

Animal Rights from the Perspective of Evictionism

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Abstract:

In this paper, the conception of Anthony J. Cesario about the philosophy of animal rights is critically reviewed. His approach is a valiant effort to defend the philosophy of animal rights. He is a moderate on this matter, offering all sorts of compromises. He applies an unusual insight to this matter with using the libertarian doctrine of evictionism.

Keywords: philosophy; libertarianism; law; animal rights; evictionism.

1. Introduction

The conception of Anthony J. Cesario in respect to animal rights was presented in [6] and it is worth reviewing from different perspectives. It is brilliantly written, addresses a crucially important subject, and makes just about the strongest case for animal rights ever written. However, I deviate from this author in his conclusions. The present paper is then an attempt to correct what I see in the reasoning of this author.

Cesario starts off on the right foot. He clearly demarcates the views of Murray N. Rothbard [16], Hans-Hermann Hoppe [16] and Walter E. Block [4]; [5] to the effect that the case for animal rights is flawed. There will be no straw man arguments in Cesario's sights, nor any passing of ships at night. At the very least, we will together, Cesario and I, reach real disagreement.¹

In Section 2 of this paper we consider Cesario's case for animal rights. Section 3 is given over to a criticism of it. The burden of Section 4 is to analyze the contribution to this debate made by Huemer. In Section 5, 6, and 7 we consider Cesario's views on, respectively, aliens, evictionism and children. We conclude in Section 8.

2. Cesario's Case

Cesario² begins his support of the animal rights position by slightly modifying the important contribution of Thomas Raskin [14]. The results are three critiques:

1. "Block assumes from the outset that the human-animal division is legally significant, even though that division's legal significance is the very thing that Block needs to prove" [6, p. 39].
2. "Block seems to make the inappropriate assumption that individuals have rights if and only if they belong to a species that can articulate a sincere respect and desire for rights" [6, p. 39].
3. "Block pays inadequate attention to sentience when determining who has a right not to be tortured" [6, p. 39].

3. Critique of Cesario

Let us consider each of these points in turn. As to the first, this could easily be turned around. To wit Cesario and Raskin "assume from the outset that the human-animal division is *not* legally significant, even though that division's legal significance is the very thing that Cesario and Raskin need to prove" [6, p. 39]. These two authors in effect accuse the denier of animal rights of arguing in a circle. But the same charge can be leveled against their hypothesis. Upon which side should the burden of proof reside? Upon theirs. For, if their thesis were correct, that all animals have rights, there is no reason to be a "sizeist," e.g., to think that only cute and cuddly animals, such as deer and cows, dogs and cats, have rights. This should also apply to insects and other creatures so small that they can only be seen with a microscope. Yet, we vicious humans kill, nay, murder, zillions of them practically every second, whenever we walk outside and step on them or inhale them. If we refrained from so doing, all humans would die, and thus the need for libertarianism would be ended; again, if animal rights were taken seriously – pursued to the logical conclusion of this argument. Cesario might think animals have rights, but, surely, not even he would acquiesce in the notion that they are capable of engaging in philosophical discourse.³ But with all human beings deceased, this issue could not arise. So if there are any circular arguments going on here, they would appear to emanate from his side.

Second, to the contrary, "belong(ing) to a species that can articulate a sincere respect and desire for rights" [6] is crucially important for deserving and bearing rights. Animals don't respect each other's rights. The lion kills the gazelle. No one, not even the most fervent animal rights advocates, would charge the king of the jungle with murder. Yet, if they were serious about their stance, they would be logically obligated to do just that.

Third, sentience. This applies, only, to torture, not to humane⁴ killing, and thus rights. It is possible that animals do not have the right to not be killed, and, yet, the right not to be tortured. Thus, this issue is somewhat adventitious to the subject now under consideration.

4. Huemer's Case

The next point on my critic's list stems from Huemer [9, p. 44]:

Block makes no effort to explain why species classifications are morally special but not genus classifications, race classifications, hair color classifications, or any other grouping – nor, indeed, why the moral rights of an individual would depend upon a grouping of that being with any other entities at all, rather than on the actual characteristics of that individual.

Further, Huemer opines:

Block invites us to take land ownership as the model for all rights. But land ownership certainly does not work in the way that Block and Rothbard require: I do not own a plot of land because I could homestead it in the future, or because someone else homesteaded it, or because other members of my species homesteaded other things. The way homesteading works is that the individual who actually homesteads a plot of land acquires that specific plot of land and nothing else. So again, on the homesteading theory, there is no basis for infants or severely disabled humans to have any rights. The idea that they have rights because they might homestead something in the future or because other conspecifics have homesteaded other things is a non-starter [9, p. 44].

But this is a disanalogy. There is all the world of difference between how we get to own ourselves,⁵ and how we get to own inanimate land. It can be expressed by the following joke: “Do you know the difference between a bathroom and a living room? No? Well, then, don’t come to my house!” The differences between living rooms and bathrooms are pellucidly clear to all. However, the same exact situation pertains to land and self-ownership. They are entirely different. It is illicit, as per Huemer, to infer that what is true of the one is necessarily true of the other.

5. Aliens and Their Rights

In the section of his paper “4. Arriving at a Crossroads” Cesario [6, p. 41] comes up with a very powerful argument against the Rothbardian position, the latter of which I support. Cesario writes as follows:

Consider, for instance, that alien life is discovered on another planet. Suppose further that this alien life has the exact same features as humans do. The only differences are that for some reason they do not have human DNA and, as a species, they are all intellectually disabled, meaning that they lack the ability to petition for their rights. To be clear, this alien species is not a part of the human species even though they look and act identical to them [6, p. 41].

According to the Rothbardian view of animal rights, while it would be completely illegal to abuse and torture intellectually disabled humans since they are a member of the human species, it would be perfectly legal to abuse and torture the alien creatures who look and act exactly the same as the intellectually disabled humans merely on the grounds that they evolved separately on a different planet and consequently have different DNA. Why, though? On what grounds, qua libertarianism, does membership to a particular species grant individuals rights, especially when those individuals may never be able to petition for rights or respect the rights of others themselves? Such a distinction does not appear legally significant, qua libertarianism [6, p. 41].

This is a strong critique indeed. Our heartstrings tug at the prospect of these quasi, demi, semi human like creatures being abused. However, the opponents of animal rights are not without a response. It is this: In the future, robots will be manufactured to look just like us. Mannequins, especially very expensive ones, already do. We may of course still abuse them in any way we wish, legally, from a libertarian perspective. The point is, Cesario’s “humans” are nothing but flesh and blood robots, or mannequins. They are no more really human than are these man-made objects made out of ceramics and clay, or metal and wires. We should get over our squeamishness about “mistreating” these human look alikes just as we would now have no compunction about physically abusing a robot or a mannequin.

Cesario's next sally in favor of animal rights concerns the continuum problem: "It consequently calls into question the assumption that being a part of a species that can articulate a sincere respect and desire for rights is what grants a species legal rights and it suggests that the issue is a 'continuum problem,' which means that the answer cannot be determined qua libertarianism."

Again, he sets up a strong bulwark in favor of his position. He is entirely correct in his claim that when the continuum problem arises, "the answer cannot be determined qua libertarianism."⁶ For example, you can infer, deduce and reason from the basic non aggression and private property rights foundations of libertarianism as much as you want, and you will not arrive at a proper and unambiguous statutory rape age. It is 15? 16? 17? 18? Somewhere in there perhaps, but if you are expecting libertarian theory to pinpoint an exact age, you will be sorely disappointed.

But there is simply no continuum for this author to utilize when it comes to animal rights. There is such a gigantic gap between *homo sapiens* and the next most intelligent species⁷ that there is simply no continuum problem. However, we will concede to Cesario that if these other species doubled, or tripled, maybe quadrupled in intelligence,⁸ then, indeed, there would be a continuum problem. Then, but only then, would there be a difficulty in claiming that a red line can justifiably be drawn in the sand, and on one side there are rights bearing species, and on the other, there are none. But that is for another day. For the present, relying on the continuum issue to support animal rights is to depend upon a weak argument.

6. Evictionism

Next in the batting order is this claim [6, p. 42]: "... it could still be legal to abuse, torture, and kill animals even if it's given that animals have legal rights, then such an approach would make the analysis 'more logically robust.'" This much cannot be denied. Cesario attempts to make good on this claim in his section 5. "A Primer on Evictionism" by relying upon the evictionist theory of abortion.⁹

One difficulty with his analysis is that he mis-states the evictionist position. Cesario [6, p. 42] describes it as follows: "... despite assuming that life begins at birth, the evictionist view ends up supporting the pro-choice position related to it being legal for a woman to remove an unborn baby from her womb at any time during the pregnancy for any reason even though the child in the womb lacks mens rea..." This is wrong for two reasons. One, evictionism posits that human life begins not at all "at birth." Rather, it starts at the fertilized egg stage. Two, evictionism does not at all "end ... up supporting the pro-choice position." Rather, it explicitly rejects not only the pro-choice position, but also the pro-life position [2].¹⁰

Cesario then utilizes libertarian child-care rights, forestalling, stem cell research and trespass, which he brilliantly and accurately renders, to apply to the point at issue, animal rights. It is in his section 8. "Tying It All Together: Application to Animal Rights" that the denouement occurs. Let me say at the outset that I think this is the most ingenious attempt to rescue animal rights from its critics I have ever read, but, that, ultimately, it fails.

He [6, p. 46] starts this section of his paper as follows:

How does all of this relate to animal rights? First off, much like the way that the theory of evictionism stipulates that life starts at the moment of conception, the compromise in this paper will assume, for the reasons mentioned earlier, that animals are included under libertarian legal theory and consequently have the same rights as non-rational humans such as infants or the intellectually disabled. This is one point in favor of vegans. To be clear, this means that animals own themselves, at least partially; people do not own animals as property and therefore cannot legally violate their negative rights. Despite this, people can come to homestead ownership of the trustee or guardian role for particular animals by

caring for them. If, however, a person stops caring for an animal, then they forfeit ownership of their trustee role, meaning that someone else can come in and, by caring for the animal, become the guardian of it. As long as there are people who want to care for particular animals, it would not be legal for individuals to abuse, neglect, or starve those animals since doing so would make them guilty of forestalling.

One minor problem with this is that Cesario misconstrues the role that compromise plays in evictionism. In his view, it is a crucial aspect of that philosophy. But a more correct exegesis of it is that it is merely superficial. Yes, things work out nicely for evictionism in that it is a compromise between the pro-life and pro-choice perspectives, but this is only accidental. It is only the way the cookie happens to crumble. The essence of evictionism is that it is congruent with the libertarian theory of property rights. The woman, not the fetus, is the proper owner of the premises under dispute, namely her womb, and thus the latter just happens to be a trespasser.

A more serious difficulty is that Cesario applies forestalling where it does not belong. He argues in a circular manner; assuming as true the very issue under disagreement: that animals do indeed have rights. He avers they are helpless, true enough, and therefore akin to babies or needy adults, which is not at all the case. It only logically follows that our brothers of field and stream should be treated on the basis of forestalling if they have rights in the first place, and this author has not established that they do.¹¹

Yes, I do indeed regard it as “one of the greatest weaknesses in libertarian theory” that under its aegis we are unable to declare animal torture¹² a crime, as Cesario mentions. Every fiber in my being cries out in anguish against people are so vicious, so depraved, so nasty, as to conduct themselves in this evil manner. I am indeed mortified and proud of it that this is not considered illegal under this philosophy. I am sorely tempted to renounce libertarianism in this one instance. But, as a social scientist, and a would-be philosopher, my job is to weigh and assess libertarianism. And I cannot see my way clear as to condemn this wicked behavior as a crime under this perspective, Cesario’s important efforts notwithstanding.

Our author is entirely accurate in transposing the correct libertarian view of children onto animals when he asserts that “... a property owner would be legally justified in ending the life of an animal that is currently on their property in a situation where nobody else wants to take care of the animal because, in that case, using lethal force would be acting in the gentlest manner possible consistent with stopping the violation of rights” [6].

But this claim is only valid if there is no libertarian distinction to be made between beasts and helpless humans. It is my viewpoint that he has not successfully defended this position.

What about medical research on wildlife, so as to cure cancer, stroke, heart disease, etc. Again, Cesario very cleverly utilizes the forestalling argument to maintain that this could only be done, licitly, if “Similarly, under the compromise position in this paper, it would also be legal contingent on the fact that no one else wants to care for the animals in question. If someone wants to care for the particular animals, though, then they would get priority over them.” But this fails for the same reason: the major premise, that children, or fertilized human eggs, have the same rights as beasts is unproven.

7. Children and Their Rights

Cesario [6, p. 49] is unafraid of reductio *ad absurdum*; I find it admirable that he sticks to his logic no matter how unexpected, not to say peculiar, are the results. Here, he is likening animals to (human!) children, and does not at all even shy away from equating them:

Next, consider the implications of this compromise if courts were to draw the line at larger predator and prey mammals. Since all of these animals would, by stipulation, have legal

rights, *the predator and prey would both be thought of as children under the law*. Not as long as there are others who want to care for the child being killed and eaten. Similarly, it would not be legal for one mammal, such as a lion or wolf, to kill and eat another mammal, such as a gazelle or deer, as long as there are people who want to care for the prey of the other animal. A mammal that kills and eats one of these animals which someone else wanted to care for, then it would be guilty of a negative rights violation as well as forestalling, their lack of mens rea notwithstanding. In addition to that, trustees who allow one of their animals to kill and eat other animals which they're the guardians of would similarly be guilty of a rights violation as well as forestalling (emphasis added).

This is indeed a compromise of sorts and I appreciate that. But it is not a principled one, based on rights.

Cesario [6, fn. 54, p. 64] is not loath to stretch the bounds of credulity, and, again, I admire him for his intellectual courage. He goes so far as to bring into his ethical analysis, of all creatures, vampires: "If there was a vampire species that could only survive by sucking the blood out of living humans, it would not be legal for those vampires to aggress against others and involuntarily suck their blood out of necessity. If they end up going extinct as a result, then so be it."

But this seems unduly harsh against our brother species, the vampire. What happened to his penchant for compromise? Can we not just all get along together? Surely, some humans should be sacrificed to our fellows from this biological category? After all, apart from that relatively minor detail of blood, they are otherwise very human-like. Do they not bleed, if scratched? After all, if rats have rights,¹³ why not vampires? The latter are on two legs and resemble us humans far more than rodents.

But our author [6, p. 50] goes further than this, much further:

Moreover, consider the even more extreme case of plants and vegetables. Would the compromise position still hold up if it was insisted, even if only to test out the limits of this theory, that these living organisms would likewise be protected by the law just like germs, insects, animals, and children? Certainly. While it may seem absurd at first, such a radically fringe view of life would not necessarily pose any problems to the theory. To clarify, just like with all of the other living organisms, what would matter would be whether or not there are more individuals who want to care for the plants and vegetables than there are existing plants and vegetables.

Again, his adherence to carrying through, logically, on a theory, no matter where it leads him, is admirable. However, even Cesario admits this exercise "may seem absurd." One wonders then, why he did not "check his premises"¹⁴ and rethink whether or not an illogical, irrational conclusion, coupled with impeccable logic, does not imply some flaw in the basic premise.

Rothbardians and Cesarions do not diverge as regards cannibalism. The former would certainly allow voluntary cannibalism, where the only way most of the group can survive is by eating one of their own, and they all agree to draw lots, fairly, to see who is sacrificed in this manner. The latter points to an extreme case, as is his wont, and discusses justice in the situation where there is overpopulation, and there is no place for a person to go, without necessarily trespassing on someone's land. Then, too, this practice would be allowed, if no one is willing to rescue such an individual.

The author of the paper [6, p. 52] under examination makes a valid point when he writes:

Given that it could be possible to kill and eat livestock and game animals under the theory presented in this paper, the main difference between the two views is essentially related to whether or not people can torture or sexually abuse their own pets if others are willing to

care for them. Under the Rothbardian view, doing so would be legal whereas under the compromise position, such acts would be criminal animal abuse.

However, this is not at the expense of Rothbard, who would not prohibit by law any interaction whatsoever between pets, livestock, and their owners. Rather, it shows the hypocrisy of those¹⁵ who would allow legal slaughter of animals but shrink from allowing these other types of abuse. The libertarian position on this is clear: either you own the fauna in question or you do not. If you do, you may treat them exactly as you wish; if not, then of course, not.

When he talks of the tide shifting, Cesario makes yet another insightful and incisive contribution to libertarian theory. He [6, p. 62] avers:

... in the distant future, it's entirely possible the tide shifts and the people in favor of animal rights get their way and consequently make it illegal to kill and eat animals even if no one else wants to care for them. In this type of situation, the non-vegans would ultimately lose the battle since they wouldn't be able to abuse or kill any animals, even their own. Under the compromise position, though, non-vegans would be in a much better situation. Specifically, if the compromise was adopted, then in the future situation just described, the non-vegan people would at least be able to consume animals that no one else wanted to care for rather than not being able to consume any animals at all.

This is similar to an understanding in an entirely different context. Under laissez faire capitalism there is room for voluntary socialism, of the variety "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." That is, communes, homeowners associations, kibbutzim, condominiums, etc., would be allowed in the free market system. However, the inverse does not hold. With more traditional socialism, in which the government owns all the means of production, there would be no room at the inn, at all, for any free enterprise whatsoever.

Cesario [6, p. 53] offers a very powerful argument against one criticism of animal rights. He states:

A third possible non-vegan objection that could be brought up is that this compromise grants rights to animals that they are unable to reciprocate. Specifically, Block has argued, "The problem with this more "humane" system is that if adopted, we humans would be granting to mammals, for example, more rights than they, in turn, accord to the creatures upon which they prey. To take but one example, the cat tortures the mouse, playing with it, not putting it to an immediate and relatively painless death. To prohibit by law abusing cats would be to grant to them more rights than they offer mice" [14, p. 90].

Continues this author [6, p. 53]:

This objection (of Block's)¹⁶ fails, however, for multiple reasons. First, even the traditional Rothbardian view grants rights to individuals who are unable to reciprocate those rights, such as the severely intellectually disabled. While they may belong to a species that has other members that can petition for rights and respect the rights of others, that doesn't change the fact that they cannot reciprocate whatever rights are granted to them.

Second, as established earlier, granting rights based on the ability to reciprocate the respecting of those rights does not appear to actually follow from the NAP and private property rights. Instead, it is more of a continuum problem.

Third, while some cats may torture some mice, that doesn't mean that other cats that haven't ever tortured mice don't have any rights. If a particular cat has never tortured or killed another mouse, then this objection doesn't apply.

Fourth, under the compromise presented in this paper, if the courts granted rights to both cats and mice, then any cats that torture or kill mice would be treated the same as any child or intellectually disabled person who tortures and kills another child or intellectually disabled person. In other words, just because some animals may not respect the rights of others doesn't mean that those animals, or the trustees of those animals, cannot be held accountable for violating the rights of others.

Cesario offers four important and compelling points. Each of them is true; they all are incisive. Yet, my claim is that my original point, still, has not been refuted. Despite the undoubted power of his four critiques, it is still the case that there remains an anomaly in the animal rights position: advocates of it want humans to stop torturing animals, even though some animals, not all of them to be sure as Cesario points out, engage in that selfsame horrendous behavior.

As to the first of these four critiques, yes, "even the traditional Rothbardian view grants rights to individuals who are unable to reciprocate those rights, such as the severely intellectually disabled." But I fail to see why this accurate statement demonstrates that what is being asked on behalf of cats establishes its justification.

As to the second, certainly it is within the "penumbra" of libertarian theory to demand of rights bearing entities that they at least be able, at some point in their lives, or be a member of a species that can do so, to respect the rights of others. Can this be said of insects, rodents, even mammals? No. Even if a dog never bites, nor a cat scratches, is it not because they are "respecting rights." That would imply mens rea on their part; such that if they failed to do so, we would hold them guilty of a rights violation. Not even animal rights advocates hold cats guilty of torturing mice. Rather, that is just their nature, it would be agreed on all sides of this debate.

As to the third, regarding the "particular cat" who has never tortured a mouse, even assuming he has found himself placed in a position to do just that, still, it cannot be to his "credit" that he has refrained. He does not know right from wrong; he has not resisted wrongful action, even though he would have liked to indulge. He is simply not capable of any such thought process. People are. Not all of us. Hitler and Stalin and Mao failed this test. But at least they failed. Cats did not fail this test. They are incapable of even taking this examination.

As to the fourth criticism, Cesario likens a child who kills another child to a cat that slays a mouse. Yes, it cannot be denied, there is a similarity; both terminators lack mens rea, at present. But that is where the difference ends. The healthy child, but not the cat, will grow up with this ability.

8. Conclusion

Reading and responding to Cesario has been an exhilarating experience for me. In so doing, I am struck that I am in the presence of a first-class mind, with practically a limitless imagination, and courage to match. If anyone could make the case in behalf of animal rights, it would be this author. Unhappily for the animal rights position, even he cannot be fairly said to have succeeded. I regard the case for animal rights as roughly akin to the argument that the earth is flat.

Why, then, have I "wasted" so much verbiage in an attempt to refute Cesario on this matter? It is due to the fact that this is just about the best attempt in this regard I have ever read, and thus deserves repudiation. Along the way he has made important contributions to legal philosophy. His attempt to apply the insights of evictionism to this case is nothing short of magnificent. Cesario's analysis of child-care rights, forestalling, stem cell research, mens rea, positive and negative rights, trespass,

punishment theory, defense, invitation, law versus morality, obligation, the lifeboat situation, are superlative, not so much intrinsically; these are all grist for the libertarian mill. Rather, this honorific is due to the fact that he applies these concepts in totally uncharted waters, animal rights. This is never before been done, and Cesario does it in an unsurpassed manner.

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Notes

1. This is no mean accomplishment. All too often, “debates” in law and philosophy are exercises where each side pretty much ignores the views of the other.
2. All mention of this author, unless otherwise indicated, will refer to this one article of his, Cesario [6].
3. Only Gary Larsen would go this far! https://www.google.com/search?q=gary+larsen&sxsrf=APq-WBvd8OrjQ5A7iZ3wgm-DLcJ6dz4QHg:1643430001686&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&vet=1&fir=B8z5gECiKRyW8M%252CB27Aijl64Z4eAM%252C_%253BczMvi4OnINf-yM%252CKaGQbBuwBBGnbM%252C_%253BSUNBKm-2D4hpVM%252CYQ9eEiPwmc6EIM%252C_%253B9zjYMhskgLy1kM%252CB27Aijl64Z4eAM%252C_%253BrKmgQkE2qMzkEM%252CWkGgoDxBshZ1tM%252C_&usg=AI4_-kQZtuLU8w_i9iCOAgd_JuehMz9aIQ&sa=X&sqi=2&ved=2ahUKEwi2odrrjdb1AhVpAWMBHYqLCSMQ_h16BAg9EA E#imgc=SUNBKm-2D4hpVM
4. Animal rights advocates might object to the use of this word in this context.
5. For libertarian discussions of this highly complex issue, see [1]; [7]; [10]; [11, p. 353-544]; [12]; [16]; [18, pp. 242-24]; [19]; [20]; [20]; [22]; [23]; [24]; [25]; [27].
6. See on this Block and Barnett [3].
7. What are they? Pigs? Dolphins? Chimpanzees?
8. They would also have to improve in other aspects we associate with a civilized order: compassion, ability to see the other persons’ (ok, ok, entities’) point of view, morality, fairness, mens rea, etc.
9. See Block [2].
10. On the other hand, Cesario’s is an entirely accurate rendition of this position when he states: “In other words, a pregnant woman may evict the unborn baby from her womb, according to libertarian legal theory, but she may not unnecessarily kill it.²³ This is because the unborn baby, by being an unwanted occupier of another person’s property (the woman’s womb), is a trespasser (albeit one that lacks mens-rea, otherwise known as a guilty conscience) and libertarianism permits individuals to use any means necessary, up to and including deadly force, to put an end to a rights violation such as trespass.” Does this mean that the mistake mentioned in the text is no more than a typographical error on his part? That is my strong suspicion, based on his further description of this theory. This is further demonstrated by this explicit statement of his: “... according to the theory of evictionism, it is stipulated that life starts at the moment of conception.”
11. Nor has anyone else, including [8]; [9]; [13]; [14]; [15]; [17]; [26].
12. Here, we are not talking about uncaring, even cruel, “industrialized farming” or even dog or chicken fights. We are discussing disgusting things like burning animals alive.
13. Writes Cesario: “... suppose that someone’s house becomes infested with rats and the courts have drawn the line for legal rights to include small rodents in addition to large mammals. According to the compromise presented in this paper, each of those rodents would be assumed to be rights bearing creatures, which means it would not be licit to aggress against them as long as others want to care for them.” Ditto for germs and insects, even down to microscopic size in his view: “According to the compromise position presented in this paper, they would all likewise have legal rights similar to other animals, children, and the intellectually disabled.”
14. This is a favorite saying of Ayn Rand.
15. Most of us, to be sure.
16. I have added the material in parentheses for clarity’s sake.