience of pleasure at someone else's misfortune (e.g. the fall of the "tall poppy" we envy). Leaving this issue in my work I concentrate mainly on cases of pleasure in others'-misfortune which cannot be justified by the fact that the subject deserved what happened to him. For me a special and perhaps not as rare as you might wish case of that pleasure is pleasure in someone else's aging. This study is devoted to the consideration of this specific variant of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* in terms of the adaptive function of the emotion.

This article consists of two main parts: the first, in which I present Ben-Ze'ev's concept of emotions as adaptive mechanisms and the second, in which I first briefly introduce Ben-Ze'ev's characteristics of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* and then consider hypothetical pleasure in someone else's old age through the prism of the adaptive function assigned to emotions.

2. Adaptive Function of Emotions

The idea that emotions have an adaptive function is a concept developed in modern evolutionary psychology in which it is argued that emotions are developed in the course of evolution programs organizing the behavior of the subject, focused on his survival [5, chapter 7]. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev refers to the above precise definition. In his view, emotion is a phenomenon caused by the

perception of a significant change in the subject's situation, aimed at the adaptation of the person to the change. Changes taking place in the external and or internal environment of the subject demonstrate the instability of his life position. And this instability can be potentially detrimental to him. Emotions, as a kind of an early warning system, not only signal that something needs attention, but also intensify the attention and temporarily narrow the cognitive perspective of the subject.

In the context of survival of the individual a change for the worse seems to be more important in the relations person-environment. This does not mean, however, that only this "kind" of change generates emotions, understood as adaptive mechanisms. According to Ben-Ze'ev:

Emotions typically occur when *we perceive positive or negative significant changes in our personal situation* – or in that of those related to us. A positive or negative significant change is that which significantly interrupts or improves a smoothly flowing situation relevant to our concerns [2, p.13].

In the proposed approach to emotions it is stressed that a change is essential not only for emotions, but also for human consciousness as such. It is clear that when the situation of the body is stable (no change is taking place), it goes into a state of limited consciousness, called "an automatic pilot". In this state, similar to the unwitting maintenance of vital functions which constantly takes place in every living organism, the performance of routine, everyday tasks (such as getting dressed, cooking, etc.) is basically automatic, and therefore does not require the involvement of consciousness. This means that the subject "switched" to auto pilot is in some measure sensorially, perceptually and cognitively asleep, and his consciousness unconcentrated on the occurring change is passive and uninvolved. Just like Ben-Ze'ev we can treat this decrease in awareness as "constituting a process of adaptation (...) which expresses the system's return to its homeostatic state" [2, p. 15].

Unlike changes essential for consciousness in general, changes that cause emotions have a highly personal meaning. Changes which the subject perceives as having significant implications for him or those who are connected with him have this status. It is stressed that a change relevant to the generation of emotions is "*a perceived change whose significance is determined by us*" [2, p. 16]. Moreover, the perceived change can be either a change which actually took place or only an imagined one. Both types of changes are essentially subjective, because it is the perceiving subject who decides that changes are significant for him. Apart from the importance of the changes he determines their extent, because deciding to include chosen persons to the group of beings that have a personal meaning for him he sets the range of his emotional involvement (response).

In Ben-Ze'ev's terms emotions are not only a reaction to "local", specific changes in the subject's situation. They are also a "response" to a more profound kind of change associated with the randomness of human existence, i.e. an existential change. I will define the first kind of change with the adjective "external" and the other as "internal". It would be convenient to assume that the former have a real, and the latter mostly imaginary character. Such an assumption is, however, not justified due to the heterogeneous nature of the concept of "existential change". Although Ben-Ze'ev writes about one form of this change – death – not only possible death "persists" in the background of human existence, affecting certain emotional reactions of the subject.¹⁷ It seems that the term "existential change" can include also: maturation, aging, chronic illness, as well as entering into new social roles, e.g. of a parent, a spouse or a senior. Each of the above-mentioned "forms" of the existential change can pertain to the perceiving subject and/or people who are important for him. Possible own or someone else's death, as an indelible element of the situational context, has primarily an imaginary character due to its potentiality. The same can be said about other types of existential changes as long as they are only possibilities which are taken into account. The situation changes when these possibilities actually occur – someone close dies, the subject or someone close to him is ill/maturing/aging or enters into a new role. The death of a loved one is a one-time fact, while maturation, aging, illness or performing of a new role are processes extended in time. The

processual nature of these phenomena is responsible for the way they are perceived. The ailing, maturing or aging subject cannot deny the reality of the changes that occur in him. On the other hand, he cannot completely ignore those which will occur. The subject must adapt to the two types of changes (the occurring ones and the future, and thus only imagined ones). Just like Ben-Ze'ev, I maintain that it is possible thanks to emotions.

3. Comparative Character of Emotional Concern

According to Ben-Ze'ev the occurrence of emotions is determined by a significant change, i.e. the one which the subject regards as relevant from the point of view of his personal concerns (interests, worries). "Concerns" are defined here as "short- or long-term dispositions to prefer particular states of the world or of the self" [2, p. 18]. Emotions serve to monitor and safeguard these personal concerns. The author additionally defines the typical emotional involvement by reference to such aspects as: a) comparative character, b) the availability of an alternative, c) social comparison and d) group membership.

Ad a)

Ben-Ze'ev stresses that "significance, or meaning, is by nature relational; it presupposes *order and relations*" [2, p.18]. The significance of relations for the meaning which the subject assigns to the change is compared here to the rank which color has for the sense of sight. Color is a necessary condition of seeing, but of course not the entire contents of perception. The implication of the relational nature of significance is its comparative nature. Understanding of something involves, therefore, the comprehension of its alternative.

Opting for the comparative character of emotions Ben-Ze'ev maintains that:

the emotional environment contains not only what is, and what will be, experienced but also all that could be, or that one desires to be, experienced; for the emotional system, all such possibilities are posited as simultaneously there and [as such – MMJ] are compared with each other [2, p. 19].

It is clear that the comparison is important because of the central role of changes in the generation of emotions. Only in comparison with a certain background structure the given event may be perceived as a significant change. This structure can be described as a personal baseline. In this way, the reason to feel envy would be a higher position of the object in relation to the subject's personal baseline. Analogously, pity or contempt would be emotions towards those whose position was estimated as significantly below one's personal baseline. Shame would be the result of perceiving own behavior as grossly below own normative standards determined by this baseline, and pride would be the result of estimating it to be significantly above them.

According to Ben-Ze'ev the personal baseline expresses a person's values and attitudes. It is a specific resultant of biological, social, personal, and contextual features. It is also a flexible¹⁸ and not rigid structure, which we can adapt to our own experience, determining the way in which we perceive our own (but also others') states – present, past, ideal and desirable. Emotions are formed by comparing one's own new present situation to one's own different situation or of significant others. Own or someone else's "different" state, as a standard of assessment of the current position, can be a real earlier state, an ideal state in which one wishes to be, or a state in which one should be. In short, an emotion is a result of the discrepancy between one's own (or someone else's) new position and this person's personal baseline, which is a real/ideal/normative criterion that determines the kind of felt emotions. In light of the above, sadness and happiness are the result of a comparison of one's current state with his earlier condition. In contrast, disappointment, hope, fear,

love, hate, sexual desire and disgust are to be related to a comparison of the present condition with the ideal state. On the other hand, comparing one's own position with the current situation of others may lead to other emotions such as envy, jealousy, pity, compassion, happiness because of the well-being of others or pleasure-in-others'-misfortune. Certain emotions can be the result of several kinds of discrepancies occurring at the same time. In Ben-Ze'ev's opinion these are anger and gratitude because these emotions are often connected with a comparison of the current condition of the subject not only with his previous position but also with the condition desired by him, i.e. the one in which, according to his judgment, he should be.

One of the implications of the characteristic for emotions comparative assessment of the situation of the subject or people close to him is that they go beyond the given information. The emotion generating change can be real or imagined. Both are the result of a comparison.

Perceiving the significance of an actual change involves its comparison with some imagined alternatives; and imagining an alternative involves a comparison with our present situation. Perceiving actual changes entails a comparison of our current situation with our normal, baseline situation: the more significant the change is perceived to be, the more intense the emotion [2, p. 20].

Sometimes the real and imaginary types of changes are in conflict. One can be, for example, satisfied with winning a small prize (three winning numbers in a lottery) and at the same time dissatisfied because of perceiving oneself as someone who has not won a lot more (six winning numbers).

Ben-Ze'ev maintains that:

Actual and imaginary changes are present in all emotions, but their relative importance varies. In negative emotions, where our evaluation of the situation is negative, the imaginative type is usually more dominant since the preferred reality is imagined. However, imagination is also present in positive emotions (...) it is dominant in hope and in sexual desire (...) Humans do not live exclusively in the immediate present. Through our mental capacities, we imagine what is likely to happen, what already happened, or what might happen [2], p. 21].

It seems, therefore, that in the case of human emotions, they are mainly the result of "perception" of imagined changes.

Ad b)

An important element of a comparison constituting the emotional significance is a mental construction of an alternative situation. The greater availability (or proximity) of that imagined alternative results in a more intense emotion because: "A crucial element in emotions is, indeed, the imagined condition of <<it could have been otherwise>>," [2, p. 21]. What has just been written explains why in games like „all or nothing" the proximity of an unachieved success¹⁹ is more frustrating than failure itself. When the teams playing the match clearly differ in their level of skill a close loss of the underdog can be a source of pride, instead of sadness, felt by its fans. Not only the greater proximity of an alternative, but also its lack intensifies the felt emotion. Ben-Ze'ev notices that outright failure may lead to depression because the defeated subject cannot imagine a better alternative. A situation in which no particular alternative is more likely to occur than others is also emotionally significant. It happens because of increased uncertainty, which is a variable of emotional intensity.

Ben-Ze'ev notes that the notion of the availability of an alternative is connected with the concept of "abnormality". This is because an "abnormal" (deviating from the norm, not ordinary) event has a highly available alternative. What is more, "the more exceptional the situation, the more available the normal alternative and the more intense the emotion" [2, p. 23].

Ad c)

Emotions arise not only as a result of the perception of a significant change in the physical environment of man, but also (if not primarily) due to the perception of a significant change in his social environment. In the latter case, an emotion is a result of social comparison. This comparison, in general, refers to people and areas which the given subject considers relevant for his own well-being or for the most important concerns. Ben-Ze'ev stresses that in social comparison we do not compare only our own current state with the state in which the significant others are. One's present state is also juxtaposed with one's own earlier state, with the ideal state and the desired state from the point of view of a recognized duty.

Our perception of these states – especially of the ideal and “ought” states - are heavily dependent on social norms and the way others perceive them. Social comparison is important in determining our values and hence our emotions; it reduces uncertainty about ourselves and is helpful in maintaining or enhancing self-esteem [2, p. 24].

For these reasons, social comparison is a potential source of personal instability, especially in terms of self-esteem. An example of the latter is a situation in which the mere presence of someone with very desirable traits produces a decrease in one's self-esteem and thus creates negative emotions.

Social comparison has a decisive role in a number of emotions, among others in envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, compassion, gratitude, hatred, anger, embarrassment, pride and shame.²⁰ The importance of social comparison in such emotions as fear or hope is less obvious. In Ben-Ze'ev's opinion these emotions are more concerned with existential matters.²¹

The importance of social comparison for the generation of emotions is connected with various kinds of relationships. For emotions the most important are social relations that include rivalry and cooperation, and conformity and deviation. Rivalry and cooperation characterize relations among individuals. In contrast, conformity and deviation can be measured in relation to certain values. Rivalry prevails in envy and pleasure-in-others'-misfortune. In these emotions, satisfaction and dissatisfaction depend on the relative superiority of the subject in comparison with the object of the emotion. On the other hand, cooperation prevails in compassion and love as these are emotions directed towards the well-being of both the subject and the object of the emotion. Conformity and deviation dominate in guilt, regret, gratitude, anger, hatred, pride and shame because all these emotions are focused on the compliance of our or others' behavior with certain standards.

In the pair of terms: conformity vs. deviation, deviation is more significant in the context of generating emotions because it attests to the occurring change.

Ad d)

Another very important factor in the emotional reactivity is group membership. If we agree with Ben-Ze'ev that emotions are focused on the issue of survival and social status then one will need to recognize their (emotions') dependence on the formation of groups. Two types of groups have particular importance for emotions: social groups and the reference group.

Every human group is a more or less organized collection of individuals collectively sharing certain standards and entering in relationships with one another. Members of the group are significantly interdependent. Due to this interdependence group membership (e.g. in the family, economic class, ethnic, religious, professional or political party group) essentially influences the goals, self-esteem and well-being of the individual. Against the background of the above definition of the term “group”, the types of groups stressed by Sen-Ze'ev – the social group and the reference group – require further additional specification. A particular social group to which the person

belongs is composed of persons with whom this person has frequent social contacts and real social relations. A function of such a group is to provide mutual support and close social ties to each of its members. Typically, it is less organized and less binding than the reference group, so it can include people with whom we do not have hierarchical relationships. Although generally the social group is larger than the reference group it does not have to contain all its members. Such a situation occurs when we do not have social contact with some members of the reference group.

Someone's reference group contains all those with whom that person compares himself. Members of this group are the most essential for achieving the objectives of the person comparing with them and for his self-esteem. Someone's reference group can include those whom that person knows personally and those with whom he has only imagined, not real, relations. Therefore, the reference group plays a large role in defining the attitudes which its members maintain and appreciate. It also affects the shape of norms and rules which they consider binding regulators of their own behavior. The significance of the reference group is reflected in the fact that the individual identifies with it or aspires to belong to it. The reference group is a kind of a normative censor/controller of attitudes and behaviors of its members, determining their group status. The individual status in the reference group can change significantly in time, while it is generally stable in the social group. The stability of the membership status in the social groups prevents social isolation, whereas the membership in the reference group prevents normlessness which may result in the loss of personal identity.

They above highlighted types of groups are connected with different emotions. Envy, pleasure-in-others' -misfortune, hatred, shame and pride are derivatives of the rivalry prevailing in the reference group and self-esteem of its members which is constantly threatened (or at least demands confirmation). Other emotions are typically triggered by the membership in the social group. The relative status of each member of this group is of less importance than in the reference group. However, the actual situation of individuals is of great importance. For these reasons, the membership in the social group contributes to the occurrence of the emotions of compassion, happy for, fear, hope and love. In contrast, emotions typical for both these groups are, according to Ben-Ze'ev, anger and gratitude. It is justified by the fact that these emotions include concern for our self-esteem in the group.

It is often difficult to set a demarcation line between someone's social group and his group of reference. In the case of children it is typical that both groups overlap, because children do not have fully formed self-esteem, and thus individually specified boundaries. In adults, the borders of the two groups are to some extent flexible. They depend on the way in which one sees his relationships with people in his environment. It is easier to change the boundaries of the social group than the boundaries of the reference group.

It is more up to us to determine with whom we have social contacts than to determine who is significant within the areas of importance to us (...) it is difficult to avoid comparing our professional status and achievements with a colleague who is superior to us (...) however, that sometimes we change the borderlines of our reference group as a result of our personal development or to protect ourselves from frustration and other negative emotions [2, p. 28].

4. Adaptive Nature of Pleasure-in-Others'-Misfortune²²

Ben-Ze'ev refers everything that is written above about the nature of emotions to all emotions, and thus also to the emotion of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune*. In the following part of this article I will focus on the issue of beneficialness of this emotions for the subject experiencing it. Meanwhile, I will introduce the reader to the characteristics of this emotion presented by Aaron Ben-Ze'ev [2], pp. 353-377].

According to Ben-Ze'ev, the cases of the occurrence of the emotion of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* are typically accompanied by the following circumstances, which are also its peculiar characteristics:

1. The person who is the object of this emotion is perceived by the subject as deserving what happened to him;
2. His misfortune is relatively minor²³;
3. The subject is passive in generating the object's misfortune [2, p. 356].

I do not fully agree with the above additional specification of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune*. I actually fully approve only of the third circumstance highlighted by Ben-Ze'ev's associated with the occurrence of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune*. Substantially:

An active personal involvement is contrary to the rules of fair competition (...) [because it is – MMJ] deliberately harming the other (...) [that is why the subject would not be able to feel – MMJ] the real winner in the ongoing competition [2, p. 359].

In other words, an important feature of feeling joy because of adverse fate of another person is the fact that his bad luck is a kind of “unwelcome gift from fate”. This feature lets us distinguish this emotion from sadism and cruelty which are sometimes identified with it. In addition, “the subject's innocence” gives him some kind of right to feel pleasure because of this unwelcome gift. According to this principle we do not rebuke joy of a finder of someone's lost property, although we know that its owner came to harm.

Basically I also agree with the second characteristics of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune*. Indeed, generally *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* pertains to relatively small misfortunes. Ben-Ze'ev is right when he considers the fact of rejoicing at someone else's tragedy (the death of a child, etc.) as an atypical and abnormal case unfortunately associated with this emotion. On the other hand, currently old age is often portrayed as a great misfortune, sometimes more frightening than death. Does this mean that cases of joy felt due to observable aging of another person should be classified as symptoms of pathology? Not necessarily. The analysis of this special kind of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* in terms of the adaptive function assigned to emotions will show (I hope) that its concrete occurrence is not necessarily a dangerous deviation from the commonly acceptable standard.

I cannot, however, agree with the first additional definition of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* proposed by Ben-ze'ev. Although I think that presenting this emotion as allegedly inhuman is wrong, it seems equally inappropriate to me to treat it as a virtue, which happens when pleasure at someone's misfortune is justified by the fact that it was deserved. In this approach the deservedness of a specific misfortune not only legitimises the “onlooker's” pleasure, but is also supposed to testify to his moral motive – the assumed concern for justice. John Portmann accurately notes that although the satisfaction derived from the suffering of others (e.g. those convicted of murder) “might stem from an objective concern for justice (...) [there is still doubt – MMJ] about the frequency of that kind of morally acceptable pleasure” [8, pp. 199-200]. I think it is often not about justice.²⁴ It happens that the motive is a desire to compensate one's own shortcomings or suffered failures. If we accept Portmann's argument that „we are more likely to view the misfortunes of others as deserved than we are our own” [8, p. XI], then we will have to accept that the correct classification of the misfortune that happens to someone else under the terms indicated here (the deservedness) can be problematic.²⁵

Another issue is the scope of meaning attributed to the emotion of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune*. I think that limiting this scope to the cases of *pleasure-in-others'-deserved misfortune*, as suggested by Ben-Ze'ev, is wrong. I think that the reduction of the incidence of this emotion to a situation where someone's misfortune is deserved, thereby giving us the legitimacy to rightfully enjoy it²⁶ is not correct. Similarly, the position of Aristotle [1, 1233 b, pp. 452-453], who reduced

this emotion to pleasure in someone else's undeserved misfortune, while calling rejoicing at deserved misery – righteous indignation²⁷, seems excessively reducing. In other words, *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* seems to include pleasure in both deserved and undeserved bad luck of another person.

Ben-Ze'ev's claim that "the very fact of being pleased with someone's misfortune implies our belief that this misfortune is somehow deserved" [2, p. 357] seems true in a specific way. It seems that this specific truthfulness lies in the fact that not finding the reason for someone's bad luck and at the same time feeling joy because of its existence we are actively looking for its justification, often going so far as to pseudo-rationalization. It happens not only because most of us have inculcated impropriety (and even immorality) of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune*. An important motive for the search for a reason for the occurrence of someone else's misfortune is the fear of it, and the desire to repress that fear.²⁸ This reason, I suppose, is typical for the emotions of *pleasure-in-others'-aging*.

If we maintain that *pleasure-in-somebody's-aging* is an adaptive reaction we need to immediately ask what change it is to adapt the subject to. I suggested that it is a change of existential nature – one's own future or just started aging. Unlike death (another form of an existential change), which is a single fact, aging²⁹ is a process. This circumstance is responsible, in my opinion, for the perception of this change.³⁰ Many people are afraid of old age because our culture depreciates it. Old age is identified with infirmity, ugliness, dependence on others, and generally with the lack of significance. Elderly people are not noticed and "not respected". The world is no longer theirs. If indeed it is so, it is not surprising that own aging is the object of strong repression. Young people repress the awareness of their future old age simply by not accepting it as a fact. It is easy, because for a young person his own old age is as abstract as disease is for a healthy person. A middle aged person is in a more difficult situation. Although we can treat life as the aging process stretching over time, it is clear that the apparent "swallows" of changes associated with aging occur only in the so-called middle age (around 40 years of age). At that time it is difficult to deny the reality of the changes that occur in us, or completely ignore those that are to come. That is why, achieving this level of maturity seems to generate the highest level of fear of old age. If it is so, this stage of ontogenetic development is the most conducive to *pleasure-in-other's-aging* if we assume that this emotion really adapts the subject to his own (occurring or future) aging.

If, according to Ben-Ze'ev's concept, a change significant from the point of view of the subject initiates an adaptive response – emotion – we have to assume that the higher intensity of this change, the greater the strength of the emotion. Translating this into the aging process, we can say that the more rapidly the process takes place, the greater the fear it causes, due to which the adaptation to the observed change becomes a more urgent task. On the other hand, it seems that people differ in the reactivity or approach to changes taking place inside and outside. Although it is necessary to adapt to every change, it can be experienced in various ways. What I want to say is that such a radical change as aging does not have to cause fear in every person. It probably pertains to those of us who are more distanced to both the media demonizing of the old age and to the cultural overestimation of youth. I leave it to the reader's consideration where this distance comes from. In short, we cannot say that aging is an absolutely threatening change that causes a specific emotion, e.g. fear of or pleasure at someone else's old age.

For the sake of clarity I confine the analysis of the emotion of *pleasure-in-other's-aging* to the consideration of women's fear of old age and hypothetical woman's *pleasure-in-other's-aging*. If fear has a gender it seems that the fear of losing physical attractiveness is central in the female fear of aging³¹. Treating this hypothetical assumption as legitimate, I limit myself to considering the emotion of *pleasure-in-other's-aging* to women's rejoicing at signs of deteriorating physical appearance observed in another woman.³²

In our times, "there are no ugly women, there are only neglected ones", and that is why women seem to feel obliged to be physically attractive. Old age itself is treated today in a similar

way, i.e. more as a matter of negligence, rather than the effect of the inevitable biological process. We are told that we work the whole life for our old age, thus suggesting that as a result of acting properly (diet, exercise, caring) our own old age will not be ugly, infirm or insignificant. In short, we are taught that culture can overcome biology. If this is true we are responsible for what we look like in mature and older age. On the other hand, despite the fact that maintaining pretty appearance is presented as a realistic task, it is known that it is like winning the Tour de France – an extraordinary achievement, accomplished in competition with all those who have the same goal.

Comparison of efforts to maintain attractive appearance to the competition highlights the importance of determinants of emotions indicated by Ben-Ze'ev – comparison, the availability of an alternative and the reference group. I will show below how all of them contribute to the occurrence of specific woman's joy due to the reduced attractiveness of another woman.

Keeping Ben-Ze'ev's findings, I treat women's pleasure in another woman's physical attractiveness deterioration due to age as a result of comparison. What is compared here is one's own attractiveness and attractiveness of another woman. Although the impulse to felt pleasure is someone else's worse appearance, it is not, as Ben-Ze'ev argues, the subject of this pleasure. This emotion concerns obtaining a higher status (here: attractiveness) and not humiliation of the "rival", although this „ennoblement" requires her diminution. According to Ben-Ze'ev's analysis of pleasure-in-others'-misfortune in the enjoyment of someone's lesser attractiveness we should see also a reaction to the imagined change. This means that this emotion is also the result of a comparison of the current good looks of the subject for example with the imagined (past or future) looks of another woman.³³

An important element of a comparison constituting the emotional significance is a mental construction of an alternative situation. Greater availability of this imagined alternative is to correspond to greater intensity of the felt emotion, because in emotions the imagined condition – "it could be otherwise" – has great importance. In light of this, pleasure in someone else's deteriorating appearance will be more intense when the imagined alternative – own reduced attractiveness – is more accessible. Such a situation occurs when a woman of our age or a younger one looks worse than we. The similarity of the subject's age to that of the object of the emotion (here: a peer/a younger woman) is for the subject a threatening *memento* activating fear of what is to come – the reduced attractiveness of own appearance. The assumed increased intensity of the emotion due to greater availability of the alternative corresponds to my assumption that middle age especially predisposes people to pleasure in somebody's old age.

A comparison, which results in an emotion (including: pleasure in someone else's lesser physical attractiveness) is primarily a social comparison, i.e. relating to people and areas important from the point of view of well-being and the most important concerns of the subject. What is more, social comparison is multidimensional, so feminine joy because of another woman's worse appearance is the effect of not only comparing the current appearance of the subject with the appearance of the „rival". This emotion arises also by comparing one's own present appearance with the earlier, ideal and desirable (in the sense of being an expression of a specific duty) attractiveness. Ben-Ze'ev emphasizes that our perception of the above distinguished own states is largely dependent on social norms and how others perceive us. Hence, social comparison is important in determining our values and affects subjective self-esteem. Applying these findings to women's pleasure due to the lower attractiveness of another women, we can say that: 1. This joy is a by-product of our culture characterized by the perception of women in which physical beauty of women is overrated. 2. An important attribute of feminine beauty is youthful appearance. Maintaining it is an ideal which women try to achieve in different ways and in varying scopes. 3. Women feel obliged to ensure that their appearance corresponds to the current standards of beauty. How well (and if at all) they fulfill this „task" affects their self-esteem. 4. Reduced attractiveness of a peer/a younger woman confirms the beauty of the one who compares herself to her. For this reason, women may be inclined to feel pleasure in decreasing beauty of other women.

The reference group, including all those with whom the subject compares herself, also plays a considerable role in “provoking” pleasure-in-others’-misfortune. Since we compare ourselves with those who are the most essential for our purposes and self-esteem, the reference group determines our status. According to Ben-Ze’ev’s analysis feminine pleasure in the deteriorating appearance of another woman is the result of rivalry and constantly threatened self-esteem in the reference group with which the woman feeling this pleasure identifies herself and to which she aspires. It can be assumed that the reference group of an average 40-year-old woman includes not only peers, or more broadly her generation (e.g. women born in the 70s), but also women from the later generation, that is from 10 to 15 years younger. What is more, each reference group includes not only those people with whom the subject has actual contact, but also women personally unknown to her – actresses, singers, etc. – who often have opportunities to maintain and preserve their beauty which are unattainable for ordinary women. It is clear that these unusual members of one’s reference group increase the physical attractiveness standard binding in this group. Oddly often mediocre women, identifying with the reference group, do not blame them, because slowly and nicely aging celebrities prove that the maintenance of attractive appearance is achievable for anyone who tries hard enough. Assuming that this is the case makes it easy to absolve oneself of experienced pleasure in worse appearance of a female friend. The former can “rationalize” that it is the latter’s fault – she has not kept a diet, has not exercised, has not nurtured her skin, etc. Blaming a female friend for her condition we protect ourselves from compassion for her. When the woman sympathizes with another woman because of the visible traces that time has left on her, then in a way she identifies with her, and thus takes into account the fact that today’s misfortune of the other woman can befall her tomorrow.³⁴ The identification with the object, which is characteristic for compassion, may thus undermine the sense of one’s own efforts to maintain beauty.

Why should we be afraid of compassion if it confronts us with the brutal truth that the desire to maintain attractive looks is like chasing a rabbit? The answer is contained in the question itself, because it is the brutal truth, and as such should be applied in doses. If we cannot win it means that we are like others, dependent on biology, not exceptional as general Zajaczkę’s wife who being an elderly lady aroused appreciation for their beauty of young men in their twenties. Does the above mean that the fear of own old age should always be alleviated? An affirmative answer does not seem to be correct. Trivially speaking with the passage of time it becomes more and more difficult to maintain appealing appearance, and thus it becomes increasingly difficult to believe in its maintenance. What is needed in the face of changes that cannot be denied is the adaptive acceptance of them.

In light of the above, women’s pleasure in the deteriorating physical attractiveness of another woman can be seen as a necessary part of gradual adaptation of the subject to her own, not remote in time/recently started aging process. If this possibility is plausible, a tendency to feel that kind of joy should decrease with the progress of the physical changes associated with own aging. Should this assumed “predisposition” also disappear? I think that it should. This cannot be applied, however, to pleasure-in-other’s-aging understood more broadly, i.e. not limited only to physical changes in appearance. I signaled earlier that as the aging process progresses its other attributes gain in importance. Saying the obvious: to maintain health and fitness becomes the most important.³⁵ Competing in the realm of health seems bizarre, and also inappropriate. Although unhygienic lifestyle and/or applied diet are often the main (and sometimes the only) cause of a disease, a disease seems to be still seen primarily as something that happened to a particular person, and not as an ailment that the patient himself is culpable of. A disease perceived in this way is not a suitable object for pleasure in someone else’s aging.³⁶ The situation is different in the case of physical fitness. It seems that regardless of gender, all elderly people may have a tendency to feel pleasure in someone else’s deteriorating physical fitness, as long as they believe that physical fitness is a result of exercising. This belief not only justifies their joy, but also allows for the temporary repression of fear of one’s own infirmity. As such it is the affirmation of their own power.

5. Conclusion

In light of the above presented depiction of emotions as adaptive mechanisms, emotional sensitivity is the resultant of the subject's specific ability to face two kinds of changes – “local” and existential changes. Ben-Ze'ev emphasizes that, thanks to the reactive character, emotions can be seen not only as a testament to individual sensitivity, but also as an expression of profound vulnerability of the subject. On the other hand, we can also perceive them as “ways to cope with [this vulnerability – MMJ]” [2, p. 17].

It means that an emotional response in the face of a specific local change in someone's situation may be a way to cope with what really cannot be overcome – the most important existential change, our own death. In other words: 1. An emotional reaction in the face of a certain change is synonymous with granting significance to it; 2. This assigning of significance to a local change is a form of ignoring a change responsible for our existential vulnerability (death); 3. This “ignoring” is a kind of self-deception, “a certain measure of [which – MMJ] (...) is highly advantageous from an evolutionary point of view, as it enables us to protect our positive self-image and mobilize the required resources for facing daily changes” [2, p. 17].³⁷

It is clear that the assigned to emotions ability to face a local change in the situation of the subject only seemingly reduces his existential vulnerability. This disposal should not, however, be depreciated. Thanks to emotions life itself seems possible. By engaging the subject in the activity aiming at his adaptation to everyday changes which are identified as important, they give meaning not only to the effort overcoming them, but also to the very existence focused on constantly repeated actions of this type. As Ben-Ze'ev rightly observes, without emotional involvement which affirms ordinary changes “the fact that in the long run all of us will die” would have to imply that in the short term we should not strive to “forget” that it is the case, i.e. to live, in the sense of constantly adapting to the changing environmental conditions [2, p. 17]. In short, by motivating us to respond to changes around us and in us emotions give us the illusion that we can overcome death because the most important reason for our reaction to changes is our will to survive. And this seems to be exactly the final sense of the specific kind of *pleasure-in-others'-misfortune* – *pleasure-in-others'-aging*.

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Notes

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1. Such a presumption arises after reading the texts by Kuipers [4] and by Oostdijk [7]. Kuipers shows changes that have taken place in social regulations relating to pleasure in-others' –misfortune. These changes have been the result of transformations in the sphere of contemporary standards of civilized behavior. In the Middle Ages it was not thought that pleasure connected with watching the suffering or even death of publicly punished criminals is immoral. However, in later times reacting with this emotion in the face of someone else's misfortune was not only inappropriate, but also immoral. Oostdijk proves that by the incorporation of new, more civilized rules of showing emotions to the nineteenth-century novels (e.g. *The Portrait of a Lady* and *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*) these books "incidentally" educated the readers to slow their emotional "savage" impulses by empathically feeling the situation of other people.
 2. Apart from philosophical texts contained in this volume (e.g. by Aaron Ben-Ze'ev and John Portmann), there are also studies in the field of psychology, sociology and history of literature.
 3. This book contains a summary of the state of research on the emotion of pleasure in others' -misfortune in issues such as the definition of that emotion, its moral nature, factors determining the occurrence of pleasure in others' -misfortune, the role of this pleasure in group and intergroup relations, the expression of this emotion and its social consequences, etc.
 4. The description of these studies is contained in the second part (in the ninth chapter) of the mentioned collective volume[16].

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5. Solomon enumerates nineteen different additional definitions of the terms "positive"/"negative", while stressing that his "list" is not complete. For example the sense of the term "positive" covers, among others: 1. That is good (in the sense that it satisfies my needs and / or my desires), 2. That gives me pleasure, 3. That makes me happy, 4. That is good in the normative sense, i.e. connected with the observance of certain universal principles and rules, 5. Positive attitude to object, 6. Positive attitude to self, 7. The object has high status, 8. I have high (higher) status. In contrast, meanings of the term "negative" indicated by Solomon are, of course, oppositions of the definitions of the adjective "positive" [14, pp. 171-172].
 6. Solomon mentions only simple disgust as a possible exception to this rule. You can, however, have doubts whether this disgust is an emotion or simply a physiological, automatic reflex.
 7. I put the word "object" in inverted commas because the object (i.e. the subject) of pleasure in others' -misfortune is not the unhappy person, but his/her misfortune, and even (if we agree with A. Ben-Ze'ev) own, free from that bad luck state of the person manifesting this pleasure.
 8. For example, in the form of naughty, overt laughter.
 9. That hypothesis seem in some way confirmed by the study conducted by A. H. Fischer, Mann, et al in 2014 which showed that the audience laughing at someone offended causes a stronger feeling of humiliation in that person [4, p. 310].
 10. On the other hand, pleasure in others' -misfortune may be a factor strengthening the unity of a group. This happens when members collectively experience and express their joy at the misfortune of members of the group with which they compete (e.g. fans of a sports team). In such a situation this joy not only strengthens ties in their own group, but essentially does not harm intergroup relations, because it promotes "healthy competition". Unfortunately, when the balance of power between the rival groups is apparently uneven, that healthy competition, which in some sense expresses respect for the rival, can be replaced by ruthless, aggressive domination. Then joy at the failure of the other group (especially collectively and publicly expressed) can have destructive consequences for the self-esteem of the victim (the defeated group) [12], [7].
 11. The exact wording of the quote to which I refer is as follows: "Feeling envy is human, gloating over the misfortunes of others is diabolical. There is no sign more infallible of an entirely bad heart, and of profound moral worthlessness than open and candid enjoyment in seeing other people suffer". Although we are talking here about envy, it pertains rather to envy. The description of alleged jealousy contained in the fragment of the paragraph from which this quote comes justifies that conclusion. [Note from the translator: in the Polish version of the book the word used in this fragment is jealousy, not envy].
 12. I base this assumption on the fact that in childhood we are taught that pleasure-in-others' -misfortune is not only inappropriate, but also immoral and possibly imprecating punishment for the one who feels it. "You will be punished if you take pleasure in someone's misfortune". Thanks to this teaching, many of us are ashamed of it when we feel this emotion (and hence we do not disclose experiencing this emotions) and/or preventively avoid it, in the same way as we avoid cursing someone in fear of our curse turning against us. For these reasons, the subject experiencing this emotion seems to have a tendency to shorten the duration of this experience and/or to deny it. In short, as a result of the received education we chide ourselves for feeling pleasure-in-others' -misfortune, that is why this emotion seems to be rather "spot" felt.
 13. For example, for St. Thomas Aquinas, I. Kant, John Portmann or Aaron Ben-Ze'ev.
 14. Numerous psychological studies show that the more deserved someone else's misfortune is, the higher the level of pleasure felt by the observer of the other person's suffering [3].
 15. John Portmann is a known contemporary philosopher emphasizing the importance of the deservedness of the object's misfortune for the moral evaluation of the joy at his misfortune. He points that that the pleasure that one derives from the suffering of another person (if suffering is adequate to his guilt) "might stem from an objective concern for justice". In this case, it is a morally acceptable kind of pleasure. Portmann distinguishes this morally justified joy at someone else's misfortune from the condemned "malicious glee" (pleasure motivated and constituted by malice). Malicious glee, despite its fundamentally unethical nature, can be justified if the other person's misfortune is deserved or trivial, and the malicious person enjoying it is passive (in the sense of not causing this misfortune) [8], pp. 199-200]. On the other hand, the same author indicates that the issue the deservedness of the misfortune is very problematic. More information about this will be discussed later in this paper, on the occasion of the presentation of Ben-Ze'ev's clarification of pleasure in-others' -misfortune.

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16. John Portmann's book [8], contains an interesting discussion about various kinds of criticism of *pleasure-in-others' -misfortune*.
 17. The great importance of fear of death for the emotional functioning of man is stressed by the creators of the TMT (terror management theory) – J. Greenberg, S. Solomon, T. Pyszczynski. They point out that people are generally so afraid of their own death that they are highly motivated to repress the awareness of this future fact from their consciousness. An effective way of this repression of this fear is not noticing or belittling (instead of compassion) someone's suffering or a tragedy happening to other people [10].
 18. Ben-Ze'ev rightly pointed out, however, that "such flexibility (...) is limited since our ability to change our values and attitudes is limited" [2, p. 19].
 19. Such a situation occurs, for example, when the level of the teams playing the match is even.
 20. Researchers such as Smith [12], Schurtz [12], Van de Ven [17] or Van Dijk [16] similarly to Ben-Ze'ev emphasize the central meaning of social comparisons for a particular instance of pleasure in-others' -misfortune.
 21. "Fear of death and hope for better health are such cases in which the concern for our existence is so dominant that social comparison is less significant. In other cases of fear and hope, social comparison may be significant" [2, p. 24].
 22. In the strict sense, this emotion is rather pleasure/enjoyment/joy caused by someone's failure/bad luck, which is suggested in 2).
 23. Although it may seem easy to distinguish the trivial from the serious misfortune, the explicit qualification of what befell the other person can often constitute a problem. John Portmann writes about it inspired by the view of Arthur Schopenhauer according to which trivial misfortunes do not exist and therefore all suffering should be treated equally seriously, instead of laughing at it, or even worse enjoying it. Portmann rejects the attitude of seriousness and compassion towards every possible misfortune postulated by Schopenhauer. On the other hand, he also stresses that "it is impossible to draw a clean line between trivial and non-trivial suffering" [8, p. XVII].
 24. I have in mind justice in the Kantian sense, i.e. something impartial, which is different from the rationalized self-interest.
 25. The correct classification of a given misfortune into the class of deserved or undeserved ones is difficult for many reasons. Using John Portmann's interesting analysis of this question [8, *Introduction*) I will show only two of them: 1. An obvious reason for the ease with which we accept someone else's suffering is our self-interest. Nietzsche showed how easy it is to "see" a bad person in an individual with whom we compete for a certain good. In this way, the rival, as someone bad, deserves the misfortune that befalls him. 2. Beliefs regarding what people deserve, widespread in the given culture and time, are always in some way arbitrary and potentially harmful. To simplify, one could say that in the eighteenth century United States, according to white people black slaves deserved their fate. In the same way, a heterosexual, conservative community condemning promiscuity and/or sex between men can perceive people with visible signs of syphilis or suffering from AIDS as individuals who deserve the disease. If such an estimation took place, those who made it are, according to Portmann, "bad things that happened to others who suffer". In short: the determination of someone's misfortune as "deserved" is not a simple ascertainment of the real state of affairs, but rather an act of its constitution.
 26. Also St. Thomas Aquinas' explanation of saints' joy when observing the deserved suffering of the wicked seems similarly reductive.
 27. "Envy means being pained at people who are deservedly prosperous, while the emotion of the malicious man is itself nameless, but the possessor of it is shown by his feeling joy at undeserved adversities; and midway between them is the righteously indignant man, and what the ancients called Righteous Indignation—feeling pain at undeserved adversities and prosperities and pleasure at those that are deserved".
 28. This human motive is described in an interesting way by the psychological terror management theory. This reason is also the essence of one of the attributes of defense – the belief in a just world.
 29. Just like maturation, suffering from an illness or entering into new social roles.
 30. I think that the perception of aging and maturing, entering into new roles or developing a chronic illness must also be a process. We perceive these phenomena, so to speak, in tranches. Maybe that is why we can accept them. On the other hand, the fact that signs of aging develop gradually in a long-term perspective (several years/decades) facilitates the repression of the occurring aging process from consciousness.
 31. The loss of beauty is something that excludes women from the competition for importance and influence. An old woman does not mean much, because no one notices her. An exception to this rule are only women who are

outstanding in their field/very well known. Oddly, many of them maintain attractive appearance, thus confirming the social practice of marginalization of unattractive women.

32. This does not mean that women do not feel the fear of all that is associated with/attribution to old age – infirmity, dependence on others or lack of significance. It just concerns the fact that for a 40 or 50 year old woman infirmity and the other above mentioned attributes of old age are as abstract as old age is for a very young person.
33. Trivially speaking a comparison with the imagined past appearance of another person is a necessary condition to be able to recognize his/her present appearance as a significant change. A comparison of one's own attractiveness with the imagined deteriorating physicality of another woman is less obvious. If such a comparison occurs, it makes the significance of the actually observed change more frightening (e.g. the loss of skin elasticity or face oval) perceiving it not so much as a single symptom of deteriorating appearance associated with old age, but rather as an obvious harbinger of something much worse – the total loss of beauty. In short: the imagined change intensifies fear of old age, and thus increases pleasure-in-others' –misfortune as the one which the subject has (yet!) succeeded to avoid.
34. It is a reference to one of the conditions of compassion highlighted by Aristotle – similarity of possibilities.
35. I am not writing here about intellectual ability, because mental indisposition of various degrees is connected with serious diseases, while reduced fitness (except, of course, post-traumatic disability, or resulting from the nature of the disease someone has suffered from) is simply the result of negligence of efforts aimed at maintaining one's own body in good shape.
36. I have pointed out that I believe that the reduction of cases of pleasure in someone's misfortune to deserved failures is inappropriate, however a disease seems to be some exception. In the case of an illness, particularly a severe and chronic one, Ben-Ze'ev's emphasis on the deservedness of the misfortune that happened to the other person (cf. the first of the additional definitions of pleasure at someone else's misfortune distinguished by Ben-Ze'ev) seems to be justified. Perhaps the assumed unique status of a disease stems from the fact that it is (especially when it is serious) generally perceived as great evil. A disease seen in this way, in accordance with the second of the characteristics of pleasure-in-others' –misfortune proposed by Ben-Ze'ev, is not a typical object of this emotion.
37. Remedying a local change in one's own situation proves agency, and it is an important component of self-esteem. In this way, a person forced to move by his own fear has a sense of agency and control over his own life if his escape from the aggressor was successful.

Procrastination as a Form of Misregulation in the Context of Affect and Self-Regulation

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Abstract: This article aims in situating procrastination, as a specific form of affect regulation failure in context of general affect and self-regulation literature. This will be brought starting with definition of the phenomenon and its' various forms and perspectives. Next, giving an insight into affect regulation literature. In the third step we will focus on elaborating the picture of procrastination and its' underlying mechanisms in order to locate it in a broader domain of affect regulation as a specific form of self-regulatory lapse. A commentary regarding dealing with procrastination and effective affect regulation will be provided.

Keywords: affect regulation, self-regulation, procrastination.

1. Foreword

Work self-efficacy is a fundamental component of functioning inside the modern western culture. As a result of finished motivation cycle cycle [1, 2], Kofta [3], together with different forms of self-regulation, like keeping a healthy diet, refraining from drugs or resolving conflicts without violence, contributes to subjective well-being. Whereas auto-regulatory processes, like regulation of heart rate or breathing, that don't demand consciousness, are common among living creatures, only humans are capable of exerting conscious, effortful control on their behaviour in order to reach significant goals [4]. The dependence of self-regulation on mental processes explains the interest of psychological research in this domain. One could wonder if the strength of the interest hasn't corresponded to human weakness in exerting self-control over oneself.

The aim of this article is to present procrastination as one of faulty self – regulation mechanisms, that weakens self-efficacy. Specifically, it is argued that stalling behaviour results from prioritizing present affect, regardless of threat to significant goals and well being. Since multitasking and fragile self-control breed procrastination, it most often occurs among young professionals and students. Even though procrastination screening rates in samples of American

university and college students vary between reports, they show that stalling behaviour is a pervasive problem in those population, reaching the level from 70% [5], up to 80 – 95% [6, 7] of students reporting to procrastinate at least in some points in time during their education, as compared with 15-25% of general population [7]. Research on procrastination from other culture, like South Korea [8], Nigeria [9] and Poland [10] indicate that this problem isn't restricted to American sample. This is why work and academic environments are most often a focus psychological investigation into procrastination [for example: 11, 12, 13, 5, 8].

2. What is Procrastination?

In various research procrastination is defined as postponing an intended action to future date [14], neglecting to attend to necessary responsibilities in timely fashion, despite intention to fulfil them and awareness of unpleasant consequences of such a postponement [7], putting tasks off despite expecting to be worse off because of that [15]. Another commentary that adds to understanding of the phenomenon, limited to academic environment, states that stalling behaviour is self-reported tendency to nearly always or always put off academic tasks and nearly always or always experience problematic level of anxiety associated with this procrastination [16]. Definitions reveal various factors that demand consideration in work on procrastination, namely its' behavioural (inaction), cognitive (consequence awareness) and emotional (distress) components. Another component explicitly or implicitly present in the definitions is temporal aspect of the phenomenon, that focus on present, associated with lack of task performance, and future, associated with action and task performance. To exemplify the case: a student who sits down to homework assignment, but instead of opening a textbook, decides to watch "just one" episode of his favourite TV show, and do the task "just after that", then starts feeling nervousness nearing the end of the episode after remembering he promised to help father repair the sink in the kitchen the same evening, and comprehension he won't manage both tasks before bedtime because of the unnecessary delay of assignment performance, isn't just chilling out, but procrastinating. Procrastination may be a problem in various domains of life, concerning, apart from academic tasks, professional duties, house chores and interpersonal relationships.

Multiple frameworks show that procrastination isn't a homogenous phenomenon, as it brings different forms. Chu and Choi [12] propose to distinguish between passive and active form of procrastination. In their conceptualisation passive procrastinators don't intend to postpone their actions but end up stalling after spending too much time on making decisions and initiating actions. When deadline gets closer pressure starts to take its' toll on their task completion attitude, eliciting doubts about their ability to finish it. In the same time active procrastinators deliberately don't initiate action on planned project straight away. Having plan to complete it in mind, they focus on other activities in immediate time perspective and become mobilised by planned project's deadline approaching [12]. Another distinction highlighted in literature focus on subject of procrastination, which can affect task completion directly through action postponement or indirectly through delay in decision making process [17]. In regard to cross-situational stability of the phenomenon, procrastination is a subject of scientific attention both as an occasional occurrence [7] and as a stable disposition [18]. Multifaceted nature of procrastination indicate that the phenomenon requires to be placed in broader framework of self-regulation.

3. Gross' Model of Affect Regulation

Various forms of self-regulation involve: impulse, emotions, desires, performances and different behaviours regulation [19]. Listing affect management as a type of self-regulation is frequent, however relies on simplified definition of emotion. Indeed, when understood as altering expression of one's emotional experience [4], emotional regulation can be considered as similar to other forms of self-control. However, modern research approach identifies three components of emotional episode: behavioural expression, subjective feeling and physiological arousal [20]. Management of

so understood affect is more interconnected and reliant on other forms of self-regulation (impulse, cognitions, goals management). However, despite established position of three componential definition of emotion, large body of affect-regulatory research focus on its' expression, overlooking subjective experience and physiological arousal.

To both compliment the gap and organize various forms of affective states management Gross [21] formulated a process model of emotional regulation. In this process model, emotional regulation is understood as a mechanism in which an individual influences which emotions they have, when and how they experience and express them [22]. Regarding temporal aspect of emotional episodes people tend to regulate them, when they are not satisfied with duration or frequency of such experiences [23]. Organisation of emotional regulation strategies is embedded in generative process of emotion elicitation, starting from situation selection (1), through situation modification (2), attentional deployment (3), cognitive change (4), up to response modulation (5) [24]. The phases of emotion arousal also group five families of affect regulatory strategies.

Consequently, in the first phase – situation selection – Gross [22, 24] distinguishes two kinds of behaviours: approaching and avoiding emotionally engaging situation, people or places. For example an individual can decide to walk home after work, fearing to meet a nasty co-worker on the bus, or take the bus on purpose of responding to their malicious comments and experiencing satisfaction. Situation modification – the second family of strategies - can take a form of problem-focused coping [25] when an individual puts effort into changing certain aspects of situation, which in turn influences reaction of the individual. In case of nasty co-worker, an honest conversation would be an example of problem-focused coping. Attentional deployment (3) involving such processes as distraction, concentration on positive and mindfulness, can also be conceptualized as internal situation selection. The employee could take the bus, but instead of engaging in conversation with the colleague focus on the music from the radio (distraction), notice it's nice to have someone to talk to (concentration on positive) or analyze their sensual experiences during the ride (mindfulness). Cognitive change (4) family of affect regulation strategies comprises, among others, challenge, instead of threat, appraisal, humour and downward social comparison. Their common feature is that an individual interprets the situation in a way that boost their perception of control over it or shows their beneficial position. Using downward social comparison strategy, the character from the example can tell themselves that they are better off having a nasty co-worker in comparison to unemployed, who neither have colleagues, nor job. In the chronologically last phase of emotion elicitation – response modulation (5) Gross [24] names venting, suppression, self-harm, substance use, food preoccupation, exercise and relaxation. They occur after the innate responses have been launched and are directed at modifying different emotional components, for example the employee may suppress expression of anger after some vicious co-worker remark, go for a drink to relieve muscle tension associated with physiological component of emotion or listen to favourite song to boost its' subjective feeling. Although abovementioned strategies function is mostly to boost affective state, some frameworks include perspective of social benefits resulting from its' worsening [26].

It is important to notice that regulation of subjective feeling and physiological arousal, that takes place in early stages of emotion generation influence its' expression, shaping bodily (facial, postural, gestural) signs of the experience, as well as temporarily direct, like fight, flight, freeze [27] and indirect behavioural, like compulsive gambling [28] manifestations of emotional arousal. This means that a conscious cognitive decision of avoiding some kind of situation with a direct consequence of feeling a relief, facing some kind of situations with immediate result of stress and mastering ability to cope with some stressors as a long term gain, altering thoughts about the situation (reappraisal, acceptance, humour) are all forms of affect regulation [23], [29]. They all, however, refer to different mechanisms, potentially influencing various affective states.

4. Adaptive and Maladaptive Aspects of Affect Regulation

Generally, studies show that actual [30], [31] and believed [32], [33] ability to regulate affective states contributes to physical and mental health and general well-being. However, not everyone is capable of regulating their affect successfully. Deriving from more general framework of self-regulation, problems with affect regulation (regulation failure) might take the form of underregulation, when an individual fails to carry the regulation process out, and misregulation – when an individual uses an inappropriate form of regulation [4]. An example of underregulation would be the aforementioned employer who, after getting annoyed by the colleague malicious remarks, puts on his favourite music album, but fails to listen to it through and get completely relaxed. Misregulation on the other hand could be portrayed by a situation in which the man decides to tell about the event his friend but feels unsatisfied with the friend's lack of misunderstanding and ends up feeling even more nervous.

A different approach to regulatory processes focus on flexibility of their application [34, 35, 36]. Cheng [36] defines coping flexibility simply as variability in coping. It is worth to notice, that term *coping* refers to dealing with external situations, what makes it a close relative of emotion, but not mood, regulation [see: 76, 77, for the difference between emotion episode and mood state] Bonnano and colleagues [35] studied two affect regulation strategies: enhancing and suppressing emotional expression, as well as adjustment in college among New York freshman college students directly after terrorists attacks of September 2001 and 18 months later. Greater flexibility of the two strategies application was associated with less distress experienced later in the study. Further understanding of successful adaptation to college was brought by Park and colleagues [37]. They studied three self - regulatory processes: constructive thinking, emotional regulation and mastery (sense of controllability over one's social and academic lives). Results indicated that the strongest predictor of freshmen's college students adjustment to new environment wasn't the initial level of regulatory abilities but their development over time. These findings give a notion of real processes behind life-span effective adjustment.

Even though affect regulation doesn't have to be necessarily a conscious, effortful process [see: 38 for implicit/automatic emotion regulation] it requires specific knowledge and ability to apply it in real-life situations. As any self-regulation process it consists of standards, monitoring and strength [4]. Standards stand for understanding of social norms operating in situations given, monitoring means consciousness of one's current behaviour and feeling state, while strength is an ability abstain from an automatic response (or state) and conform to desired one. More specific for affect regulation conditions involve awareness of emotions experienced and their context, goal of regulatory process (what exactly one wants to achieve) and strategies that define its' means [23]. Those components themselves, especially emotional awareness and strength to carry desired changes, together with distress tolerance are dispositions constituting individual differences of affect regulation ability [39, 40, 41].

Individual differences research approach to management of affective states refer to concept of emotional intelligence [42, 43, 24]. Salovey and Mayer [42] definition of emotional intelligence comprises four skills/abilities: (first) to perceive and recognize emotional expressions, (second) to take advantage of emotion for cognitive actions, like thinking, planning or problem solving, (third) to understand emotions, their dynamics and relationships between them, development of this capacity is closely related to emotional language comprehension, and (fourth) to manage one's own and others emotions. Explaining the concept of emotional intelligence authors argue further that it meets standards of traditional intelligence, but operates on other forms of information – social, practical, personal and emotional [43]. Emotional intelligence disposition shows positive relationship with various domains of life, like work satisfaction [44], marital satisfaction [45], mental health [46], well-being – especially happiness measures [47]. Emotional intelligence framework, focuses on trait-like perspective of affect management, and is perceived, by some researchers as parallel tradition, next to emotional regulation, of research on affect management. While emotional regulation tradition studies processes of affect management as separate phenomena, emotional intelligence tradition focus on contextual perspective of their functioning. It

argues that individuals show propensity to use some regulation strategies and not use others, what constitutes their emotional regulation style [24]. Following the example of the malicious colleague: one person will eagerly avoid taking the bus, engage in conversations with other passengers or even will consider buying oneself a car, whereas the other will consider improving their verbal self-defence abilities and openly talk with the co-worker about their feelings, not only in this particular situation but more as a habit.

Both emotional regulation and intelligence tradition emphasize role of emotional awareness in one's affective functioning [4; 42, 23]. Emotional awareness was found to be associated with more adaptive regulatory strategies – reappraisal instead of suppression [41]. In the opposite, difficulty identifying emotions was associated with compulsive behaviour – gambling [29]. One of explanatory mechanisms behind affect regulation difficulties include low distress tolerance [48, 40]. Low distress tolerance manifests itself in perceiving distress as unbearable, not accepting it and seeing one's abilities to cope with distress lower than others. Individuals with low distress tolerance make use of the quickest and easiest ways of boosting their mood, not considering the side effects of their actions [48]. Rose and Segriest [40] found meditating role of low distress tolerance between difficulty identifying emotions and compulsive buying.

Difficulty identifying and describing emotion, next to difficulty distinguishing between feelings and bodily sensations, paucity of internal experiences (fantasies) and externally oriented cognitive style, that contribute to failure in affective regulation, are all components of alexithymia¹ [29]. Alexithymia construct emerged on the ground of psychosomatic medicine, after observation of emotional functioning of patients suffering from psychosomatic diseases, who due to lack of understanding of their emotional state were preoccupied by physical symptoms [49]. However, recent studies show that alexithymia, which is understood as a psychological trait [50] and measured by Toronto Alexithymia Scale, developed by Bagby, Parker, and Taylor [51] is not specific for only one mental disorder, but also for conversion [52], major depression, social anxiety disorder [53], panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder [54], anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa [55]. Alexithymia was found to be correlated with gambling [29] – one of self-regulatory lapses. Keltikangas-Jarvinen [56] study on aggressive fantasies of violent offenders is a vivid example of relation between alexithymia and affect regulation. The violent offenders, as compared to non-violent offenders, had high alexithymia score and were less likely to fantasise aggression in projection test. This shows the link between inability to recognize affective states and expressing them in socially acceptable manner, what constitutes emotional regulation [57].

Aforementioned findings show importance of basic skills constituting affect regulation. Both emotional regulation and emotional intelligence traditions indicate the role of affect awareness, identifying and differentiating particular components of emotional episode in healthy and effective functioning, while studies on alexithymia (which covers opposite characteristics) evidence its' strong link with various forms of pathology.

5. Procrastination in Affect Regulation Context

Having affect regulation established as a significant contributor of general well-being, some researchers shift attention to its' potentially disadvantageous forms, that may result in successful altering of current (short time perspective) mood but impede prospective goals implementation, what is considered as a general self-regulatory problem. Procrastination, in which current affect is given priority to finishing intended projects, finds its' place among different self-regulatory lapses [58].

To explore in-depth picture of how individuals engage in procrastination, Pychyl and colleagues [5] used experience sampling method constructed by Csikszentmihaly [59] in a sample of students during examination period of the semester. Experiment was based on monitoring what activity students engaged during that time, how they felt (emotions) and what they thought

(appraisal of the activity as: important, pleasant, stressful, difficult, confusing) about what they were doing. Results indicate that activities students felt they should be doing (personal importance) and activities they were engaging in weren't always exclusive (sleeping, eating, talking to family/friends). Students' perception of difficulty, confusion, stressfulness of studying (what they felt as should be doing) was higher and perception of amiability was lower when they procrastinated (were avoiding them) than in times of studying (involvement). Procrastination was positively associated with guilt and negatively with motivation (toward the task). Study also brings evidence for link between negative affect and procrastination as a disposition [5]. Other studies show positive link between chronic procrastination and shame [60], higher (in comparison with non-procrastinating individuals) test and weekly state anxiety and belief about low ability to delay gratification, self-efficacy, ability to control ones' emotional reactions [16]. Procrastinators also tend to use various forms of excuses to avoid facing consequences of failing to meet deadlines of the task they are postponing. For example Ferrari and Beck [18] found that students, who tend to postpone their academic obligations use more fraudulent excuses in comparison to more conscientious students. The first group experienced more positive feelings (like being happy, calm, confident, relieved, excited) about excuses before using them, but stronger negative affect (being scared, nervous, guilty, ashamed, frustrated or desperate) during and immediately after the excuse [18].

To deepen the understanding of mental process leading individuals to procrastination Spada, Hiou and Nikcevic [17] studied cognitive sources of its' decisional and behavioural form. Specifically, in the study, conducted in academic environment, they questioned students about their metacognitive beliefs, and found that belief about cognitive confidence (level of certainty that cognitive functions like planning, memory or decision making are functioning well) was significantly related to behavioural procrastination. Together with positive belief about worry (holding a notion that worry serves an important role in individual's functioning), negative beliefs about thoughts concerning uncontrollability and danger (worry that thoughts can cause harm) and belief about need to control thoughts (holding theory that thoughts have to follow individuals' vision) was significantly correlated with decisional procrastination [17]. This shows that exerting too much control over cognitive control inhibits another cognitive function – decision making.

In broader perspective of personality structure, procrastination was found to be negatively correlated with conscientiousness [62]. However, understanding stalling behaviour only as a manifestation of low conscientiousness, would miss an importance of its' temporal perspective. This line of research [63, 64] studies individuals' focus on self perspective: past, present and future, which stand for preference for cognitive attention directed at oneself in one of the three time frames. For example an individual with present perspective gives most of their thought to their current feeling state, values most immediate profits, because they contribute to the present well-being. In the same time a person with future perspective gives more thought to things that will facilitate their forthcoming self. Sirois [64], in meta-analysis of 14 studies on procrastination and time orientation, found that procrastination was linked to high present perspective and low future perspective. In parallel to this framework theory of specious reward assumes that humans have stronger inclination for choosing short-term (immediate) rewards over longer-term rewards [63]. This conceptualization could bring explanation to procrastinators' dwelling on present, provided they would associate it with more positive experiences. Contrary to this intuition Jackson [63] found that individuals engaging frequently in stalling behaviours hold resigned, fatalistic view of present, with rather negative perception of past and pessimistic attitude toward future. Moreover, results show that procrastinators do adapt hedonistic attitude toward life pursuit of pleasure, which fails to be an effective strategy of unpleasant feeling avoidance [63].

The link between temporal perspective and procrastination points out toward cognitive mechanisms underlying the tendency to postpone task completion. Findings in this domain show how people tend to evaluate and plan their actions in order to keep their affect as pleasant as possible. Among various hypothesis contributing to this understanding, several explores the aspect of personal preference that occurs between automatic perception and acting on the intention, the

propositions include: *resource slack hypothesis* [65], *construal level theory* [13, 66], *planning fallacy* (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979, in: 67), *discounting-induced preference reversal* and *stable but intransitive preferences* [68]. Each of them will be described with reference to research on their suppositions.

In correspondence with specious reward theory Zauberman and Lynch [65] experimentally tested mechanisms behind delay discounting, which (alluding to specious reward theory) involves a preference for smaller reward now than a larger later or higher cost later than a small one now. The mechanism (*resource slack hypothesis*) assumes differences in perception of changes in resource slack, that is dependent on its' temporal aspect. Common misperception of the resource is that it seems to be greater later than now. When time availability is considered as a resource, people tend to think that they will have more time available in future than at the moment. This is crucial when planning completion of a task, especially when it requires to devote time: people prefer to spend their time on a task in the future, when they believe to have more of it, than at present, when time is scarce. This disproportion in resource slack is closely biased on present – the closer the period of first investment is to time of decision, the larger resource slack seems to be in second period of time – the period of delayed investment. In fact, present, in Zauberman and Lynch [65] experiments turned out to be busier than any other point in future [65]. Soman [69] brought more evidence to resource slack hypothesis in consumer context research, and found that effort associated with shopping seems to be easier when it is mentally located in more distant future comparing to present. When individuals are asked to plan two tasks of different difficulty at present the one requiring more time devotion seems to be more aversive, when the tasks are presented in some time delay both tasks are evaluated as equally aversive [69].

According to *construal level theory* [13]. people are more eager to attend to projects which they perceive as more concrete – know more details about them, than to more abstract ones. The former ones are low-level-construals and represent near events, while the latter are high-level-construals and are associated with distant events [66]. In three experiments McCrae and colleagues [13] confirmed that when a task is presented in concrete form, accentuating the means of performing it, focusing on examples, as opposite to category, or simply by focusing attention on details, people are more probable to complete it in timely manner. Whereas, when features of a similar task highlight its' reasoning (abstract “why” of doing it), focus on category either its' global characteristics people tend to postpone its' completion [13].

Another factor predisposing to dilatory behaviours may be overly optimistic prediction of task completion time, what Kahneman and Tversky (1979, in: 67) defined as a *planning fallacy*. Planning fallacy is a kind of misperception that concerns personal situation, especially evaluation of task time demands – indicating difficulties to incorporate previous experience information to forthcoming duties. In five studies Buehler, Griffin and Ross [67] confirmed that students tended to underestimate time needed to complete tasks given. What's more they presented high level of confidence they should succeed in finishing them in timely manner.

Unfolding the scientific discourse on specious reward theory Andreou's [68] *discounting-induced preference reversal* framework develops hypothetical explanations for the preference reversal, which is the specious reward parallel, that focus on the act of preference. In this framework choosing a smaller reward now before a larger one later is dependent on opportunity. Reasoning humans do prefer more beneficial situation, even if they have to wait for it. However, when the opportunity to obtain any benefit gets close enough, they don't resist temptation and choose the smaller reward immediately, squandering a chance for a better reward later. The opportunity is a central component in discounting-induced preference reversal theory, that turns individual's intention to implement their premediated project into a shortsighted pleasure. In this context, the reward or pleasure can be understood as expectation of positive feeling resulting from successful completion of a quicker task at hand – in comparison with waiting for a even more positive feeling after finishing a larger task. The decision to yield to temptation only in current situation with strong determination to resist it in every time in the future, according to Andreou [68] is characteristic for procrastination in discounting-induced preference reversal mechanism.

The second Andreou's [68] proposal - *stable but intransitive preferences* - is more related to the decision making process. If an individual has to choose when to implement the action plan they may prefer to act later than now. Stable but intransitive preference hypothesis states that in the t point in time individual will prefer to act in $t+1$ point in time, in $t+1$ point in time they will prefer $t+2$ and so on. However, especially when deadline is considered in this evaluation, an individual will prefer to act now than at a point in time, they recognize as a last-minute. Still, the option to delay the action for a non-threatening to task completion period of time is more attractive than performing it at present. This reasoning keeps the procrastinator busy wondering about the most beneficial course of action and automatically delays operation.

The theories outlined above present cognitive mechanisms underlying procrastination. Their common feature is a motive to preserve a good feeling state or to quickly achieve some task completion satisfaction disregarding the chance to benefit even more provided for necessary effort exertion and time investment. This phenomenon can be examined in context of Gross' [23, 24] process model of emotion regulation. If procrastinators postpone intended task completion in order to maintain a good feeling state, regardless if it's due to fear of losing it while focusing on a demanding task or reluctance to wait for a larger reward (satisfaction) when an opportunity for a tinier one is very appealing, then they regulate their affect by withdrawing from the situation. This attitude corresponds with the family of regulatory strategies characteristic for the first phase of emotion elicitation – situation selection. However, such a course of action stand in opposition to procrastinator's initial plan to behave in certain way to attain certain benefits. In Tice and Bratslavsky [4] terms this attitude can be seen a form of misregulation, because the affective outcome – good feeling in present but possible frustration in longer time perspective – is contradictory to what the individual desired.

In support of this line of reasoning Tice and Bratslavsky [4] explain that when a procrastinator notices an unpleasant affect (such as anxiety or distress) while intending to perform some obligation or task, they give priority to taking care of their mood and prefer to drop the planned activity. The withdrawal is a successful strategy of reducing the unpleasant experience in the short time perspective – the individual feels relieved immediately [4]. Nevertheless, it was evidenced in academic context, that students who tend to procrastinate suffer from more stress and health problems than their non-procrastinating in longer time perspective [70, 71]. Specifically Tice and Baumeister [70] study found that procrastinators experienced less stress and had less physical symptoms during a semester, which stands for short term profits, but exceeded non-procrastinators in both measures at the end of the semester. In fact the difference in symptoms between the beginning and the end of the semester was significantly higher for students with tendency to delay academic task completion. What's more, contrary to procrastinators belief, that they act best under pressure, tasks resembling the conditions they put themselves into doing their assignments at the last minute (time limit, high cognitive load) are associated with worse performance [72].

A distinct perspective on procrastination place in self-regulation domain applies to nature of affective states. Most researchers of the field use terms 'mood' and 'emotion' interchangeably as a term for the similar affective experience closely connected with procrastination [58, 4, 70, 71]. A question that remains unanswered due to this equivocal phenomenon understanding is mechanism behind procrastination and its' self-regulatory function. Studies examine the link between unpleasant affect and procrastination, but fail to specify whether they refer to emotional episode elicited by task planning or mood that individual experiences regardless the task itself. If procrastination is elicited by unpleasant emotion induced by the obligation they are supposed to fill then it might be low distress tolerance [40] behind the failure to overcome the impulse of task avoidance. An individual both approaches the task, because of its' long term benefits, and avoids it, because of the distress connected with starting a new activity. Low distress tolerance acts in favour of avoidance tendency, which prevail in form of procrastination. On the other hand, low mood was documented to reduce capability to withstand impulses like eating, delay of gratification or procrastination [19]. In this case however, it isn't low distress tolerance responsible for task

avoidance, but rather low mood proness and belief that doing something pleasant, or avoiding something unpleasant, can improve mood, that was given priority before completing the task.

The literature so far portrays procrastination as a purposeful, yet counterproductive, strategy of affect regulation. Numerous studies evidence low benefits and high costs of procrastination [70, 18, 60, 72]. What remains disputable is specific mechanism of this regulation failure, a question that might result from lack of terminological clarity – interchangeable use of concept of emotional episode and mood as experience directly precluding avoidance of an activity. Temporal approach to procrastination line of study brings promising accommodation of temporal self perspective, that is closely associated with personal goals and values, and affect role in their pursuit.

6. Final Remarks

The article commented on procrastination in context of affect and general self-regulation. First, definition of the phenomenon, together with its' various forms was presented. Literature review on affect regulation followed, specifying some of its' adaptive and maladaptive forms. Procrastination was described through findings from research on the phenomenon together with presentation of various hypothetical mechanisms underlying it. The explanations described served in locating of procrastination as a specific form of affect regulation attempt in Gross' [23, 24] process model of emotion regulation.

Two (at least) questions surface the preceding discourse: (1) how to overcome procrastination, and (probably a more thoughtful one) (2) how to regulate affect in effective and functional way? In fact, addressing both question will help to highlight the massive body of knowledge about self-regulation that psychological research accumulated, despite the numerous questions still remaining unanswered. Referring to the first inquiry, for example Gollwitzer's [73] intention implementation was find to be a robust field of study offering a potent remedy for stalling behaviours. The clue of the proposal is specification of condition and details of actions planned, for example if individual intends to start working on assignment they should include in their plans when precisely they will do it ("at ten a.m."), where ("at my desk") and how ("make notes of five articles"). Generally, skilful planning, that involves identifying sub-goals (of the target goal), putting them in time order, and staying attentive to various difficulties that one may encounter (like what to do when conditions are disadvantageous), is an acknowledged contributor of intended action execution [74].

It's noticeable that most of aforementioned studies [for example 2, 13, 75] help in answering the second question, about effective affect regulation strategies, pointing toward cognitive reappraisal as a adaptive and successful method of altering one's feeling states. This can be an empowering information not only for therapists, equipped in knowledge of humans affective functioning, but also for individuals eager to discuss with their own thoughts. Another common conclusion reported across affect regulation research is importance of subjective state consciousness [49, 39, 40, 41]. A pointer from this line of studies leads to techniques of self-awareness and self-observation development. The arguments chosen to reflect on questions about overcoming procrastination and affect regulation by no means exhaust the magnitude of literature in area of self-regulation. They role was to direct a reader to respective literature and encourage them to consider the findings as a guide post in journey of self-cognition and self-improvement. Correspondingly, the problem brought in the article, which aimed in situating the procrastination inside self-regulation domain, is far from clarification. However, authors believe it gives a valid insight into the context of the issue and contributes to its' understanding, by providing authorial perspective in the subject.

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Notes

1. Alexithymia by some authors is defined as specific disturbance in psychic functioning (Taylor, 1984), some others refer to alexithymia as a trait (Swart, Kortekaas, Aleman, 2009). Alexithymia term was coined by Sifneos (Taylor, Bagby, Parker, 1991) as referring to address cognitive and affective characteristic of psychosomatic patients.

The Godfather: A Translator's and Writer's Subconscious and Conscious Skills in the Process of Evoking Reader's Emotions

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Abstract:

The article is an unyielding argument supporting the thesis that not only a writer, but also a translator is expected to use their creativity so that nothing is lost in translation. Amongst various factors that influence the process of translating a novel the article focuses on two of them: a translator should stick to the original text with taking the semantic fields differences into account while s/he should keep the atmosphere of the source language, making as little changes in the target language as possible. Marking a translator's existence in a text is strongly connected with a perlocutionary act. A great example of the translation that covers both principles is *The Godfather*, written by Mario Puzo and translated from English into Polish by Bronisław Zieliński. He translated only English words into Polish, leaving the target Italian words with no metamorphosis. The article presents the effect obtained by such an action.

Keywords: emotions, reader, the godfather, translation, translator.

1. Introduction

A translator ought to have some peculiar skills and is undoubtedly seen as a person whose responsibility of the usage of the language is one of the highest. Not only is s/he expected to be an absolute specialist about the language itself, but also a linguist with a great command of writer's abilities. That is why independent authors are perceived as the best translators. Susan Bassnett claims that: *I have never satisfactorily worked out exactly when there began to be an hegemonic distinction made between writing and translating* [9, p. 173]. She makes a point that both writers and translators use the same amount of creativity and share the same traits needed in their professional work [9]. The author states also that:

Yet it is absurd to see translation as anything other than in creative literary activity [...] What is often forgotten is that many writers also translate, [...] writers can recognize and learn to speak in different voices, it becomes more probable they will identify the distinctive voice of their own [9, p. 184].

All things considered, one may safely conclude that a successful writer would be also a successful translator. Also Susan Bernofsky, a translation teacher at the University of Columbia says that: *I consider all literary translators writers* [5]. Hence, a translator is anticipated to have the same skills

as an independent writer, it is granted mostly in the case if s/he represents both professions at the same time.

However, the number of qualified, foreign language knowing novelists is insufficient to make translation of all the world's masterpieces or simply books that are somehow worth the process. As a consequence, there are more and more schools for translators or translation faculties at universities opening all over the world. One can have an impression that undertaking such an action was unavoidable – the readers have started to detect the translator's skills, style and very often, in modern reviews that are rather of an amateur style, e.g. on the webpage 'lubimyczytac.pl', where an ordinary reader can share their opinion; people do pay attention to the translation itself, they even cite the translator's name.

Eser Oktay claims that: *Translation as a business is a service. The concept of translation competence is a term covering the various skills and knowledge that a translator needs to have in order to translate functionally* [12, p. 4].

Mildred Larson introduced seven types of translation: very literal, literal, modified literal, inconsistent mixture, near idiomatic, idiomatic and unduly free, claiming that idiomatic is a translator's goal. Sixth level of translation is six times more creative than the first one and the author believes it is the most desired one [14]. He claims that a translator who is idiomatic in his works becomes recognizable in the literature community and also amongst regular readers. Probably it is a far-fetched conclusion that they can become a literature celebrities, however, they might become as popular as novelists in the near future.

The aim of this article is to show that a translator evokes reader's emotions, the effect can be as strong as a writer's evoking or even stronger. As an example, *The Godfather*, Mario Puzo's novel, translated from English into Polish by Bronisław Zieliński was used.

2. A Proper Translation: the Classical Approach and the Modern Approach

A reliable translator is obliged to pay attention to many factors, however, an additional one that is rather controversial is to absorb reader and satisfy them. A classical school of translation suggests rather not to change anything in the style of a book, according to it, it is better to leave uninteresting passage uninteresting [16]. For a translator dealing with such it can have very crucial consequences – the reader who does not know the original language can state an opinion that the work is of a high value, just the translator is the one who is not. The publisher probably wants to make their editions as beneficial as they could be, so the responsibility is laid on a translator. Wanting to satisfy the publisher, the reader and still obey the classical rules of translation seems to be impossible. Surely, if one talks about the book that has not got any weaker parts, the problem does not exist. The book market is full of novels of rather moderate or even non-ambitious character and the translator is forced to cope with this situation [17], [18]. The obvious question arises: How far from the original text can a translator go with their translation? The answer is not a clear-cut.

3. The Perlocutionary Effect

Regardless to how far from the original text did a translator go with their translation, each change that is not a literary translation, and is one out of other 6 types rendered by Larson has got a perlocutionary effect. The perlocutionary effect, called also the perlocutionary act is a speech act that is greatly associated with psychology and even with a language manipulation, it can evoke a great effects on a reader [3]. Not only can the author cause some emotions or even force a recipient to take some actions, but also a translator can expose himself making some decisions connected with a lexicon choice. A demonstration of their existence is not necessarily a bad practice, unless the variations they make are changing the whole context or a tone. The perlocutionary act emphasizes some issues, the author of a novel obviously places their private emotions and feelings in their works, the translators should read them properly and ensure themselves that the reader of a translated novel would feel the same atmosphere as the reader of a novel in an original language.

The perlocutionary act has got more functions, it can convince, enlighten, motivate, persuade, warn, etc. [23]. The translator can cause such an effect by chance, that is why s/he should be utterly careful so not to change the original writer's attitude.

Mario Puzo wrote *The Godfather* in English with some Italian vocabulary, causing a perlocutionary effect with this action. A Polish translator, Bronisław Zieliński made a choice of not translating the Italian words in *The Godfather*, so he performed a perlocutionary act. Moreover, if he did not, he would still perform one. The conclusion is self-evident: Each action taken by a translator has got consequences, s/he must decide wisely to follow both rules: not allow any passage to be lost in translation and not change any passage's tone. The perlocutionary effect is unavoidable though.

4. Semantic Fields

Translating a book is a process consisting of many actions and decisions to be made, it is believed to be a complex one, in the meaning that it has got many steps. Contemporarily, it is becoming more compound, however, not only because there are many factors that must be taken into consideration, but rather because nowadays there are more and more factors, and some of them are exclusive towards each other. A translation should be as similar the original text as it can be. Literally, it should be simply identical. Larson makes a division between translating a form and a meaning. He claims that:

Form-based translations attempt to follow the form of the source language and are known as literal translations. Meaning-based translations make every effort to communicate the meaning of the source language in the natural forms of the receptor language. Such translations are called idiomatic translations. [...] Literal translations sound like nonsense and have little communication value. [...] A truly idiomatic translation does not sound like a translation. It sound like it was written originally in the receptor language [14, pp. 17-18].

Therefore, the translation should be identical, but taking the meaning into the consideration, not the form.

On the other hand, the semantic fields are not always the same in two languages, even if the meaning would be understood, the translation should be done in the way that it sounds naturally, to make it an idiomatic translation. Each language has got its own connotations and associations, especially when it comes to nouns fundamental in every language, such as colours, food, animals, etc. That is why in England one can be as white as a day, in Poland one can be as white as a snow and in Vietnam, one can be as white as cotton. The tribulation occurs when one part of a semantic field is a matter of a context, e.g. when a main character works in a cotton field and she is compared to cotton. There are two ways to deal with such a situation: to give a note from a translator, that in Vietnam one can be compared to cotton and it corresponds to being as white as a snow, if the book is bound to be published in Poland or simply to compare the main character to a snow without giving any note. Both ways have rather huge disadvantages; the former one introduces too much chaos, especially when the novel is rather a simple one; the latter one can enervate the story, the translator might not know the deep layer of a book, surely they should, however, sometimes the deep surface of a novel is discovered few hundred years after the first translation, it can be connected with the author's life or their posterior books [16], [22].

5. Translation Tribulations: Words Carrying an Emotional Meaning

Modern translation trend allows and even dictates to make changes into translation, so that the reader feels the spirit of a book. A translation can be pushed even further from Larson's idiomatic translation, towards unduly free translation. In 1997 he wrote that: "Unduly free translations are not considered acceptable translations for most purposes. Unduly free translations add extraneous information not in the source text, they change meaning of the source language, they distort the fact of the historical and cultural setting" [14, p. 19]. It can be compared with Christopher Conti and James Gourley's statement, written in 2014:

The impossibility of translation in a sense of a copy or replica seemed to us not the condition of literature but of culture too. The densely cultured zones of meaning traversed by translation cannot be circumvented with the lexical ratios of the dictionary. The medium of translation is not abstract equivalence but the creative understanding of another culture that preserves the foreignness produced by temporal and cultural distances [10, p. 8].

These two statements do not exclude each other, nevertheless, they show the change in the attitude.

The personalities of readers are so differentiated that one can make advantage of the only factor – nationality. Does Polish *zemsta* sound so emotionally as Italian *omerta*? Does English *revenge* cover Italian *omerta*? One can draw a conclusion that these matters are of cognitive nature. A regular reader is defined by many factors, not only by their nationality, there are many variables influencing the understanding and perceiving reality, such as age, sex, education, financial status, etc. Undoubtedly they are, but even more, they are a matter of semantics. One-to-one translation is forbidden if it comes to any official translating [14], nonetheless, the nouns that are not elements of idioms or idiomatic expressions are the most translatable parts of a book. There are some nouns that can cause some tribulations and doubts, e.g. Polish *zamek* that can be translated into *castle*, *zipper* or *lock* in English, but when a translator knows both the source and the target language well, this issue should not occur.

Words, especially nouns can be divided into three groups. The first group consists of nouns that carry an emotional meaning, they can be easily mistaken with evaluative morphemes; these are the nouns that are positive or negative in all of their contexts, excluding the irony and idioms or idiomatic expressions, e.g. *killer* is a person who is perceived pejoratively, the word itself evokes negative thoughts and associations, however, as an idiom and neologism it works differently, e.g. *time-killer* is something that helps people to spend their time when they cannot do what they wish to, but still have some spare time. This word could belong to the second or third group. It is worth noticing that the groups have got fuzzy edges. The second group covers the words that have got an emotional meaning only in particular contexts, e.g. *jednorazówka* in Polish normally does not carry any emotional or evaluative meaning, it simply means that something can be used only once, for example *razor*, the situation changes when one talks about socks, after one washing they are not suitable to wear anymore, then, the meaning is negative. The third group contains nouns that are neutral, they do not carry any emotional meaning, e.g. *book*.

All of these groups look different in different languages, they are unique. Even somebody who is fluent in a language, but it is not their mother tongue can have complications with noticing the emotional meaning. Another, more vital notion is that these words should be translated in a way that does not change the word and does not change the meaning. The problem is escalated due to the fact that some nouns carry emotional and evaluative meaning according to the history and culture of native speakers of that language. A great example of that is the Italian language and especially the mafia register.

6. The Godfather: Italian Words Left Without Translation

Bronisław Zieliński, a great English-Polish translator of American literature translated Mario Puzos's *The Godfather* from the English language and he kept all of the Italian words that are used in the novel. The question arises: Why did Mario Puzo put some Italian words in the book that was written in English? Probably because he knew that *omerta* mentioned before has got a deep emotional meaning, an Italian associates it with mafia and with all types of actions that are mentioned in the book. An English reader has got the impression that this word is important on account of occurring in a different language. Zieliński copied the idea of Puzo, he translated only English words, leaving Italian words with no changes. So did the other languages' translators, however, not all of them. The Polish and other translators who followed the idea trusted the writer, who was of Italian origin and he knew the power of some words very well. *Omerta* seems to be suitable only for some violent actions, not like *revenge* that can be used even in case of issues connected with love. Before the popularity of *The Godfather* these words had not been widely known, now, they are in use in many languages, other writers use Italian, especially when writing about mafia.

The most popular word that has been used extremely a lot of is *omerta*, it brings a huge emotional tone or even overtone, this word evokes death, blood, masculinity, mafia and is also connected with dishonor that led to *omerta*. The visual side of a word is very interesting, similar in sound to French *mort* meaning 'death', English *mortal* meaning 'deadly'.

The word *caporegime* cannot be found easily in a dictionary, however, *capo* means 'head' or 'boss' and *regime* means 'the system'. So, it was not enough to write that somebody, in this case, e.g. Clemenza (a character from the novel) is the boss, it was crucial to mention that he is the boss of the whole system. A reader feels the respect and perceives somebody who is a *caporegime* as a very powerful human. *Padrone* is not 'the father', in Italian it means 'an employer' or 'a host', so this is the Godfather (the main character of the book) indeed, he gives work and he meets people who want to speak with him in his own house, even if they do not have the same financial and social status. The word *padrone* brings a lot of associations with a father, Italian *padre* means 'father' and also in Spanish *padre* means 'father', *padrone* is just one step further from *padre*, so that everybody knows that the Godfather is a father of all the mafia, the word *father* is connected with God, as Almighty Father and this associations cannot be avoided. Mario Puzo made the main character a god, a father, a host and an employer; all of these words have got rather a positive emotional meaning, hence, the reader likes the Godfather, it is unbelievable for many critics and literature researchers, that people perceive the boss of the mafia as a good person.

The word *paisan* cannot be found in a regular dictionary, however it is possible to find it at English Urban Dictionary and it says that this is a word used by Italians or Italian Americans when they address one other. This word brings a huge emotional connotation, it emphasizes the Italian origin of the speaker, they are Italians in America, however, still Italians.

Cosa Nostra is the Mob, however the words translated mean 'our thing', it shows that the mafia does not consist of individuals, it only functions properly as a group, a family, or even more than a family.

The book shows a huge importance of the family, all the characters support the members of their family and care of their honor. What is more, when one member of the family commits a crime that is not approved by another family, the *omerta* is done very often not on the person who committed the crime, but on the members of this person's family. The word *finocchio* means 'fennel' or 'finochio' that is an English version of this word naming a vegetable. It is used in the context of a weak man, a singer/actor that cries and does not know what to do with his life. Here, the semantics fields are different and that is why the comparison did not work. One does not compare a weak man to a fennel in English, or Polish. The translator left this word unchanged, so that the reader can hear the melodiousness of the word *finocchio*, that this word cannot mean any good if it is used to describe a male. It is very similar to the word *Pinochio* – a boy, who was just a wooden doll, changed into a man. Probably, he is not manly enough to be shown as a role model of a male. Fennel, the vegetable is very easy to cut, rather flexible in its structure, so the comparison is obvious.

Pezzonovante cannot be found in a regular dictionary, like many other Italian words that can be found in *The Godfather*. The meaning of a word from English Urban Dictionary is ‘big shot’, however, usually used pejoratively. Italian word *pezzante* means ‘beggar’, so the connection is obvious. The word is used to describe somebody who thinks that has got a huge power, but reality is different. The length of a word and its melodiousness suggests the reader that this word can be rather ironic. It is similar in sound to English *peasant* so rather somebody who has not got a huge power.

The word *infamita* is built from two other words, *infamia* meaning ‘dishonour’ and *intimita* meaning ‘intimacy’. English Urban Dictionary states that *infamita* is ‘an act of dishonor, usually against family’. The word brings a lot of emotions, the sound and the look of it suggest something bad, the word is similar to English ‘infamy’ and also ‘infection’, so something negative.

Consigliori is built of two words too: *consiglio* meaning ‘advice’ and *consigliere* meaning ‘adviser’, English Urban Dictionary gives a very narrow definition: a person who is a right hand of the Don in Italian Mafia-families.

The word that is Italian sounds more professional, undoubtedly *consigliore* sounds more sophisticated than ‘advisor’ or ‘doradca’ in Polish. The word creates the Italian atmosphere and dictates the reader to think of a *consigliore* as of somebody very important. In the book *Ojciec Chrzestny* published by Albatros in 2006 in Poland, on page 51 the word *consigliore* occurs 7 times, creating an impression that this must be somebody truly important. Also the word *signor* used before somebody’s surname means that the speaker respects the receiver. It gives the reader the feeling of Italian respect towards another Italian, using the word ‘mister’ the effect would be missed.

Importantly, Zieliński did not give any note or even a gloss, so the reader must check the unknown words by himself or guess their meaning from the context. Probably, it makes the story even more gripping and real.

It is worth mentioning that all of these Italian words have got a magical character. The way that they sound, the way that they look make them extraordinary. Obviously, they could lose their attributes when read by an Italian, but still, they remain outsized, when juxtaposed with words coming from other languages.

Over and above all those considerations, the Italian words used in the original English version of the novel, and Polish as well, were not created by Mario Puzo. They had been used much earlier, most of them come from the mafia register and were used in everyday language among the mafia members. There is a huge possibility that a regular Italian person, having nothing to do with the mafia would not understand these words as well which makes the atmosphere of the book even better [8], [11].

7. Conclusion

One can draw a conclusion that a translator should leave some words in their original version because they definitely carry a meaning that can change the reader’s view of a story. Zieliński did not have a dilemma, because he copied the Puzo’s idea to leave the chosen words Italian, however, translators from Italian into Polish could do the same, especially, if the book is on mafia or any other topic that Italian words are best to describe. A translator should be familiar not only with the source language but also with the culture, tradition and history of its native speakers so that s/he is able to choose the words to be left in original language. Furthermore, the translator should know the semantics fields of both languages well and decide whether to leave a *finocchio* as comparison to a weak man or to change it into some more accurate word in the target language.

There is always a possibility to change the reader’s view of a story too much, changing semantic fields when the change is not necessary or even harmful. Hence, the translator is the one who takes the responsibility of the translation, its quality, similarity to the original text and its literary values, so that they are not lost in the translation.

There is one action that a translator should never take. S/he ought not to try to evoke emotions in a reader in the passages where the author did not intend to. Nevertheless, they must remember about the reverse process, when the translated passage does not correspond to the original one emotionally and evaluation could be different, the translator is answerable for its final shape and should use their creativity to keep the context and the atmosphere.

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The Tectonics of Love in Leo Tolstoy's *Resurrection*¹

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Abstract:

The text analyzes Leo Tolstoy's *Resurrection* focusing on the feelings expressed in the novel. It focuses on: (I) the ways in which the content of the novel is expressed through artistic means; (II) Tolstoy's anthropology; (III) the notion of love presented by Ronald de Sousa in his last book *Love. A Very Short Introduction*: the difference between love and mood or emotion; the classification of love (*philia*, *storge*, *agape*, *eros*); the distinction between love and lust; love as a reason-free desire; and the notion of the historicity of love.

Keywords: Love, Tolstoy, de Sousa, *Resurrection*, lust, target of love, altruism.

1.

In his lecture on Anton Chekhov's oeuvre, Vladimir Nabokov explains that literature is "beauty plus pity" [11, p.163]. Undoubtedly, a well-told story can trigger emotional reactions such as laughter, tears, terror, sympathy or disgust.² The analysis of their function in philosophy as well as in relation to other branches of science (psychology, neuroscience, literary theories, but also social and political sciences) shows a considerable potential of the phenomenon that is at present described as the affective turn.³ One of the most acclaimed writers whose novels can generate a nuanced plethora of emotions is Leo Tolstoy. His *Anna Karenina*⁴ became an integral part of readers' imagination and emotions, which prompted philosophers such as Colin Radford and Michael Weston in 1970s to discuss how the reader – moved by her situation – can shed tears and, at the same time, know she is a fictional character.⁵ This problem – known as the paradox of fiction – is not central, however, to the following study.⁶ Tolstoy's less popular, last novel is *Resurrection* (1899); its protagonist is prince Nekhludoff, who as a young man seduces an innocent maid, Katusha, and abandons her only to meet her again years later in a courtroom where she is being tried for the murder of a client (she became a prostitute and changed her name to Maslova). In my opinion this novel is an example of a sophisticated, artistic attempt at describing human emotional states, love included. Tolstoy's mastery of literary means he uses to represent love is undeniable. Though the way Tolstoy understands love may for many contemporary readers be incomprehensible for it stems from his theistic world view, *Resurrection* gives one an opportunity to scrutinize the tectonics of emotions that accompany love, and raises a few questions regarding love's ambivalence.

Firstly, this article analyzes how feelings are expressed in Tolstoy's novel. To this end (I) I will first analyse the way in which the message of the novel is expressed through artistic means. Subsequently, (II) I will focus on the main premises of Tolstoy's anthropology, necessary to understand his views on love. Finally, (III) I will analyse the concept of love presented in the novel. The analytic tool applied in the article is based on Ronald de Sousa's last book concerning the philosophy of love. I will discuss Tolstoy's idea of love through the prism of the following issues: the difference between a mood and an emotion; different ways of classifying love (*philia*, *storge*, *agape*, *eros*); the difference between love and lust; love as a reason-free desire; and the historicity of love.

2.

When Nabokov asserts in the above-mentioned *Lectures on Russian Literature*: "The word, the expression, the image is the true function of literature. Not ideas" [11, p. 108], he distinguishes two aspects of literature. The first one is affecting the reader by means of form, that is the magic of words, figures of rhetoric, narrative techniques, rhythmic organization – in the first place, literature is an aesthetic fact, evaluated according to its aesthetic values. The second aspect is a message, which can generate various reactions ranging from cognitive (e.g. judgements, also ethical) to emotional ones (such as empathy and sympathy), which also seem to have a cognitive dimension.⁷ These two aspects of literature are discussed in a similar vein by the 2006 Nobel Prize winner, Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk. As Pamuk claims, writers may be divided into two groups: those who perceive thoughts and feelings of their protagonists as rooted in particular contexts (i.e. things and landscapes), and those who focus primarily on notions. This distinction is based on the difference between those who use visual imagination (i.e. images, landscapes, and things, which the reader accesses through smells, sounds, tastes, and touch and which bring the literary world to life) and those who use verbal imagination, analytical thinking, and ideas [15, p. 42]. In Pamuk's opinion, the first group – whom he calls visual writers – is represented by Leo Tolstoy, whereas the other – verbal writers – by Fiodor Dostoyevsky. This division is also confirmed by Nabokov, who believes that "a landscape of ideas, a moral landscape" [11, p. 71] is one of the most crucial aspects of Dostoyevsky's novels. While in Tolstoy's works, his art which is "so powerful, so tiger bright, so original and universal that it easily transcends the sermon" [11, p. 71] was more important than his ideology or message which – to his mind – was "... tame and ... vague" [11, p. 92]. This message was grounded not only in an extreme form of theism⁸ but also in a radical form of moralism, according to which art should be evaluated through the prism of its moral value and beauty should define what is spiritual and morally good.⁹ In my opinion, both aspects of the impact of literary texts, especially in the case of Tolstoy, can be conjoined. Tolstoy's artistry lies in his ability to combine analytical thinking and – as I believe – not really vague ideas with a subtle description of the human lot; he simultaneously thinks with words and images, fluently shifting from one type of narrative to the other. The expression of emotions is characteristic especially of visual imagination. I believe this division to be parallel to the narrative of *Resurrection*.

The story of Maslova and Nekhludoff is presented from three points of view: a dry third-person narrative and emotional retrospectives of both protagonists, where their feelings are expressed with precision, beauty, and clarity of details – elements that make images come to life in the reader's imagination. The third-person narrator delivers the story as if it were a prosecutor's testimony. The story of Maslova presented in such a way resembles a note in a prisoner's file which, in addition to being banal, is also ordinary. The narrator tells her story with reluctance or even disgust; yet, the story is still told objectively. At the end of his testimony, the narrator, far from understanding, passes unambiguous moral judgment on the life of Katusha. The reader feels that such an account is not enough to understand both Katusha's and Nekhludoff's motives. We learn that Katusha is one of the five surviving children of a farm girl who, not having a husband, each year gave birth to a child that she would not feed so it would die. Katusha survives because she is taken in by two old spinsters who make her their maid. One summer, Katusha's employers are

visited by their rich nephew, Dymitr Nekhludoff, and Katusha falls in love with him. Two years later, on his way to war, Dymitr returns and seduces the girl. A few months later Katusha realizes she is pregnant. Immediately after birth the child is given to the orphanage where it dies. This event marks the beginning of Katusha's moral decline. In search for employment (while still pregnant, she left her patrons), she is repeatedly sexually abused by men. Finally, she finds herself in a brothel where she lives for seven years, until she is accused of murdering a client. During her trial she is recognized by Nekhludoff, who serves as a member of the jury.

Nekhludoff's point of view combines the two types of narrative mentioned before. Having read Pamuk's account, one may consider Nekhludoff's narrative a visualization of the author's message, and, following T. S. Eliot's objective correlative, the reality depicted by the author may be seen as a reflection of the character's emotional states.¹⁰ When Nekhludoff meets Katusha, he is in his third year of university. It is "that blissful state of existence when a young man for the first time...when he grasps the possibility of unlimited advance towards perfection for one's self and for all the world" [20, p. 69]. Nekhludoff's state correlates with the landscape. The rising sun, morning mist, swim in the river above the cliff, grass and flowers wet with dew, taste of coffee and sleepless nights become an artistic expression of Nekhludoff's feelings: innocence, joy of life, dreams about the world and openness to its surprises. It is in these circumstances, during a game of *gorelki*, that Nekhludoff meets Katusha. The description of freshly mown, aromatic meadow in front of the house, the rustle of Katusha's starched dress, Nekhludoff's large palm squeezed by Katusha's small, but rough and strong hand, her radiant smile and eyes shining like wet blackcurrants, the hideout behind the ditch overgrown with nettle wet with evening dew, and the first, innocent kiss behind the lilac bush – all these descriptions refer to visual imagination, that is "our ability to see things in our mind's eye and to turn words into mental pictures" [15, p. 43]. By using objective correlatives, Tolstoy describes feelings that originate in sensual experiences that involve the sense of sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell. Strong sensual impressions evoked by Tolstoy's prose make the reader believe that Nekhludoff's feeling for Katusha is more than an expression of the joy of life that he overflows with. When Nekhludoff returns to his aunts three years later, he is a different man.

Tolstoy writes:

now he was depraved and selfish, and thought only of his own enjoyment... Then women seemed mysterious and charming... now the purpose of women... was a very definite one: women were the best means towards an already experienced enjoyment... Then he had looked on his spirit as the I; now it was his healthy strong animal I that he looked upon as himself [20, p. 75].

When Nekhludoff sees Katusha, who brings fresh towels and a soap to his room, old feelings return. The narrator describes Nekhludoff's feelings as an inner struggle between two persons: a spiritual man [*dukhovnoe ia*] caring about other people's happiness, and an animal-self [*zhivotnoe ia*] interested only in its own well-being. The climax takes place during the night of the Resurrection. Nekhludoff will remember the service as unique because of Katusha's presence: "She was the centre of all. For her the gold glittered round the icons; for her all these candles in candelabra and candlesticks were alight; for her were sung these joyful hymns" [20, p. 86-87]. Nekhludoff feels love for all creation – not only toward the beautiful, but also toward the beggar with whom Katusha exchanges Easter wishes. For Nekhludoff, Easter becomes the moment "when [his] love has reached its zenith – a moment when it is unconscious, unreasoning, and with nothing sensual about it" [20, p. 89]. Before he yields to an animal instinct that overshadows the feeling of pure love,

[t]he voice of his real love for her, though feebly, [is] still speaking of her, her feelings, her life. Another voice [is] saying, 'Take care I don't let the opportunity for your own happiness, your own enjoyment, slip by!' [20, p. 93].

After the night with Katusha, Nekhludoff is torn between two feelings – a burning memory of animal love that did not bring what it seemed to offer, and an awareness that the deed was wrong and needs to be remedied, if not for her sake, then for his. He is dying of shame, but he is trying to convince himself that what he did is what everyone does and he seeks consolation in giving Katusha money before his departure, “not because she might need it, but because it [is] the thing to do” [20, p. 100]. He tries not to think of Katusha because the memory exposes him and proves that his pride in being a decent man is unwarranted because he treated a woman in such a despicable way.

During the trial, looking at Maslova’s face, Nekhludoff recollects the events that took place ten years earlier; repulsion mixes with compassion; pangs of remorse come back and he cannot but feel anxious under the gaze of her dark eyes. Nekhludoff fights with his persistent feeling of remorse. After unfair sentencing (Katusha is sentenced to four years of penal servitude and hard labour), Nekhludoff feels responsible for Katusha’s fate and attempts to revoke verdict. Tolstoy describes the moment Nekhludoff’s conscience is resurrected as a “cleansing of the soul” [20, p. 156]. The experience of salvation – described by William James¹¹ – results in tangible actions. A few days later Nekhludoff visits Maslova in jail and asks her forgiveness. To delay the sentence he arranges for her to be moved to a hospital where she is to attend the sick. In the meantime, he gives all his lands and farms to peasants, and breaks all previous engagements (he was to be married with princess Missi); Katusha becomes his lodestar. Therefore, at this point it may be beneficial to focus on Katusha’s point of view and analyze her moral evolution after meeting Nekhludoff.

Undoubtedly, Katusha was in love with Nekhludoff. He was her first love. When shortly after his departure Nekhludoff is to return to Petersburg through his aunts’ town, Katusha is waiting to meet him. She already knows she is expecting his child. When she learns that the prince will not visit his aunts but his train will pass through the village, she runs to the station. She sees Nekhludoff playing cards with other officers in the first-class carriage and knocks on the window, but he does not see her. When the train moves, Katusha starts running after it until the wind carries away her headscarf. She stops after a while, crying. She decides to throw herself under the next train:

Up to that night she did not consider the child that lay beneath her heart a burden. But on that night everything changed, and the child became nothing but a weight... Wet, muddy, and quite exhausted, she returned, and from that day the change which brought her where she now was began to operate in her soul. Beginning from that dreadful night, she ceased believing in God and in goodness [20, pp. 198, 200].

She also ceases believing that other people believe in goodness. People she will soon meet will want to use her, and “the men... [will] look at her as on an object for pleasure” [20, p. 200]. That is why when Nekhludoff visits her in her cell asking for forgiveness,

she remember[s] ... dimly that new, wonderful world of feeling and of thought which ... [was] opened to her by the charming young man who loved her and whom she loved, and then his incomprehensible cruelty and the whole string of humiliations and suffering which flowed from and followed that magic joy. This g[ives]... her pain, and, unable to understand it, she ... [does] what she [is] ... always in the habit of doing, she ... [gets] rid of these memories by enveloping them in the mist of a depraved life [20, p. 225 – 226].

At first, she only wants to use him (for example by taking his money to buy alcohol that will allow her to survive the difficult life in prison), which makes Nekhludoff realize “to his horror ... that Katusha exist[s] ... no more, and there ... [is] Maslova in her place” [20, p. 230]. And when Nekhludoff proposes to her and promises that even if she refuses, he will go after her to Siberia, she will not hear of it. Yet even though she tries to convince herself that she cannot forgive him and that she still hates him, in reality she loves him. She remains unwavering in her resolution. When on her way to Siberia, Nekhludoff informs her that she has been pardoned, she receives the message

calmly but refuses to accept the pardon. She decides to marry Simonson, a political prisoner who fell in love with her, but her decision is not caused by love but by a desire to free Nekhludoff. Nekhludoff understands that seeing her forlorn goodbye smile:

She loved him, and thought that by uniting herself to him she would be spoiling his life. By going with Simonson she thought she would be setting Nekhludoff free, and felt glad that she had done what she meant to do, and yet she suffered at parting from him [20, p. 670].

3.

Before I turn to further analysis, it is crucial to discuss Tolstoy's idea of man from which stems Tolstoyan notion of love. Man, according to Tolstoy, has both animal and spiritual (rational) identity. The tiresome split between the two occurs only when the intellect is directed – to quote from Tolstoy's essay *On Life* – “to recognize as life nothing but his carnal personal existence, which cannot be life” [19, p. 269]. Therefore, human life is ruled by two laws: one that stems from his animal identity, and one (considered by Tolstoy to be superior) that originates in his rational consciousness. True human life is stored within man and is reborn as he matures: “our life is nothing but the birth of that invisible essence which is born in us, and so we can never see it” [19, p. 273].

Life, understood in such a way, consists of “the subjection of the animal personality to the law of reason, for the purpose of obtaining the good” [19, p. 276]. As a result, human life cannot be considered only from the point of matter and its organic structure; to investigate life in such a way “cannot give us the chief knowledge which we need, – the knowledge of the law to which our animal personality must be subjected for the sake of our good” [19, p. 281]. That is why

no matter how well he [man] may know the law governing his animal personality, and the laws governing matter, these laws do not give him the least indications as to how he is to act with that piece of bread which he has in his hands, – whether to give it to his wife, a stranger, his dog, or eat it himself; whether to defend this piece, or give it to him who asks him for it. But the life of man consists only in the solution of these and similar questions [19, p. 282].

If, as stated by Tolstoy, “human life we cannot understand otherwise than as subjection of the animal personality to the law of reason” [19, p. 293], then how does Tolstoy define love?

Tolstoy does not claim that a man must renounce his biological life, for that would be similar to renouncing one's circulatory system, yet he believes that biology is neither the law nor the goal of life. People searching for individual good, the illusion of pleasure that leads to the loss of life, excess, suffering, despair, and death prove that biological life is not the main goal of existence. Tolstoy prefers a spiritual, altruistic understanding of love as this kind of love contributes to social harmony. If a man believes that the purpose of his life is other people's well-being, then he has a chance to see the world as something else: “by the side of the incidental phenomena of the struggle of the beings – a constant mutual service of these beings, a service without which the existence of the world is unthinkable” [19, p. 308]. That is why the only rational human action is love that “draws him [man] on to give his existence for the benefit of other beings” [19, p. 326]. If human life is merely animalistic, then love becomes lust. Love, then, becomes

that feeling, according to which he who loves a woman suffers from this love and causes her to suffer, when he seduces her, or out of jealousy ruins himself and her; that feeling, which sometimes leads a man to rape a woman [19, p. 329].

Tolstoy, however, believes love to be the desire for good and “an activity which is directed upon the good of others” [19, p. 331]. “True love is the consequence of the renunciation of the good of personality” [19, p. 335], and it begins with the state of kindness toward all people. “Love is then only love when it is a self-sacrifice” [19, p. 339]. According to this definition, the relation between Katusha and Nekhludoff started as love, for at the beginning they both could – in spite of their natural inclinations – resist desire, and their love for each other included love for all people; what is more, they both regained that love when they met ten years later and renounced their own well-being for the well-being of the other person (Nekhludoff by leaving behind his old life and his dreams of having a family and children, and instead following Katusha to take care of her; Katusha by rejecting him and choosing Simonson to set Nekhludoff free).

4.

We may understand better the Tolstoy’s view on love if we use de Sousa’s distinction introduced by Ronald de Sousa in his last book on love, a distinction “between true love, which is ‘higher’, ‘spiritual’, and linked to our virtuous aspirations, and mere lust, which expresses ‘lower’ instincts we share with non-human animals” [1, p. 18]. Even though at first sight Katusha and Nekhludoff’s love may be categorized as the first type of love, one can ask a few questions about its nature. Firstly, can love be seen as a feeling, a type of emotion? If not, then what is love? Or, if the love between the characters of *Resurrection* leads to putting the other person’s interests first, can this love be described as *agape*? What elements make its tectonics: what are its reasons, and what is its object? If it is spiritual love, what is its object? What part does desire play in love? What does Nekhludoff want? Is Nekhludoff’s love altruistic? What part does the story of their relationship play in identifying the reasons behind their love? Finally, what are the reasons for love?

Love as neither a mood nor an emotion

Even though Tolstoy repeatedly uses the term “feeling” to describe the relationship between his characters, it seems to be only one aspect of love defined as an expression of will. Tolstoy’s descriptions of love distinguish it from moods that are independent of human will. Love, Tolstoy writes in *On Life*, “is a certain irregular, agonizing mood which impairs the regular current of life, – something like what must appear to an owl when the sun comes out” [19, p. 327]. Such love is accompanied by numerous feelings like those that permeate *Resurrection* from its very first pages; love can be manifested through sadness, guilt, remorse, anxiety, disgust, or shame. De Sousa also introduces the differentiation between love and mood, yet he notices certain similarities between them. According to him, these similarities stem from love and mood being rooted in an “emotional pseudoproposition” that has three distinctive features:

it is difficult to pin down to falsifiable content; its truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for the persistence of the emotion; and it is not clearly related to those propositions that might, as a matter of fact, lead to a change of mind on the emotional level [2, p. 8].

On the other hand, de Sousa claims that contrary to mood, love “seems tied a priori to an object” [2, p. 8] (a thesis I will discuss later). At this point it needs stressing that Tolstoy would probably accept de Sousa’s proposal to consider love “a condition that shapes and governs thoughts, desires, emotions, and behaviours around the focal person who is the ‘beloved’”. Like a kind of prism, it affects all sorts of experiences” [1, pp. 3 – 4].

By claiming that love is “a syndrome: not a kind of feeling, but an intricate pattern of potential thoughts, behaviours, and emotions that tend to ‘run together’” [1, p. 4], de Sousa seems close (at least on a basic level) to Tolstoy’s notion of love.

Philia, storge, agape or eros

What type of love do Katusha and Nekhludoff share? Certainly, it is not *philia*, which is a close friendship. Should it, then, be classified as *storge*, which “connotes caring in the sense of taking care of, implying concern for the beloved’s interests and welfare” [1, p. 2]? It seems that Nekhludoff’s love for Katusha (and later her love for him as well) concentrates on the beloved’s well-being. However, *storge* does not exclude sexual desire, whereas the latter stage of Katusha and Nekhludoff’s love is purely asexual. Should their love, then, be categorized as *agape*, that is “a sort of indiscriminate, universalized, and sexless *storge*” [1, p. 2]? At least three issues seem to contradict such an interpretation. Firstly, Nekhludoff’s love, though inclusive of other people, even after his ethical transformation, clearly focuses on Katusha; Katusha remains in Nekhludoff’s centre of attention – she is the reason he changes his life and follows her to Siberia. The first argument against classifying this love as *agape* is Nekhludoff’s attitude: he favours Katusha, whereas *agape*, according to de Sousa, should be free of individual preferences for it “requires us to abstract from individual preferences” [1, p. 11]. Secondly, the reader may question Nekhludoff’s motives. Is he entirely selfless or is he looking for his own peace of mind (trying to repent for his sin by following Katusha to Syberia), thus making his own well-being his main goal? *Agape*, best defined in the First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians, excludes self-seeking. Thirdly, *agape* “always trusts ... always perseveres” (1 Corinthians 13:7), whereas Nekhludoff’s love for Maslova is shaken by mistrust when he learns about the reason Katusha was dismissed from her job at the hospital: an alleged affair with a doctor. Even though the rumours about the affair turn out to be false, Nekhludoff does not believe that Katusha cannot control her debauched nature. At least at first, mistrust, or even hostility toward her former lover may be noticed also in Katusha. Undoubtedly they both feel passion; moreover, hate can create a bond equally strong as love. Should we, then, classify their love as *eros*, or even – to use a term de Sousa borrows from an American psychologist Dorothy Tennov – *limerence*, that is *eros* “in its most extreme, obsessive, anxious, and passionate romantic form”, or – to quote from George Bernard Shaw – “that most violent, most insane, most delusive, and most transient of passions” [1, p. 3]? Maybe what Tolstoy calls love is Nekhludoff’s obsession, a projection of his desires, an illusion he created for himself? What contradicts this interpretation is the fact that the prince’s love is not sudden; even though his friends believe it to be a temporary madness, Nekhludoff remains constant in his resolution to abandon his former life. The reader witnesses a positive change that takes place in Nekhludoff, therefore it seems impossible that his actions are a result of an illusion or blindness. What are, then, Nekhludoff’s reasons for loving Katusha? The answer to that question is a prerequisite for determining the nature of his love.

Love and lust

De Sousa claims that

‘[l]ove is the love of something.’ Love is an *intentional* state. That term refers a state of mind that is *about* something... In this way love is unlike a mood, for a mood, though it affects how you feel about everything, isn’t *about* anything specific. It is also not like a pain. A pain in itself isn’t about anything else, and is no less a pain if you have no idea what caused it... Love involves desire of what one does not possess [1, p. 34].

If love affects emotions and behaviour, it must move us to desire. Even though the term is ambiguous, desire by definition leads to what does not yet exist [See 1, p. 35]. In addition to the desires one may feel toward one’s friends, such as emotional resonance, trust, intimacy, concern for the other’s welfare or companionship, erotic love is a desire for a moment of sexual pleasure. Desire may be seen as developing in the following manner: “desire motivates pursuit; successful pursuit secures its objects; securing the objects produces pleasure; and pleasure adds strength to the desire the next time around” [1, p. 38]. This cycle describes the first stage of Nekhludoff and Katusha’s

relationship. Unfulfilled desire is painful. Pleasure that stems from fulfilling one's desire is temporary; its result may be disgust – “this occurs when the satisfaction of certain desires not in emotional contentment” [1, p. 39]. De Sousa describes this state as the “curse of satisfaction” [1, p. 39].¹² Nekhludoff experiences this state, yet his disgust is moral and is directed toward himself – he is aware that he used Katusha to satisfy his desire. The abuse affected Katusha as well, as she started perceiving herself as an object used to satisfy male desires. Katusha's and Nekhludoff's desires operate according to the same principle: “[w]hen the desire is itself painful, the desired consummation is an end in three senses at once: as a pleasure, as cessation of pain, and as termination. That fact may partly explain the popular association of love or sex with death” [1, p. 40]. Disappointment with sex and the realization that desire itself is a “highly undesirable condition” may be the reasons of Tolstoy's critical attitude to erotic love and his search for a more satisfying kind of love. Therefore, even though the theory of unfulfilled desire explains Nekhludoff's original feelings for Katusha, it does not account for the feelings that overwhelm him (and Katusha) ten years later.

Love as a reason-free desire

Let me turn to the analysis of spiritual love, since it is the one that Tolstoy put on a pedestal. Addressing the question of desires that spiritual love awakens in Nekhludoff and Katusha, Tolstoy answers: Nekhludoff desires Katusha's and Katusha Nekhludoff's well-being. To quote de Sousa, “they brim with altruistic benevolence: ‘your will is mine’” [1, p. 42]. This approach, according to de Sousa, is treacherous, for it traps the beloved within a logical riddle: an altruists' dilemma. De Sousa explains:

if each wants only to do the other's will, there is nothing either of them can do. They are even worse off than two purely selfish individuals, each of whom refuses to take account of the other's preferences. In a pair of egoists, each will have her own preference, and it might happen, if only by chance, that both want the same thing. What they do will then satisfy both. The two pure altruists, by contrast, cannot ground their action in any positive desire, until one of them admits to an independent preference [1, p. 42].

Is Nekhludoff an altruist? Is Katusha's will his will as well? At first, Nekhludoff's visit in prison makes Katusha nervous, but the spiritual change resurrects her love. This change is reflected in her behaviour, her trembling lips, her eyes, or her smile. In spite of how mixed the signals sent by Katusha are, Nekhludoff manages to decode the favourable ones. Although Katusha never admits that she still loves him, he can sense that she does. Her love is finally confirmed by her altruistic decision to marry another man. As far as Nekhludoff is concerned, Tolstoy provides a detailed description of his internal struggle (he wants to have a family and children). Even though at first Katusha openly demonstrates her hostility and her answer is clear, Nekhludoff decides to redefine his values and follow her to Siberia; by taking care of her, he wants to deserve her forgiveness. What are his reasons? One may claim that he follows Katusha because *he needs to* repent for the sins of his youth. His intentions are not clear. However, if spiritual love is the love that perseveres (even when the beloved's hostility makes one question the rightness of one's actions), then is not Nekhludoff's love exactly this kind of love?

I believe that to see Nekhludoff's decision as an obsession or a toxic desire to control Katusha with whom he had a passionate affair is a misunderstanding. If these were the reasons behind his actions, then Nekhludoff would not be able to accept Katusha's final decision. Finally, they both make altruistic decisions: she chooses Simonson, he accepts her choice. The only problem lays in whether Katusha does *what Nekhludoff wants her to do*. After all, he wants to be with her. It seems that using the altruist mantra “your will is my will” is misleading, for the goal of love is not to become the beloved's hostage.

Love's reasons should be analyzed from the point of view of an "objective observer" [1, p. 57]. In Tolstoy's novel such an external point of view is provided by the narrator who stresses that love's purpose is *the well-being of the other person*. The solution to the altruists' dilemma lays in substituting one's will with the well-being of the beloved. Katusha decides to make a decision that will best benefit Nekhludoff. He makes a similar choice when he decides to follow her to Siberia and then removes himself so that Simonson can take care of her. A distinction introduced by de Sousa sheds some light on the issue.

De Sousa states:

Some desires are grounded in one or more other desires. Call them *reason-based*. That sounds, well, reasonable; but in a certain sense it means you may not really desire what you have reason to desire. For what you want as a means to something else might not be desirable in itself. Wanting to get milk is a reason for going to the store. Getting to the store is a means. The milk, too, is a means; and you can list a train of reasons until you get to something you just want, and for which you can give no further reason. Call that a *reason-free* desire: for something you want for its own sake [1, p. 45].

Marriage seems determined by obligation, necessity, and commitment that should be viewed as love's reasons. According to de Sousa, however, "love moves us to act either without reason or from reason entirely different from those three" [1, p. 45].¹³ Why does Nekhludoff follow Katusha? She is not his wife, so he is not obliged to go – Tolstoy stresses this lack of obligation by portraying other marriages where one spouse is sentenced to penal servitude, and the other follows while not serving a sentence (the case of Taras, Fiedosia's husband). Nekhludoff is not driven by necessity. He does not have to go to repent for his sin – he could have chosen a different penance (giving the land to peasants or helping the people for whom Katusha interceded were already forms of compensation). Is not this reason-free decision a confirmation of Nekhludoff's true love? Nekhludoff does not have irrefutable arguments to support his decision, and "only reasons justify" [1, p. 46]. Could this reason, however, be found in his beliefs that stemmed from his religion and moral views? When Nekhludoff asks Maslova's forgiveness, he says that he wants to expiate his sin and marry her. "What's that for?" she asks, and he replies: "I feel that it is my duty before God to do it" [20, p. 253]. Tolstoy seems to explain his protagonist's behaviour through the Biblical commandment to unconditionally "love your neighbour" and the fact that one owes this love to a person one wronged. How should one understand such a justification? The commandment seems to explain actions, but can love be something one is commanded to feel?

Even though de Sousa is not concerned with religious beliefs, he notices that

in the case of belief, the explanation is that any belief – say, that 'the cat is on the mat' – is constituted essentially by the network of implications in which 'the cat is on the mat' is embedded... Your beliefs seem to be compelled by the facts of the world because most of them are held in place by your entire system of beliefs. You can't choose not to believe 'the cat is on the mat' when doing so would require you to reject innumerable other beliefs as well – that cats look like that, that you're not mad or dreaming, etc. [1, p. 47].

De Sousa assumes that certain beliefs are so obvious that they seem independent. One example is Cartesian *cogito*. My belief that I exist, when treated as a reason-free belief, may be seen as a counterpart of a reason-free desire.

Your desire to caress, or to gaze at, or to take care of, or to spend the rest of your life with someone, might be more like the belief that you exist: you haven't chosen to feel it, and you haven't the option not to... more frequently love is like thirst: it gives you

reasons to do things, but in itself seems not to need any reason at all. It is reason-free [1, p. 48].

Therefore, a commandment cannot be love's reason. Love may give one a reason to act in a particular way, but itself it does not need reason.¹⁴

Nekhludoff does not need to explain his love. This love, however, explains his actions. When Katusha appears in his life, at first he treats his feeling for her as an obligation (he proposes to her), but later it becomes a selfless gift that needs to be accepted unconditionally and results in a desire for her happiness. Nekhludoff's care for Katusha testifies to his responsibility, but due to the lack of obligation (they are not bound by any contract) Nekhludoff and Katusha's love becomes a free response to a gift; it becomes, to quote Raimond Gaita, a response to the "preciousness of human being" [4, p. 27]. Nekhludoff's feeling for Katusha is something

he had never felt towards her or anyone else before. There was nothing personal in this feeling: he wanted nothing from her for himself, but only wished that she might not remain as she now was, that she might awaken and become again what she had been [20, p. 228].

Even though the notion of reason-free love seems to explain the case of the protagonists of *Resurrection*, there still remain a few questions that need addressing. If Katusha was no longer as she used to be, why did Nekhludoff still love her? What was the object of his love?

Target of love

De Sousa notices that „love requires an object” [1, p. 51]. What determines the identity of the object of love? What constitutes its essence? A closer look at Katusha and Nekhludoff's relation demonstrates that not only is it not static, but it also contributes to the protagonists' moral growth. The two young lovers from the beginning of the novel are different persons than the characters who meet ten years later. To his horror, Nekhludoff realizes that the woman he is talking to is no longer the same Katusha – she has turned into Maslova. Katusha, on the other hand, even though the prince at first reminds her of the young man she fell in love with, wants to see Nekhludoff as the man who once abandoned her. At this point the two meanings of the word “love,” noticed by de Sousa, may prove useful.

The first is that there are two ways of thinking of a person's identity: as just ‘that person – whatever she may be like’, or as a person of a certain kind... The second fact is that what we regard as an appropriate reason for love contributes to our understanding of the nature of love [1, p. 58].

It seems that Nekhludoff's love for Katusha is the love for “that person – whatever she may be.” Nekhludoff's thoughts during the trial seem to corroborate that interpretation: he

kept looking at her all the time. And his mind passed through those phases in which a face which we have not seen for many years first strikes us with the outward changes brought about during the time of separation, and then changes made by time seem to disappear, and before our spiritual eyes rises only the principal expression of one exceptional, unique individuality [20, p. 118].

One could claim, then, that the target of Nekhludoff's love is Katusha's “one exceptional, unique individuality.”

By stating that love is an intentional state, de Sousa claims that love is an attitude: “[a]n attitude can be more or less appropriate to its target. ... is appropriate if the point of it is fulfilled ...

The point of desire is to pursue something good” [1, p. 59]. The target’s characteristic responsible for creating an attitude must be the “target’s *focal property*, or simply *focus*” [1, p. 59]. What is, then, love’s attitude? “To say love targets what is *lovable* is uninformative, but correct,” de Sousa writes, “love is the attitude specifically appropriate to beauty” [1, p. 60]. To use de Sousa’s terminology, Katusha is Nekhludoff’s target for he loves her for her “exceptional, unique individuality” (the focal property, focus) which “underpins her being lovable (the point)” [1, p. 60] and is the cause of Nekhludoff’s feelings. Katusha’s “exceptional, unique individuality” is “an appropriate reason for love” [1, p. 62] if such an individuality is the point of love. The target of love-as-attitude cannot be abstract beauty but it must be a person whose focal property is an “exceptional, unique individuality.” Tolstoy seems to corroborate this view when he notices:

One of the most widespread superstitions is that every man has his own special, definite qualities; that a man is kind, cruel, wise, stupid, energetic, apathetic, etc. Men are not like that... Men are like rivers: the water is the same in each, and alike in all; but every river is narrow here, is more rapid there, here slower, there broader, now clear, now cold, now dull, now warm. It is the same with men. Every man carries in himself the germs of every human quality, and sometimes one manifests itself, sometimes another, and the man often becomes unlike himself, while still remaining the same man [20, p. 300].

Tolstoy claims that the man can have many features, but the one constant focal property makes him who he is.

Still, de Sousa complicates matters by discussing the case of Alceme, the faithful wife of Amphitryon. Zeus, who fell in love with her, used many stratagems to seduce her; all in vain. Unable to charm her, he turned into Alceme’s husband, assuming all his focal properties – the reason she loved him. But, de Sousa notices, “[d]espite possessing the right focal properties, Zeus was not the target of Alceme’s love, so she ... was raped despite her ostensible consent” [1, p. 63]¹⁵, and, consequently, gave birth to Hercules. While this example cannot account for how Zeus can be both himself and someone else,¹⁶ it shows that “the target of love is a particular individual, not just whoever happens to have the right qualities...Targets of love are *non-fungible*” [1, p. 63]. Does it mean that love is motivated by this particular focal property that Tolstoy calls “being oneself”? It bears reminding that it is still a question of the reasons for love. David Vellman, mentioned by de Sosa, claims that this property remains constant:¹⁷ “[i]t is none other than [Alceme’s]... autonomous rational will which, according to Immanuel Kant, is the essential core of every person” [1, p. 67]. But de Sousa believes that such a notion of love’s reasons requires us “to distinguish true love not only from lust, but from those individual quirks, in both lover and beloved, that produce a rush of tenderness towards some and leave you indifferent to others” [1, p. 67]. Tolstoy wants to distinguish between true love and lust, which, according to de Sousa, would lead to making love independent of individual features of the beloved. Do phrases such as “being oneself” or “one exceptional, unique individuality” not stress the individual that is that which is a result of unique consciousness? Is this unique consciousness, expressed in unique behaviour (so different from our own), not the reason we love other people?

De Sousa is very critical of that thesis. According to him, the strategy that puts emphasis on “being oneself” as the reason for love stresses love’s universal reasons. He claims that this stance is based on a thesis that

being oneself is itself a property, called *ipseity*... Only Socrates is Socrates. Only you are you. On this view, each person is essentially different from every other not in virtue of any set of properties, but in being just this person and no other. Like the Kantian core, this property is universal; but unlike the rational self, which is the same in everyone, each ipseity is irreducibly different. Being-just-this-irreducible-self is the focal property that uniquely identifies the target of love [1, p. 69].

According to de Sousa, this view is “comically absurd... for to say that your ipseity differs from mine says nothing about what the difference amounts to” [1, p. 69]. That is why de Sousa proposes a different solution to the problem, one that can be applied to Tolstoy’s *Resurrection*.

Historicity of love

De Sousa claims that “instead of fixed essential identities that each must learn to decode in the other, there will be a forging of a unique relationship of which is a part” [1, p. 69]. Therefore, a relation with its unique history becomes love’s reason. The historicity of love consists of the unique path that the lovers follow or the paths that intertwine in the space and time they share. De Sousa states:

The intertwining of two or more such paths constitutes the bond of love, as both its cause and its result. It causes the bond by providing shared memories, and it results from it because it motivates further shared projects. Instead of a crucial property that identifies each lover, there is a dynamic process involving both [1, p. 70].

Many elements contribute to the dynamics of Nekhludoff and Katusha’s relation: first glances they catch of each other, the first kiss, the experience of Easter and love to the whole world cruelly destroyed by the night they spend together, and the child that dies prematurely. Nekhludoff’s history consists of guilt, shame, and even disgust with himself for using Katusha and then leaving her; Katusha’s story is the story of a broken heart she tries to mend by taking vengeance on herself and choosing the life that deprives her of her dignity. And finally, their story is the story of compensation, forgiveness, and resurrection. To quote de Sousa:

It is unique, because it is practically (though not logically) impossible that a person’s life should contain a sequence of events shared with A which exactly matches the sequence of events she shared with B. Something in the fine structure of their intertwined braids is bound to differentiate the two strands. Even if they were indistinguishable from an external point of view, their impact on the partners could not be the same, since for each, but not for both, one must have preceded the other [1, p. 70].

For Alcmene, the past and dreams about the future she shared with her husband made him the target of her love. Even though Zeus assumed Amphitryon’s qualities, he never became Alcmene’s husband. Similarly, the object of Nekhludoff’s love is Katusha, regardless of particular features that define her at different moments of her life. Nekhludoff and Katusha share a past and a future defined by their common goal: to help others. This love survives in spite of the characters’ separation, their regret and despair, and their attempts at forgetting their relation; thanks to this love both Katusha and Nekhludoff can love other people by seeing that their lives and stories are priceless.

The term “historicity of love” was developed by Niko Kolodny.¹⁸ Kolodny believes that love does not have only one target but it rather has two: the beloved and the relationship. De Sousa comments on Kolodny’s thesis by stating that “[a] relationship is not just a sequence of facts and events; it is also a normative framework. As such, it engenders not merely reasons for love, but the duty to love in the way appropriate to the relationship in question” [1, p. 71].

Love cannot be separated from duty and responsibility. On the contrary, love gets strengthened “by the cultivation of habits of care and attention, by mutual openness to vulnerability, and by engagement in common projects” [1, p. 72]. However, the individual bond between the lovers is not the only element that ensures the historicity of love. According to de Sousa, historicity of love consists also of “the arbitrary constraints dictated by historically variable norms, gender

roles, and traditional taboos” [1, p. 73]. All these elements contribute to the description of love in *Resurrection*. Another important point is Tolstoy’s theism. Because Nekhludoff and Katusha’s love is rooted in Tolstoy’s theism, it becomes altruistic. Contrary to de Sousa’s thesis, altruistic love does not have to be based on illusory desires for another person but can be caused by an unconditional desire for the other person’s well-being, regardless of the fact that “our desires are too messy ... to hold in the real world...Myriad murky motivations muddle the decisions we allegedly make out of love” [1, p. 50].

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Notes

1. The text was written as part of the “Mistrz” grant entitled *Moderate Positions in Contemporary Philosophical Debates Between Theism and Atheism. Origins, Types and Consequences* and supervised by Professor Piotr Gutowski.
2. I write about it in: [5, p. 241nn].
3. See: [8, 12, 13, 14].
4. I discussed this issue in: [6, pp. 213-230].
5. E.g. Hamlet asked himself a similar question, seeing emotional reactions of one of the actors declaiming a poem about Hecuba: „What’s Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba, That he should weep for her?” [16, II.ii].
6. See: [5, p. s. 255nn].
7. See: [5, p. 49nn].
8. Tolstoy was, first and foremost, fascinated with Christianity based on the evangelical Sermon on the Mount. He did not accept the dogmatic religion, sacraments, and religious rituals of the Russian Orthodox Church [see 7, p. 171; 17, p. 163]. The critique of religious orthodoxy was one of the themes in *Resurrection* [20, p. 202-211]. That is why, *Resurrection* was also the chief reason for excommunicating Tolstoy by the Russian Orthodox Church (the decision to do so was announced in 1901). In this context, his theism – which was not connected with a religious cult – was rather a form of skepticism, not radicalism. However, I regard this form theism as radical since – as it will become clear later, especially in the context of his anthropology – a relation with God or a lack of it is for Tolstoy a major criterion of evaluation and sense of human life. As M. Green claims, “...he created the religion he had been seeking in the Sermon on the Mount (and in Buddhist doctrine). This radical faith taught that evil... must not be resisted by force. The authoritarian state, like violent revolution, was unacceptable to a man of religion” [7, p 173]. His views in this respect were in accordance with the views of American abolitionists such as: William Lloyd Garrison, James Russell Lowell and Henry David Thoreau.
9. See: [21, p. 61nn].
10. T. S. Eliot claimed [see 3]: “The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective correlative;’ in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of the particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked”.
11. According to W. James, people who have this experience are “twice born” (they die to the world of illusion, in order to be born to the real world). In their hearts, they carry the experience of deliverance, which results in certainty, sense, the triumph of good, the will to live. God becomes the force which helps man find a solution to the most desperate troubles and co-operates with man in building a better world. It is a state of saintliness. For James, it is the center of the religion [see 9, p.162; p. 254nn].
12. De Sousa exemplifies it with Shakespeare’s Sonnet 129: “The expense of spirit in a waste of shame / In lust in action; and till action, lust / Is perjured, murderous, bloody, full of blame, / Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust, / Enjoy’d no sooner but despised straight, / Past reason hunted, and no sooner had / Past reason hated, as a swallow’d bait / On purpose laid to make the taker mad; / Mad in pursuit and in possession so; / Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme; / A bliss in proof, and proved, a very woe; / Before, a joy proposed; behind, a dream. / All this the world well knows; yet none knows well / To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell” [17, p. 166].
13. To describe love irrespective of these definitions seems unconvincing and does not apply to other types of love, for example parental love. If responsibility was not part of love, then how would one define parental love which assumes responsibility? It is difficult to imagine love that does not require responsibility.
14. The belief in God’s existence seems to follow the same logic. A character from *Anna Karenina*, Konstantin Levin, discovers that the life of a man who believes in God may be a heroic life for it is devoted to God who is “something incomprehensible”, or, to put it another way, to the idea that cannot be proven or justified. Living for God, we do not know *what we are living for*. It is a reason-free belief [See: 6, p. 228].
15. See also: [2, pp. 8-9].
16. The distinction between imagining oneself as being someone else with all the features of that other person and remaining oneself with all the features of the other person (being at the same time aware that these features belong to someone else) seems impossible to uphold. See: [23, p. 4].
17. See: [22, p. 346].
18. See: [10, p. 146]: “According to the relationship theory, love is a psychological state for which there are reasons, and these reasons are interpersonal relationships. More specifically, love is a kind of valuing. Valuing X, in general, involves (i) being vulnerable to certain emotions regarding X, and (ii) believing that one has reasons both for this vulnerability to X and for actions regarding X” (Ibidem, p. 150).

Presumptions in Communication

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Abstract:

In the first part of this paper I consider the Gricean account of communication, as structured by the Cooperative Principle and the four maxims. Several authors, including Jean Goodwin [10], Fred Kauffeld [17], Michael Gilbert [7], Ernie Lepore and Mathew Stone [22], among others, argue that the Gricean view of communication fails in as much as it pretends to offer an account of *all* such human interactions. As Goodwin and Kauffeld suggest, a more promising starting point is to consider the variety of contextually determined presumptions that we make about speakers and that we rely upon in interpreting utterances. These presumptions are established in various ways, and are dropped, or defeated, in certain conditions. In order to clarify these aspects we need to inquiry into the nature of presumptions. I argue that Kauffeld's [18], [19], [20] account of presumptions is useful in this context. In the second part of the paper I look at what this account tells us about how, and in what conditions, presumptions in communication are rebutted.

Keywords: pragmatics, communication, cooperation, presumption, Grice.

1. Introduction¹

In his seminal paper “Logic and Conversation”, Paul H. Grice introduces the term ‘implicature’, as a name for a certain phenomenon he aims to characterize. He does not offer a definition of implicatures, but instead presents the phenomenon by appeal to examples. He later proposes five characteristics of conversational implicatures, one of which is calculability [15, p. 31]. Certain ingredients are essential in the calculation of the implicature: one is *what is said* by the utterance of the sentence that carries the implicature (its semantic content, or literal meaning), and another is the premise that “the hearer is entitled to assume” [15, p. 31] that the speaker is observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle (CP, henceforth). As is well known, the CP reads as follows: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” [15, p. 27]. Starting from the CP, Grice proposes four maxims that govern conversational interactions and certain more specific submaxims, which, he writes, “will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle” [15, p. 26]. These are the

maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. I skip a detailed presentation of these maxims, as they are well known to the reader.

Concerning the grounding of the CP, Grice writes that he does not think of it as an empirical generalization. Grice also rejects the hypothesis (which he says he entertained at a certain moment) that the CP has a “quasi-contractual” basis, i.e., that it is based on some sort of implicit agreement among the participants in the conversation. Instead, he suggests that the CP and the maxims are grounded in the rationality of cooperative transactions:

I would like to be able to show that observance of the Cooperative Principle and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication... must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims [15, pp. 29-30].

Grice does not say much about the relation between CP and the maxims. Although the maxims are not directly deducible from the CP, it is clear from his writings that the latter is meant to ground them in some sense. As Eemeren et al. write, “the Cooperative Principle encompasses certain values (sincerity, efficiency, relevance, and clarity)” [6, p. 7], which correspond to Grice’s maxims.² Indeed, a person engaged in a cooperative activity seems to be moved by such values. Otherwise, it is questionable that we would be talking about a cooperative attitude at all. In calling the maxims “Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner”, Grice says he is “[e]choing Kant” [15, p. 26]. This reference to Kant suggests that Gricean maxims are conditions that *make* communication a cooperative activity. That is, communication in which the four maxims are not followed cannot be cooperative. This interpretation is also suggested by Fred Kauffeld [17, p. 5], who writes that the relation between CP and maxims “is supported by a transcendental deduction of sorts based on the clear pragmatic importance of veracity, relevance, perspicuity, and economy to serious communication.”

The Gricean view of communication has inspired an enormous literature and is central to the discussions in linguistics and philosophy of language on how to draw the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Some authors find Grice’s CP unproblematic in its universality. For instance, Green writes: “Grice saw the relevance of the CP to language use as just the linguistic reflex of its general relevance. He saw it as governing all rational behaviour. If it does, we should certainly find it universally applicable with regard to language use, and I know of no genuine counterexamples” [12, p. 411]. However, it has been argued that there are genuine counterexamples. One line of criticism suggests that the four Gricean maxims are *not sufficient* to explain the wide variety of implicatures and related pragmatic phenomena. For instance, Geoffrey N. Leech argues that a further maxim concerning politeness needs to be added to the list, which he calls “the Tact Maxim” [21, p. 13].³ In a simplified formulation this reads “Do not cause offence” (but a more complex formulation is required for it to be theoretically useful, see [21, pp. 109-112]). Leech argues that introducing such a maxim is necessary in order to explain the implicatures generated by polite requests such as “I wonder if you’d mind handing me that screwdriver?”

In a similar vein, Michael Gilbert argues that the Gricean maxims are

a necessary but not sufficient condition... Grice’s maxims must be adapted to field and cultural norms and expectations. Gricean Maxims as expressed in his essay (Grice, [15]) are geared to British middle-class values and expectations... Other cultures and, possibly, fields require adjustment [7, p. 433].

He gives the example of cultures in which the maxim of Quality (“Do not say what you believe to be false.”) is violated when it conflicts with other maxims. For instance, he argues that in the Mexican culture there is such a “Super-Duper maxim” which concerns politeness, and reads: “never be rude to a stranger”. Not answering a request for information may be considered rude in this culture, so *some* information is always given upon request, even when the speaker has not good evidence that her answer is correct.

Now, Grice is aware that his CP is to a certain extent an idealization. He writes: “Our talk exchanges... are *characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts*” [15, p. 26, emphasis added]. But the problem is not only that the Gricean picture of communication is too idealized, i.e. that real life communication (and surely argumentation) does not seem to be that cooperative. Probably the most significant problem that it faces is that communication is sometimes not even *supposed to be* a cooperative activity. Jane Goodwin [10] makes this point forcefully with respect to courtroom debates. In the case of courtroom argumentative interactions, both the accusation but especially the accused are legitimately uncooperative and cannot be expected to cooperate. It is common that the accused has relevant information that she conceals. Goodwin discusses several Gricean maxims, and argues that there is no presumption that they are observed within the courtroom, due to the normative setting of the debate. For instance, Grice’s maxim of Quality has a submaxim which reads: “Do not say what you believe to be false”. But what this maxim requires is in sharp conflict with a maxim that is enforced in Anglo-American procedure for courtroom debate, which Goodwin calls ‘Nonvouching’:

Nonvouching: Presume that the advocate will not make explicit what she herself believes. [10, p. 269].

The judge immediately cautions a lawyer that fails to abide by this maxim. Another presumption that is reasonable to make in courtroom debates is the following:

Zealous Argument: Presume that the advocate will make the best case she can for her position. [10, p. 270].

The reason behind this maxim is the very nature of the job that advocates are required to do in such settings. This, again, conflicts with the first submaxim of Quality. The advocates are not required to form a careful and balanced judgement on whether the accused is guilty or not, but to build the best case they can for her or his culpability, and, respectively, to do their best to defend the accused. Presumptions such as these are relied upon in court in drawing conclusions, either in the form of implicatures, or in the form of explicit arguments.

In a similar vein, Kauffeld [17, p. 3] notes that there is a large class of human linguistic interactions that are “patently non-cooperative”. Some such interactions, he writes, involve “a degree of coercion which precludes cooperation; in others one party is plainly indifferent to the objectives, goals, etc. of the other.” In the first category he includes interrogations [17, p. 5], in which the information is extracted from a victim by means of threatening and torturing. Grice’s PC reads that a cooperative participant in a conversation makes her contribution as is required “by the accepted purpose or direction of talk”. But in this case there is no accepted purpose, as the victim is there against her will. The other category he mentions is that of institutional discourse, in which bureaucrats proceed on the basis of regulations and are indifferent to the goals and interests of those to which the discourse is addressed. Lepore and Stone [22, p. 221] mention such cases as well in arguing that communication is not a cooperative activity, not even in the minimal sense that the participants share the goal of mutual understanding. Usually, if mutual understanding is not reached the parties engaged in conversation make efforts towards it. But this is not always so. Lepore and Stone [22, p. 221] illustrate this point

with the realistic dialogue in a comic strip due to Scott Adams, in which Alice, responsible for technical support, tells Tina the procedure to solve a computer problem:

Alice: Just disable the local cache mode to fix the MAPI settings and delete the duplicate messaging subsystem registry key.

Tina: What if I don't understand anything you just said right then?

Alice: Good grief! I can't make it any simpler.

Alice walks away commenting: "It's funny because it's cruel!" Cases of this kind show that mutual understanding is sometimes not a common goal of all participants in the conversation.

2. Presumptions in Communication

The discussion in the previous section suggests that not all communication is cooperative, not even in the minimal sense that the participants share the goal of mutual understanding. Of course, in many cases, communication is not competitive but collaborative. In those cases speakers might cooperate in a substantive sense, i.e., by subscribing to a common goal and contributing to its achievement. When communication *is* cooperative, speakers are presumed to observe the CP, and *in those cases* the maxims do find grounding in the CP. But the Gricean view of communication fails in as much as it pretends to offer an account of *all* human communicative interactions. The four maxims that Grice proposes are reasonable rules to follow only in certain kinds of communicative settings. In general, what we might presume about speakers and hearers vary in content depending on the normative setting on the conversation and many other contextual factors. In view of this variation, the natural suggestion to make is to give up the "Kantian" view of the maxims that speakers follow in communication. This is the conclusion that both Kauffeld [17, p. 14] and Goodwin [10, p. 275] suggest. Goodwin writes:

If, as I believe, such diversity of presumptions is the norm, then we should stop looking for foundational presumptions like the CP that will govern all talk exchanges. Instead, the vital question becomes: how do participants in a given talk exchange come to recognize the presumptions that are applicable to them? [10, p. 275].

The presumptions that we might reasonably make about speakers and hearers have a variety of sources. One source of presumptions is the normative setting of the conversation. As Goodwin [10] argues, courtroom debates are organized in such a way that presumptions concerning what advocates do are established from the very beginning. Kauffeld [17, p. 10], developing a suggestion in Stamp [24], identifies the source of the presumption of veracity in the intentional structure of the locutionary act of saying something, as outlined by Grice's [13], [14], famous analysis of speaker meaning. In the context of an interrogation there is no presumption that the victim will be sincere, as it is well known from the very beginning that she has no interest in being sincere. In casual conversations, jokes, etc., there is no presumption that Grice's maxim of Quantity is observed, as there is no exchange of information at all. In other cases, special norms of politeness specific to a culture must be considered, as Gilbert suggests. And so on.

This suggests a very different picture of communication, one that is more encompassing than the Gricean view. It is also a view of communication that gives a significant role to the notion of *presumption*. The idea is that in producing and interpreting utterances we rely on a series of contextually determined presumptions that function as useful tools for these purposes.

Now, while this approach to communication departs significantly from Grice's in the aspects mentioned, it does not depart so radically in emphasizing the role of presumptions in communication.

Grice also mentions “presumptions” several times in his “Logic and Conversation”. For instance, in his account of the derivation of implicatures he writes that the speaker “is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle” [14, p. 30]. However, he does not clarify what a presumption is, and does not mention any interesting consequence that results from treating the claim that the speaker observes the maxims as a *presumption*, as opposed to an assumption, or a belief.

3. Conditions on an Account of Presumptions in Communication

In the rest of this essay I address the question concerning what presumptions are. There are various accounts of presumptions available in the literature, but not all of them fit best the view of communication that I have outlined so far. As a starting point, notice that an account of presumptions that plays a role in interpreting linguistic utterances must fulfil certain conditions. I list below the three conditions and then I go on to discuss them separately:

1. We need a notion of presumption that captures an ordinary practice.
2. The kind of presumption we are interested in is a propositional attitude, or maybe a kind of inference, but not a speech act.
3. Presumptions in communication are rebuttable or defeasible.

Condition (1) states that we need a notion of presumption that captures an ordinary practice. Indeed, a technical and partly stipulative notion of presumption cannot do the job that it is put to in the Gricean account of implicature calculation. Grice characterizes the inference that leads to the implicatum as one that speakers and hearers must be, at least in principle, able to make. This is not a *theoretical* derivation, or else the account would say little about how speakers manage to arrive at implicatures. Of course, this derivation is not meant to be psychologically real either, as speakers and hearers rarely, if ever, go through all the steps of the inference explicitly. As Kent Bach notes, “When he illustrated the ingredients involved in recognizing an implicature, [Grice] was enumerating the sorts of information that a hearer needs to take into account, at least intuitively, and exhibiting how this information is logically organized” [3, p. 8, emphasis added]. Implicatures are captured intuitively, but in those cases in which the implicature is present, the intuition is replaceable by an argument that leads to the conclusion that the speaker intends to convey the *implicatum*. As, Grice writes, “unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational implicature” [15, p. 31]. So, the information that the speaker is presumed to be truthful, relevant etc. is what hearers use, explicitly or implicitly, when deriving the implicature. For that reason the notion of presumption relevant here cannot be a theoretical one, but a notion available to the speaker. Those accounts that introduce a technical notion of presumption, rather than aiming to analyse the ordinary notion of presumption in natural language, will not be fit for the present purpose⁴.

Condition (2) is that the notion of presumption that we need has to be one that picks out a certain propositional attitude, or maybe a kind of inference, but not a speech act. Probably the most well known account of presumption as a speech act is due to Walton [26]. He characterizes the speech act of presumption in relation to the allocation of the burden of proof in an argumentative dialogue. The key feature of presumptions, according to Walton [26] is that they reverse the burden of proof in an argumentative interaction. This “analysis of presumption” takes it to be “a kind of speech act that is half way between assertion and (mere) assumption” [26, p. 138]. That is because an assertion normally carries a burden of proof, while assumptions “are freely undertaken and can freely be rejected in a dialogue.” In contrast with these speech acts, “when a presumption is brought forward by a proponent, the burden is on the respondent to refute it, or otherwise it goes into place as a commitment” [26, p.

138]. More recently Bermejo-Luque proposed a somewhat similar analysis of the speech act of presumption: “I propose the following definition: a presumption is the speech-act of putting forward a proposition as a reasonable assumption.” [4, p. 4]⁵

However, I am not convinced that presumptions are fundamentally speech acts, nor that there is a speech act of presuming at all. In order to shed some light on this issue, it is useful to look at Austin’s [2, p. 79] characterization of *explicit performatives*, i.e., verbs or expressions the purpose of which is to make explicit what performative act is being realized. Austin notes that there is a significant difference between, on the one hand, expressions such as ‘I thank’ and ‘I apologize’, which are explicit performatives, and, on the other hand, ‘I feel grateful’ and ‘I repent’, which are used to report on or “exhibit” [2, p. 83] certain feelings or attitudes. He notes that there is a third category of “not pure but half descriptive” (and half performative) verbs, such as ‘I am grateful’ and ‘I am sorry’. These verbs suffer from a certain “ambivalence”, as they can be used either to make a speech act of thanking or apologizing, or to merely exhibit one’s attitude or feeling. Austin [2, p. 79f] proposes four tests in order to distinguish the performative use from the exhibitiv use of these ambivalent expressions. I mention in what follows only the first two tests:

One test would be whether it makes sense to say ‘Does he *really*?’ For example, when someone says ‘I welcome you’ or ‘I bid you welcome’, we may say ‘I wonder if he really did welcome him?’ though we could not say in the same way ‘I wonder whether he really does bid him welcome?’ Another test would be whether one could really be doing it without actually saying anything, for example in the case of being sorry as distinct from apologizing, in being grateful as distinct from thanking, in blaming as distinct from censuring’ [2, p. 79-80].

Austin argues that expressions such as ‘I argue’, ‘I conclude’, ‘I testify’, ‘I admit’ and ‘I concede’⁶ appear to be pure performatives, and to pass the tests successfully. However, he adds that ‘I assume that...’, ‘I suppose that...’ and ‘I presume that...’ do not successfully pass the tests. Indeed, at least the two tests mentioned above clearly suggest the use of these verbs is not performative. It does make sense to ask during a trial, when we see the prosecutor treat the accused as guilty, “Does the prosecutor *really* presume the accused is innocent?”. Second, one can presume something without saying anything. It seems uncontroversial that we can presume, assume or suppose something without saying anything. This is not the case for many standard speech act verbs, such as ‘assert’ or ‘promise’. It is difficult to see how one could promise something or assert something without uttering a sentence, or at least perform an act that is endowed with meaning. Austin concludes that ‘I assume’, ‘I suppose’ and ‘I presume’ “operate in the ambivalent way that ‘I am sorry for...’ operates: this sometimes is equivalent to ‘I apologize’, sometimes describes my feelings, sometimes does both at once” [2, p. 87].

In fact, it seems to me the sense of ‘I assume’, ‘I suppose’ and ‘I presume’ in which they refer to a cognitive attitude is the fundamental. Consider again Austin’s second test mentioned above. An assumption, supposition or presumption is not necessarily established or formed in the moment in which one uses the corresponding expressions, or *by* uttering them. Instead they are commonly used to *express* one’s attitude towards a particular proposition, that is, in a purely descriptive way. I might suppose that the car is where I left it this morning, and act on this supposition, without telling you anything about what I suppose. I might presume that you brought back the book to the library and not say anything in doing so. In this sense they are similar to ‘I doubt that’, ‘I believe that’ or ‘I am convinced that’, which do not seem to have a speech act use at all. This is a *prima facie* reason to take ‘I presume’ to refer primarily to a cognitive act or state, and only derivatively to a kind of speech act.

Finally, condition (3) requires that presumptions in communication be rebuttable or defeasible. An account of presumptions in communication must capture the way these presumptions are treated.

Independently of their source (e.g., the normative setting of courtroom debates, etc.), presumptions in communication are defeasible, in the sense that they might be dropped in face of contrary evidence. Sometimes hearers discover that speakers do not act sincerely, perspicuously, or say things that are not relevant to what is at issue. Consider, for instance, the norm that lawyers are presumed to observe, which requires that they make the best case they can for their position (i.e., what Goodwin [10, p. 270] calls *Zealous Argument*). But suppose we encounter evidence that a particular lawyer has been bribed to build a weaker case for her position than she could. In that scenario it is reasonable to drop the *Zealous Argument* presumption. After all, this is why they are characterized as *presumptions*: because they can be rebutted.

To take a further example, consider Grice's [15, p. 32] example of the gas station discussion, which goes as follows:

A: I am out of petrol.

B: There is a garage round the corner.

Intuitively, in the right context, B's utterance carries the implicature that the garage is, or at least might be, open, sells petrol, etc. According to Grice [15, p. 32], this implicature is generated by the presumption that the speaker is observing the maxim of relevance. But if we find out that B is a child, or someone completely unfamiliar with cars, we might doubt that B has good evidence for her claim (as the second submaxim of Quality requires), or that she has considered the opening hours of the station (as the maxim of Relation requires). In these cases we are not warranted to draw the implicature that the gas station is open. Such presumptions in everyday conversation are systematically cancelled or dropped in view of contrary evidence. An account of presumptions in communication must take into consideration this aspect of presumptions.

4. Kauffeld's Account of Presumptions and the Presumptive Inference

One account of presumptions that looks promising in view of the three requirements discussed above is due to Fred Kauffeld [18], [19], [20]. The aim of this proposal is to capture the notion of presumption in its everyday use, and to understand our ordinary practice of presuming and using presumptions in reasoning and communication. It is not part of a process of theory building, and does not aim to establish a normative model of presumption. Thus, Kauffeld's notion of 'presumption' is not to be understood as a term of art, or a theoretical concept. He writes:

This attempt at analysis and explication ... is methodologically situated in traditions of "ordinary language philosophy," and it leans heavily on the pioneering work of J. L. Austin, G. J. Warnock, the non-theoretical aspects of H. P. Grice's analysis of utterance-meaning, Dennis Stampe's studies of speech acts and so on [19, p. 1].

On Kauffeld's [18, p. 135] analysis of ordinary presumptions, a presumption is a conclusion established by a certain kind of inference. Kauffeld [18, p. 136] explicitly rejects the identification of presumptions with mechanisms for reallocating the burden of proof, pointing out that there are other mechanisms that have the same effect. The fact that presumptions put forward in an argumentative dialogue have the effect they have on the distribution of the burden of proof is explained in Kauffeld [18, pp. 143-144] and [19] on the basis of the form of the inference and the grounds from which the inference is drawn.

According to this account, the presumptive inference is not identified by its form, but rather by the *content* of its premises: "To presume that *p*, in the ordinary sense of the term is to infer that *p* on the

supposition some agent has made, is making, or will make it the case that *p*, rather than risk criticism, retribution, etc. for failing to do so.” [18, p. 140] Later Kauffeld expands on this characterization:

On the supposition that a morally motivated agent would not act in a way that would provide others with reasonable (and perhaps unanswerable) basis for objection, criticism, resentment, reprobation, etc., those others may reasonably infer that in this particular case the agent is acting responsibly, truthfully, dutifully, and so on. We ordinarily identify such suppositions based on an agent’s commitments as “presumptions” [19, p. 3].

Kauffeld [20,p. 5] notes that presumptions, on his view, have three “components”, which are the following:

- I. “the supposition that some agent (Ag) has obligation or other commitment owing to some other agent(s) and/or to herself that Ag is to do x”;
- II. “the supposition that, Ag has made, is making, or will make it the case that Ag has done x, rather than risk resentment, retribution, etc. for failing to do x;”
- III. “the inferred conclusion that Ag has done, is doing, or will do x.”

Kauffeld [20] indicates that the presumption is the conclusion of an inference, but does not put forward (I) and (II) as its premises. However, it is possible to reconstruct the inference in this way. The result would be the following (call it K1; I simplify the times of the verb):

- i. Ag has an obligation or other commitment to do x.
 - ii. Ag will do x rather than risk resentment for not doing x.
- Therefore,
- iii. Ag will do x.

The question now is whether this is a charitable reconstruction of Kauffeld’s account of the presumptive inference. Derek Allen [1, p. 2] suggests it is not, as he finds the inference to be circular: (ii) already entails (iii), that *Ag will do x*. Allen writes that, apart from stating (iii), (ii) only adds an *explanation* of why (iii) is the case, which is what the part introduced by “rather than” conveys. This explanation, Allen [1, p. 1] suggests, could be unpacked as follows:

(E) A will do x because A would rather do x than risk resentment for not doing x.

Moreover, whatever role (i) plays it relates to what comes after “rather than” in (ii), so it does not support the claim that Ag will do x. The role that (i) might play is either to give a reason for the claim that A risks resentment or regret for not doing x, or to offer an explanation of this fact. In any case, (i) does not add any reason to believe (iii). This means that (iii) is offered no support by the above inference. If this is so then this inference is indeed a case of *petitio principii*, or vicious circularity. As a result, this is not a charitable reconstruction of Kauffeld’s proposal.

However, there is an option we have ignored: (E) might be very well understood as an *argument*, and not as an explanation. Interpreting it in this way would be more charitable, as it would avoid the vicious circularity. Eventually, Allen [1, p. 2] proposes a reconstruction along these lines. This is the following (call it K2):

- i. Ag has an obligation or other commitment to do x.
- Therefore *presumably*,

- ii. Ag has done, is doing, or will do x.

Allen adds: “I would then say that if [(i)] is true, its truth counts in favour of the truth of [(ii)], and so I would say that [(i)] is positively relevant to [(ii)]. Further, I would be justified in saying this, assuming that I am justified in believing (R)” [1, p. 2]⁷. Here, (R) is the following claim:

(R) A would rather do x than risk resentment for not doing x.

Now, I am not sure why Allen does not add (R) as a premise of the presumptive inference. I suppose that he aims to capture the inferential step as one of a special *kind*, not reducible to a deductive or inductive inference.⁸ However, I do not find it more perspicuous or closer to Kauffeld’s intentions to reconstruct the inferential step as being of a special kind (one that is warranted by (R)) as opposed to treating (R) as a premise. To the effect of assessing the inference, the option of taking (R) to be a premise or taking it to be a warrant of the inferential step seems to make no significant difference. In both cases, if we are not warranted to accept (R), we are not justified accepting the presumption. Moreover, Allen’s reconstruction (K2) of the presumptive inference analyses the notion of *presumption* in terms of what we might *presumably* infer, but leaves the latter notion unanalysed. As a result, one is left wondering what ‘presumably’ might mean. In turn, Kauffeld’s account, which Allen interprets, does not seem to be affected by this kind of conceptual circularity.

In view of these considerations, I think it would be more perspicuous to eliminate the qualifier ‘presumably’, and take (R) to be a *premise* of the argument. Moreover, I propose to reformulate (R) as (R’), which, I think, captures better the underlying idea:

(R’) If A risks regret or resentment for not doing x, then A will do x.

I propose to reconstruct Kauffeld’s presumptive inference as follows (call it K3):

- i. Ag has an obligation or other commitment to do x.
 - ii. If Ag has obligation or other commitment to do x, Ag risks regret or resentment for not doing x.
 - iii. (R’) If Ag risks regret or resentment for not doing x, then Ag will do x.
- Therefore,
- iv. Ag will do x.

Reconstructed in this way, premise (i) corresponds to Kauffeld’s supposition (I), and (iii) (which is (R’)), to Kauffeld’s supposition (II). I have also added premise (ii). This premise makes explicit the relation between the existence of A’s commitment or obligation to do x, on the one hand, and the existence of the risk of resentment or regret that A faces. The relation is straightforward and unproblematic, and making it explicit helps exhibit the structure the reasoning behind the conclusion (iv).

5. Presumptions are Rebuttable

Kauffeld’s account of presumption is particularly fit for the kind of presumptions in communication we aim to characterize. The account grounds presumptions in the *motivation* that agents have for abiding by norms and fulfilling their obligations, motivation which, in turn, is grounded in the risk of regret and resentment that those who fail to live up to their obligations or commitments face. This seems to fit the structure of reasoning behind our endorsement of the claim that a speaker is, for instance, sincere. One

reason why we presume speakers are sincere is that they would otherwise risk resentment and/or risk regretting their insincerity. Although this reasoning does not apply universally, it does seem to apply to cases in which we do make such presumptions in communication. And the same could be said of the presumption corresponding to Grice's other maxims. Our main motivation for providing all the information required, as the maxim of Quantity indicates, is that we want to avoid being criticized for having a non-cooperative attitude. Consider also communicative interactions that are non-cooperative. As Goodwin [10, p. 270] suggests, the following presumption is typical of courtroom debates:

Zealous Argument. Presume that the advocate will make the best case she can for her position.

What is the reason for making such a presumption? One good reason is that otherwise the advocate would face resentment from the authorities that gave her the responsibility of building the case. The structure of the reasoning that leads to this presumption seems to be well reflected by Kauffeld's analysis.

I have suggested above three conditions that an account of presumptions in communication must fulfil: (1) that the notion of 'presumption' we are interested in is that of an ordinary practice; (2) that a presumption in communication is an inferentially grounded propositional attitude and not a speech act; that (3) that presumptions in communication are rebuttable or defeasible. Kauffeld's account of presumptions fulfils the first two conditions: it aims to characterize our everyday practice of making presumptions, which, he argues, are not speech acts, but propositions inferred from premises of a certain kind. I do not discuss here the question whether Kauffeld's account offers a correct analysis of the ordinary practice of presuming or not.⁹ But notice that if the analysis turns out to characterize only a subclass of presumptions, and not the entire category, this would not prove especially problematic in relation to conditions (1) and (2), as long as the analysis does capture a real ordinary practice.

Let us now consider condition (3), that presumptions are rebuttable, and see whether ordinary presumptions as characterised by Kauffeld's account fulfil it. To begin with, notice that (K3) is a valid inference. If premises (i), (ii) and (iii) obtain, then the conclusion (iv) also obtains as a matter of logical consequence. This means that this is a *monotonic* inference, and so a *non-defeasible* one. Godden and Walton [8] and Godden [9] do not reconstruct Kauffeld's account of the presumptive inference as I have done above, but still see this as a "problem" for the account. The problem is that "presumptions do not seem to retain the property of defeasibility" [8, p. 323]. In order to illustrate this point they present the much-discussed example of the sleepy soldier. Here is the example:

Consider the case where it is a soldier's duty to raise the flag at dawn, but he is very unreliable and tends to sleep in. Consider now our presumption (as Kauffeld would have us talk of it) that *p*: the soldier will raise the flag at dawn. In one sense, the presumption that *p* does not disappear in the face of evidence that the social bonds obliging the soldier to bring it about that *p* will not be met [8, p. 323].

The idea is that on Kauffeld's account, "the predictive force of the expectation is grounded in its normative force," and since the "force" of the norm is not affected by the soldier's conduct, we are entitled to the presumption that the soldier will raise the flag, no matter what additional information we might obtain about his conduct.¹⁰ The objection is that, on Kauffeld's account, the presumption that *Ag* fulfils her duty and acts in accordance with her normative commitments seem to stand unaffected in face of *any* contrary evidence, as long as the normative basis of the duty is unaffected (i.e., as long as she is still under the obligation to do it). This is, potentially, a serious problem for the account. It cannot be correct to say that we are still entitled to presume that the soldier raised the flag, as long as the normative grounds are unaffected, *even if* we found out he *did not* raise the flag. Otherwise, we would be entitled to presume that any person accused of any crime or misconduct *and proven guilty of this* is innocent.

In discussing the case the sleepy soldier, Kauffeld [19, p. 2] notes that this criticism does not affect his account *per se*. The account aims to characterize the ordinary notion of ‘presumption’ and out everyday practice of presuming. If it turns out that our ordinary practice of presumptions does not have certain desirable properties, such as defeasibility, then probably they are not that useful for Godden and Walton’s theoretical purposes, which are those of characterizing correct argumentation.¹¹ But Kauffeld [19] seems to admit Godden and Walton’s main point. He comments that, indeed,

we might continue to presume that Smith [the sleepy soldier] will raise the flag and are entitled to that presumption, even though we may have observationally based knowledge warranting belief that Smith will not. We would not regard the proposition presumed as a reliable prediction [19, p. 6].

He adds: “We are commonly justified in accepting propositions regarding human acts which are from a predictive point of view false;” [19, p. 7]. My reaction is here the one Harvey Siegel also expressed: “But once we know that [the agent] is unlikely to do something, how can we be entitled nevertheless to expect him to do it anyway, given the negative [evidence]?” [23, p. 4]. Are we willing to presume (in the ordinary sense) that Smith has raised the flag at dawn even when the time for him to do it has passed and we *know* he did not do it? Although my intuitions about the use of the word in ordinary contexts are not strong, I am inclined to answer that we are not.

Despite Kauffeld’s comments quoted above, I maintain that presumptions are rebuttable in the face of contrary evidence. Consider a situation in which the flags were stolen, or one in which Smith never received the order to raise the flag.¹² In those cases the supposition (I) needs to be dropped: that is, Smith has no obligation to raise the flag, as one has no obligation to do what one cannot do. Now consider a situation in which we *know* the order was conveyed, the flags are where they are supposed to be, and we *know* Smith has committed himself to raising the flag. Still, when dawn breaks, Smith deliberately refuses to raise the flag, and expresses his intention to stay in bed until noon. Do we go on to presume that he will raise, and later on, that he did raise it, although we know he did not do it? On Kauffeld’s account, reconstructed above as K3, what fails in this case seems to be premise (iii), which reads: *if Ag risks regret or resentment for not doing x, then Ag will do x*. This is the content of Kauffeld’s supposition (II). Are we entitled to suppose that *p* is the case even if we *know* *p* is false? Intuitively, we are not. This supposition must be dropped if we know that the conditional is false for a given agent at a given time. Indeed, sometimes agents prefer risking resentment or regret to fulfilling their duties.

What this means is that Godden and Walton’s criticism fails. Kauffeld’s account does not predict that “the presumption that *p* does not disappear in the face of evidence that the social bonds obliging the soldier to bring it about that *p* will not be met” [8, p. 323].¹³ The presumption does disappear in case we are not warranted anymore to the supposition (II). And this is the case when we have strong evidence that the risk of resentment and regret is insufficient to motivate Ag to act as her obligations or commitments require of her. *How* strong must this evidence be? And, *to what extent* must her commitment-based motivation be undermined? These are difficult questions that I do not know how to answer. Maybe we are entitled to certain suppositions of the form (I) and (II) in spite of *some* contrary evidence. Kauffeld presents a case in which we have some inductive evidence that the corresponding premise (iii) does not obtain and still we *are* warranted to suppose it, and so to infer the conclusion of the presumptive inference. He writes: “A teacher, for example, might say to her class, “Your papers are due tomorrow, and I presume that you will all have them in on time,” knowing full well that several members of the class routinely turn their papers in late” [19, p. 7].

Finally, notice the way in which Godden and Walton’s criticism is framed: the problem for Kauffeld’s account is, allegedly, that “presumptions do not seem to retain the property of defeasibility”.

That is, presumptions should be defeasible inferences and on this account they are not. Indeed, presumptions, on the reconstruction of Kauffeld's account of them that I proposed above (i.e., K3), are not, strictly speaking, defeasible, as the presumptive inference is monotonic. But an account of presumptions might predict that they are not defeasible inferences and still make correct predictions about for problematic cases such as that of the sleepy soldier. On my reconstruction K3 of Kauffeld's account, presumptive inferences are not defeasible (i.e., non-monotonic), but they are rebuttable. The conclusion cannot be retained when one of the suppositions on the basis of which it is drawn fails to be warranted.

6. Conclusion

That presumptions are rebuttable is a significant point to the project of reconsidering the Gricean view of communication. As I pointed out above, presumptions in communication are rebutted when contrary evidence is available. In those cases we simply do not infer the same implicatures that we infer when we do presume the speaker is sincere, relevant, is building the best case she can for a particular claim etc. Of course, many other questions need to be addressed in relation to the role presumptions of the kind discussed here play in communication. One such question concerns the strength of the reasons needed in order to cancel the supposition (I) and (II) that, on Kauffeld's account, ground the presumptive inference. I have not addressed this difficult question in the present paper. In turn, what I hope to have shown is that Kauffeld's account of presumptions is a very adequate tool for pursuing the project that Goodwin and Kauffeld, among others, advance, that of extending and correcting the Gricean view of communication. In particular I have argued that presumptions, on this account, are rebuttable in the right way.

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Notes

1. A previous version of this paper was delivered at the conference "Presumptions, Presumptive Inferences and Burden of Proof" (April 26-28, 2016 University of Granada, Spain). I would like to thank all the participants at this conference, especially David Godden, Fred Kauffeld and Marcin Lewinski, for their valuable comments.
2. See also van Eemeren and Grootendorst [5, p. 121]: the idea that argumentation is a cooperative activity the purpose of which is to resolve disputes about expressed opinions is central to pragma-dialectics' view of argumentation.
3. I am grateful to Lilian Bermejo-Luque for this reference.
4. Ullman-Margalit writes that when it comes to presumptions, "[e]xplication is usually guided by the pre-systematic, everyday usages of the notion under consideration. In the present instance, however, it seems to me that the ordinary-language analysis of the notion of presumption (or such cognates as 'presumably', 'a presumptive such-and-such') will not get us very far [25, p. 144]". Instead, she starts her investigation from the technical term 'presumption' as used in legal contexts.
5. See Kauffeld [20] for a discussion of this proposal.
6. He classifies such verbs as "*expositives*, or expository performatives" [2, p. 85]. These are explicit performative verbs that show "how the 'statement' is to be fitted into the context of conversation, interlocution, dialogue, or in general of exposition".
7. The notion of positive relevance is defined according to Govier, as follows: "[a] statement A is *positively relevant* to another statement B if and only if the truth of A counts in favor of the truth of B" [11, p. 148].
8. This contrasts with Hansen's [16] reconstruction of the presumptive inference, on which the inference is a deductively valid one.
9. Kauffeld [18] argues that at least some *prima facie* counterexamples to the analysis are not real counterexamples.

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10. Godden and Walton [8, p. 323] introduce a distinction between being *justified* to presume p and being *entitled* to do so, and suggest that there is an “epistemic sense” of ‘presumption’, and a normative one. However, I have trouble in understanding this distinction. Bermejo-Luque [4, p. 4] and Siegel [p. 1] also point out that the distinction needs to be further developed and clarified. My intuitions do not help at this point, and I sense no distinction between two uses of the ordinary notion.
 11. He writes: “Since Godden and Walton provide no reason to suppose that I have misrepresented our ordinary practices, I propose to regard Godden and Walton’s criticisms of “Kauffeld’s model” as challenges to the capacity of ordinary presuming and presumption to support day-to-argumentation” [19, p. 2].
 12. These are the type-B and type-C cases that Kauffeld [19] discusses.
 13. Alternatively, it might be the case that my reconstruction of Kauffeld’s account as K3 is incorrect. In that case, I subscribe to the “Kauffeldian” analysis of presumptions in the line of K3.