Analytic Aposteriority and its Relevance to Twentieth-Century Philosophy

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Abstract: This article begins with an overview of the fourfold epistemological framework that arises out of Kant's distinctions between analyticity and syntheticity and between apriority and aposteriority. I challenge Kant's claim that the fourth classification, analytic aposteriority, is empty. In reviewing three articles written during the third quarter of the twentieth century that also defend analytic aposteriority, I identify promising insights suggested by Benardete (1958). I then present overviews of two 1987 articles wherein I defend analytic aposteriority, first as a classification highlighting the epistemological status of several crucial (and easily misunderstood) features of Kant’s own philosophy, and second as a way of expressing some of Kripke’s claims about naming in more authentically Kantian terminology. The paper concludes with suggestions of several other important philosophical developments that also make advances precisely insofar as they expound the nature and implications of the epistemological classification that Kant assumed to be empty.

1. The Boundary of Knowledge: Kant’s Framework of Epistemological Classifications

One of the central features of Kant’s ground-breaking Critique of Pure Reason is its introduction of a new framework for classifying propositions according to their epistemological status, based on two dyadic distinctions: first, between propositions that evince an “analytic” structure and those with a “synthetic” structure; and second, between “a priori” modes of justifying such propositions and “a posteriori” modes.1 This gives rise to four possible kinds of propositional knowledge-claim, two of which are relatively non-controversial: analytic a priori propositions establish logical knowledge, whereas synthetic a posteriori propositions establish *empirical* knowledge. As is well known, Kant used one of the two controversial types to demonstrate why Hume’s distinction between “matters of fact” (cf. synthetic a posteriori propositions) and “matters of reason” (cf. analytic a priori propositions) does not encompass all possible options. In rejecting the legitimacy of the law of causality, Hume had failed to notice that some (albeit, rare) propositions exhibit a synthetic (factual) structure, yet can be justified through an entirely a priori mode of argument.

Kant’s own way of defining this fourfold distinction has been examined by so many past commentators that a thoroughgoing overview of its various nuances would require a book length work. Instead of scrutinizing the interpretive history of this distinction, I shall offer an outline of what are widely accepted to be Kant’s basic parameters for understanding each relevant term. Throughout this discussion we must keep in mind that, once again, the first pair of terms refers to the structure of propositions, whereas the second pair refers to their *justification*. A neglect of this difference has given rise to misleading portrayals of synthetic apriority in particular.2 However, we need not examine those departures from Kant’s approach here, as our interest lies elsewhere.

Kant argued that the structure of a proposition must be such that either its predicate is contained within the subject and is therefore self-evident or its predicate lies outside the subject, so that we must appeal to something else in order to ascertain its truth. Propositions of the former type
(e.g., “White is a color”) are analytic because we can derive the predicate merely through a logical analysis of the subject; they are not informative, for they tell us only what we already know, assuming we understand the meaning of the words being used. (If I merely say “white”, anyone who understands the word would be likely to assume I am referring to a color, especially if we are in the presence of something white and the listener knows I am referring to that thing). Propositions of the latter type (e.g., “This paper is white”) are synthetic because we must appeal beyond the concepts themselves, to what Kant called “intuitions” (or sensible input), in order to ascertain their truth; such propositions are informative, inasmuch as they tell us about some factual state of affairs. Whereas typical examples of analytic propositions carry with them (as in a deduction) a form of conceptual truth that is necessary, typical examples of synthetic propositions advance claims (as in an induction) that are contingent and therefore might cease to be true, if the facts happen to change. (The paper these words are printed on might have faded into a pale yellow—or for that matter, they might now be appearing on a computer monitor, perhaps with a light blue background).

The second distinction, between a priori and a posteriori modes of justification, seems at first to be coextensive with the first pair, but Kant insists their ranges of application are distinct. A proposition is a priori if we do not need to appeal to any particular experience to justify its truth, whereas establishing the truth of an a posteriori proposition requires such an appeal. Obviously, the above examples of analytic and synthetic propositions would also be a priori and a posteriori, respectively, since those examples illustrate the two uncontroversial members of the fourfold distinction. Yet Kant argues that a previously-neglected alternative, the synthetic a priori, is not only possible but constitutes the epistemological status of the most significant truth-claims in all of philosophy. His most famous example, the proposition “Everything that happens has its cause” (CPR B13), is (not coincidentally) the very principle that Hume had downplayed as a groundless “habit” of thought. In Kant’s hands, it becomes a necessary condition (hence, a priori) for all experience of objects (hence, synthetic). Because the appeal here is to experience in general, not to any particular experience, Kant famously argued that such affirmations of “transcendental” knowledge have the status of absolute (apodictic) certainty: they define the very boundary-conditions that make empirical knowledge possible.

In discussing the key features of this epistemological framework, Kant notes in passing that one of the four logically possible classifications that arises out of this fourfold distinction is simply empty (CPR B11): “Experiential judgments, as such, are one and all synthetic. For to base an analytic judgment on experience would be absurd, because in its case I can formulate my judgment without going outside my concept, and hence do not need for it any testimony of experience.” Aside from this lone, off-hand comment, Kant never considers the possibility that this fourth type of proposition might describe a legitimate area of philosophical inquiry. At first sight, he appears to have been correct to rule out the possibility of analytic aposteriority, for if we must appeal to experience in order to justify the truth of a given proposition, how can its truth be grounded entirely in the concepts? Indeed, if we judge from the extensive secondary literature on this question, then Kant was right. For out of the thousands of scholars who have commented on aspects of this distinction over the past two centuries, only a handful have explicitly questioned Kant’s rejection of this elusive fourth classification.

Despite the almost deafening lack of attention that has been given to the possibility of locating meaningful analytic a posteriori truth-claims, I have previously argued that some of the most interesting features of Kant’s own philosophical system, as well as some of the most important advances made by twentieth-century philosophy, can be regarded as a direct outworking of precisely this (admittedly paradoxical) classification. Having offered in this opening section a brief introduction to Kant’s definitions of the key terms, I shall proceed in §2 to discuss three initial attempts that were made during the third quarter of the twentieth century to rescue analytic aposteriority from Kant’s charge of emptiness. While two of those early attempts are of little help, because they were based on misunderstandings of Kant’s original distinction, the other one presents arguments that foreshadow the position I shall defend here, though in a somewhat different way. In §3 I turn to a summary and elaboration of the claim I have advanced in various previous
publications, that analytic aposteriority is actually a crucial epistemological classification for philosophers to consider, both for a complete understanding of Kant’s own philosophical system and for an accurate assessment (within a Kantian framework) of why various contemporary developments in philosophy are so significant. Finally, in §4 I will survey several twentieth-century applications of this elusive classification, arguing that some of the greatest philosophical achievements in recent decades can actually be understood more deeply if they are interpreted as examples of analytic aposteriority.

2. Some Early Attempts to Restore Kant’s Suppressed Fourth Classification

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, especially in the wake of Quine’s influential critique [7], the analytic-synthetic distinction fell into considerable disrepute, especially among philosophers in the (somewhat ironically named) “analytic” tradition. Doubts about the notion of a priori knowledge were quick to follow. As a result, many philosophers to this day consider the status of so many propositions to be difficult if not impossible to pin down as either analytic or synthetic, and the whole notion of apriority to be so counter-intuitive, that the Kantian framework tends to be discarded as altogether worthless. To counter such objections, I have argued (in “APK”) that the “gray areas” that apply to most (if not all) examples of real-life propositions cause problems for the Kantian framework only when the four key terms are used in ways that diverge from Kant’s guidelines, or when we fail to consider a proposition’s context. What I call a “perspectival” interpretation of Kant’s epistemological framework maintains that any given proposition might, in principle, take on any of the four possible classifications, depending on its use. But before explaining (in §4) how this works as a defense against Quine’s critique and how it highlights what is arguably the central error of Kant’s philosophical system, let us examine other, earlier attempts to justify the claim that analytic aposteriority may be a meaningful epistemological classification for some types of proposition.

In this section I shall examine three independent attempts, during the third quarter of the twentieth century, to resurrect the notion of analytic aposteriority from the graveyard of implausibility to which Kant consigned it. I have been unable to locate any response or even citation to any of the three articles to be discussed here, so there is no need to present them in chronological order. Instead, I shall begin with the least substantive and most problematic article and progress to the one that most successfully explains how and why the analytic a posteriori has a proper place not only in epistemology, but in metaphysics as well.

Virgil Aldrich’s attempt to awaken Kantians from the “dogmatic slumber” of merely assuming that analytic aposteriority is self-contradictory [1] consists of a short and comparatively simple argument. What “has kept viable the dogma of there being no analytic a posteriori propositions”, he claims, is the assumption that analytic containment must be conceptual (200). He correctly observes that many ordinary propositions are uttered while the speaker is in direct perceptual contact with the subject of the proposition (e.g., “This paper is white”—if you are now actually reading this article printed on white paper). If such perceptual containment counts as analytic just as much as conceptual containment does, then it is a short step to the conclusion that analytic a posteriori concepts are commonplace. After all, one must obviously experience the paper (look at it) in order to recognize that the white percept is contained in the paper (201). Unfortunately, this argument draws its entire force from a complete neglect of the crucial fact that for Kant any such requirement that we appeal to a percept (i.e., to what Kant calls an “intuition”) makes the proposition synthetic. All of the propositions Aldrich thinks he has demonstrated to be analytic a posteriori would therefore, given Kant’s definitions, merely be examples of the least controversial of all the classifications: the synthetic aposteriority of ordinary empirical knowledge. In order to be analytic a posteriori on Kant’s definitions of the terms (see §1), the knowledge that the paper is white could not come from the percept, but would have to be attached necessarily to the subject of the proposition in a completely conceptual manner. This is not just a dogmatic assumption; it is a crucial defining feature of the fourfold distinction that cannot be amended without radically changing the nature of what is being claimed.
D. Goldstick’s attempt to make sense out of Kant’s rejected epistemological classification [4] is only slightly longer and slightly more informative than Aldrich’s. Fortunately, the misunderstanding that plagues its argument is not so serious. Correctly insisting that “the term ‘analytic’ ought not be understood as equivalent to ‘provable by unaided logical deduction’” (531), Goldstick’s aim is “to justify the reasonableness of asserting the probable existence of some analytic a posteriori truths” (534, my emphasis). His ensuing argument rests on a rather curious strategy. First, he lists four propositions that each express potentially analytic a posteriori truth, because each starts with: “It is logically possible that [or for]…” (532). He then defends the key claim, that “all truths which assert the existence of logical possibilities” are analytic (533), with two reasons: (A) whatever determines logical necessity must also determine what lacks logical necessity, and negating the latter “determines also which [propositions] are logically possible” (533); and (B) “logically necessary” is equivalent to “true in all logically possible worlds”, so anything that is actually (i.e., in our world) logically possible will be logically possible in all logically possible worlds (533). The only issue that remains, then, is whether “belief in the existence of a logical possibility may sometimes be rationally founded” (534). Goldstick defends the probability that some analytic a posteriori truths exist by citing three factors that would ground the rationality of such a belief (534): (i) “the existence of a logically valid deductive proof” that has as its conclusion either that some proposition is logically possible or that its negation cannot be logically deduced; (ii) “the existence of empirical evidence” that “no logically valid deductive proof has to date been found for the [latter] negation”; and (iii) “the existence...of [real] empirical evidence for the actual truth of the [former] proposition”—all quite plausible claims. While Goldstick presents an ingenious argument, his conclusion’s appeal to probability renders it too weak to be applicable to a Kantian framework, where apodictic certainty is the ultimate goal. Moreover, he never clearly explains the crucial distinction between analytic a posteriori and the far less controversial type of logical truth, analytic apriority, thus giving rise to the suspicion that he has actually been dealing with probabilities of the latter type all along.

By far the most substantive of the three early attempts to restore credibility to the analytic a posteriori was the first, an article by Josédé Benardete [2], who writes (503):

It is our present object to show that there are in fact analytic truths which are derived from a precise examination of experience, that these truths must be understood as a posteriori rather than as a priori, and that they are material, rather than merely formal, in their content. In establishing the analytic a posteriori, we seek to provide a kind of organon propaedeutic to metaphysics itself.

Benardete goes so far as to claim that, if he is correct, then “[t]he logical question preliminary to metaphysics” must be expressed in precisely the “obverse fashion” (504) of the way Kant expressed it—namely, as “how is the analytic a posteriori possible?” In support of this claim, Benardete appeals to two crucial aspects of our empirical knowledge of the external world, sight and sound, focusing most of his attention on the latter.5

Concerning sound, Benardete asks us to consider three basic components of any sound (especially noticeable in an analysis of music): pitch, timbre, and loudness (504-505). These basic components seem to be essentially different from other, more specific characteristics of a sound, such as its “middle-C-ness”. With Kant’s definition of analyticity as containment in mind, Benardete then argues (505-506):

In general, whenever the predicate of a non-identical analytic proposition cannot be subtracted from the subject so as to leave a residue, or if, in some sense, it can be subtracted (as loudness from middle-C-ness) but the residue itself entails that predicate, then we are confronted with a real, and not a nominal, analytic proposition. By means of this method of subtraction, we are equipped with a touchstone or canon by which to certify the analytic a posteriori.

A nominal analytic proposition would be a priori: justifiable with reference to nothing more than the meanings of the words. But in the type of proposition Benardete has in mind, where the subject
is “middle-C-ness”, we would have no idea that this subject requires or contains some degree of loudness, except by examining the way the empirical world works.

As another example Benardete mentions Hume’s discussion of the hypothetical discovery of a new shade of blue, then asks: “How do we know of this missing shade? By experience? Certainly.” The proposition that this new shade of blue is a color is just as analytic as the proposition “White is a color”, yet the only way to discover (and thus, to justify) the truth of the proposition that this new shade is blue is through experience. We shall return to this point in §4, when we see how similar arguments were advanced by subsequent twentieth-century philosophers. For now it will suffice to note that Benardete’s argument rests on the claim that definition can operate in two distinct ways: as either synthetic or analytic. Thus, comparing sound and color, he distinguishes between these two senses of defining a term or determining a percept (511-512):

The simple sound itself must be described or defined in terms of a definite loudness and timbre as well as a definite pitch; just as the simple color “emerald” must be defined...as yellow-green in hue, of medium saturation, and medium brightness. It has long been fashionable to assume that simple sensations are indefinable. This is quite false.... It is a grave error to look for the indefinables in the names of simple sensations.... Just as no such thing as a bare animal can exist, unspecified as to its being canine, feline, or some other; so, too, a bare hue, which is not some definite hue, cannot exist.... The attributes of a simple sound cannot be dismissed as merely nothing at all. They exist in their own derivative way, as modes. At bottom, there is a certain indeterminacy (or synthetic quality) in simple impressions, as well as a definite determinacy (or analytic quality.)

The status of propositions that are a posteriori, because their justification requires an appeal to something perceived through our five senses, reflects this two-sided situation: if the a posteriori aspect cannot be determined or defined without going beyond the subject-concept to the direct experience of what the predicate describes, then it is the ordinary, synthetic variety; if we can determine or define the applicability of the predicate as being already contained in the subject-concept, due to the type of experience under consideration (e.g., due to the way sounds or colors operate), then those claims (e.g., “Every sound has a pitch” or “Every color has a hue”) are analytic even though they, too, are knowable only a posteriori.8

Perhaps one of the main reasons Benardete’s insightful arguments fell on rocky soil, at this point in the development of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy, is that, as he openly admits, this way of understanding the nature of color and sound would “oblige us to return to a doctrine of real essences” (512)—a metaphysical assumption that was widely discredited at the time.9 Nearly all of the facts we learn, when we experience percepts such as colors or sounds, will still count as empirical (i.e., synthetic a posteriori), if we accept Benardete’s argument; but the discovery that every experience of color necessarily “possesses the properties of hue, brightness, saturation, figure, and magnitude” (512) must be recognized as analytic a posteriori; for “these latter properties, unlike the former, do exist in a substantial unity, an intelligible necessary connection binding them all together. It is that necessary connection which provides the metaphysical ground for the logical concept of the analytic a posteriori.”

The general rule for determining the epistemological status of a proposition, on Benardete’s view, is to ask, for any proposition that is not a tautology (513), can the predicate be subtracted from the subject so as to yield a residue, as the predicate “wicked” of the analytic proposition “all ogres are wicked” can be subtracted from the subject “ogre” to yield the residue “giant.” If that subtraction cannot be performed, then the proposition is analytic a posteriori.

In order to appreciate the full force of Benardete’s conclusion, we must consider the other three options that he here leaves unspecified, perhaps because he thought they were too obvious. First, he must be assuming (unproblematically) that tautologies, or nominally analytic propositions (such as “White is a color”), are analytic a priori. What is rather curious is that he says nothing about the status of a proposition for which such a subtraction can be performed, but with a residue, as in the very example he provides. His choice of example suggests, though, that he is assuming that such
propositions are also analytic a priori, for his example follows the same structure as the standard example of an analytic proposition, “All bachelors are unmarried”, where subtracting “unmarried” yields the residue “man”. If, instead of canceling out the subject altogether or changing it significantly, the subtraction of the predicate leaves the subject (as such) essentially unchanged, then the proposition is (by definition) synthetic: subtract “white” from “paper” in “This paper is white”, and nothing essential to the subject actually changes. Presumably, Kant would say the same about subtracting “cause and effect” from “changes” in the archetypal synthetic a priori proposition, “All changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect” (CPR A/B232).

Once we see how the three main options in Kant’s epistemological framework fit in with Benardete’s “subtraction” procedure, we can appreciate the force of his claim that, if such a subtraction cannot be performed in a given proposition, then that proposition is analytic a posteriori. The three other classifications are all expressed in terms of predicates that can be subtracted from their subjects, either not changing the subject in any essential way (and thus, synthetic) or else changing it essentially (and thus, analytic). Benardete’s claim is that some propositions cannot be subjected to this procedure, and these are the ones Kant left unaccounted for by treating the fourth classification as empty. Surprisingly, Benardete never provides an actual example of a specific analytic a posteriori proposition; but from his argument, we may assume that he had in mind the two proposed above: “Every sound has a pitch” and “Every color has a hue.” In each case, the predicate designates a feature of the subject that, through experience alone, we recognize as contained within the concept of the subject. As we shall see in §4, this focus on what Kripke later called rigid designation, came to be the basis for what was arguably the most important application of analytic aposteriority in the twentieth century. But before we assess such recent applications, let us take a step back and examine what happens to Kant’s own philosophy, if we allow analytic aposteriority to have its proper place.

3. The Need for Analytic Aposteriority in Kant’s Philosophy

Once the analytic a posteriori is recognized as a non-empty member of Kant’s epistemological framework, the question arises as to whether or not Kant’s own philosophy contains propositions with such a status, propositions that would in that case tend to seem out of place or ill-defined as Kant presents them. My earliest work on this topic defends just such a claim, that the architectonic unity of Kant’s own system cannot be fully appreciated apart from an awareness of the role played by the analytic a posteriori. In this section I shall therefore present a summary and further elaboration of that initial application. While I first located analytic aposteriority only in the Dialectic of the first Critique and in the Analytic of second, I shall here suggest that it also plays a crucial role in the theory of symbolism defended in the third Critique and applied in Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason.

In the Dialectic of CPR, Kant develops some of the most elaborate and influential arguments in his entire corpus, demonstrating that propositions formerly believed to convey genuine metaphysical truth (and therefore serving as prime candidates for the classification he had earlier introduced as being synthetic a priori) are at best inconclusive, and at worst, vacuous. Having completed his demonstration that traditional (“speculative”) metaphysics provides no valid synthetic a priori propositions, he concludes the Dialectic with a lengthy Appendix, arguing that the same ideas of reason that fail to attain a synthetic a priori status (i.e., God, freedom, and immortality) nevertheless have a legitimate function in metaphysics, as regulative (rather than constitutive) principles, guiding our search for unity in the systematic ordering of human knowledge. He is careful to caution that, when we view an idea of reason in this way, we are acting as if it is true, rather than justifying its truth as a confirmed item of knowledge as such. Later, in Chapter I of CPR’s Doctrine of Method, Kant also discusses the role of hypotheses in reason’s proper metaphysical employment: philosophers may rightly use hypotheses “as weapons of war” (CPR A777/B805), even though we must treat the concepts they affirm as beliefs rather than as objectively confirmed knowledge.
The single most problematic feature of these affirmations of a more promising approach to metaphysics, both in the Dialectic and in the Doctrine of Method, is that, having demonstrated that metaphysics contains no synthetic a priori knowledge, Kant never assigns any epistemological status to the crucial counterweight to his rejection of traditional metaphysics. The claim in my early work on this aspect of Kant philosophy (see note 10) was that Kant’s whole discussion of the regulative ideas of reason would have been far more convincing, its overall role in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements would have been more clear, and its intimate connection with the use of hypothetical (belief-centered) reasoning more evident, had he presented his new path to metaphysics as one that treats the ideas of reason as analytic a posteriori truth-claims. Assigning a distinct epistemological classification to his new approach would have clearly set Kant’s response to Hume (i.e., his defense of the principle of causality) apart from his main (and quite different) project of elaborating a moral approach to metaphysics.

What does it mean to assign an analytic a posteriori status to Kant’s attempts to rescue the ideas of reason from ultimate meaninglessness? Claiming that a metaphysical proposition that uses a concept of reason (i.e., an idea), such as “God”, is analytic means precisely what Kant argues throughout the Dialectic, regarding each of the three ideas: first, we cannot have any intuition of the object that such a concept (presumably) refers to; rather, “the hypothetical use of reason aims at the systematic unity of the cognitions of understanding” through the pure concept of totality, thus producing a conceptual “unity” that “is the touchstone of the truth of the understanding’s rules” (CPR A647/B675). Assigning an a posteriori status to this use of reason means that we can know nothing about how to justify propositions about God, freedom (or the universe as a whole), and immortality (or the soul), apart from treating them as if they shed light on some specific experience(s) that the propositions refer to or imply. (This, for example, is why Kant regards the physico-theological—i.e, the teleological—argument for God’s existence as being far more effective than the ontological or cosmological arguments.) Kant sometimes comes so close to stating precisely these features of reason’s use of ideas that it is quite remarkable that he failed to recognize their analytic a posteriori status. He says at one point (A311/B367), for instance, that “although no actual experience ever fully attains to that cognition [conveyed by a “concept of reason”], yet any actual experience always belongs to such a cognition.” That experience “(perhaps even the whole of possible experience or of its empirical synthesis)” is part and parcel of every idea (i.e., every concept of reason) makes it a posteriori. Yet we cannot actually experience the object referred to by that concept, as such; the most we can do is to become aware that all our experiences “belong to” or are contained within that idea, thus making it analytic.

Given Kant’s own explicit appeal in the Doctrine of Method to the crucial role played by hypotheses in this way of thinking, I have proposed the convention of referring to reflection that aims at establishing analytic a posteriori truth as adopting the hypothetical perspective. Just as synthetic ariority defines the transcendental perspective that establishes the fundamental boundary-conditions for all the synthetic a posteriori knowledge that we generate from the empirical perspective, so also the analytic aposteriority of the hypothetical perspective establishes the fundamental parameters for all the analytic a priori truth that we verify from the logical perspective. The difference between the hypothetical and logical perspectives is that the latter presents us with a completed whole that can be grasped without experiencing it, whereas the former, with its appeal to the containment of experience within a pure concept (i.e., an idea), always presents us with a task to be completed—a theme that pervades both the Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method and explains why the hypothetical perspective leads naturally to the practical standpoint.

Within CPR’s Doctrine of Method, Kant explains that, although this hypothetical perspective (i.e., the mode of reflection that he should have identified as having an analytic a posteriori status) is problematic when assessed from the theoretical standpoint, it nevertheless gives rise to an entirely appropriate application, from the practical (or moral) standpoint. The crucial connection between the hypothetical perspective of theoretical reason and reason’s practical standpoint is obscured, as I have argued in KSP 132-137, by the fact that Kant portrays moral metaphysics as somehow providing reason with synthetic a priori principles, even though the
theoretical Critique had proved this to be impossible. My perspectival interpretation of Kant’s Critical System shows that each Critique is based on a distinct standpoint and that each of these standpoints is formed by focusing on one of the four perspectives that guide the development of the argument within each Critique (i.e., the transcendental, logical, empirical, and hypothetical perspectives, respectively). What is being critiqued in CPR is the attempt to use the understanding alone (i.e., the analytic apriority of the logical perspective) to solve problems that go beyond the realm that is the understanding’s true home (i.e., the synthetic aposteriority of the empirical perspective) and in so doing to draw (alleged) inferences about the nature of reality as such (i.e., the analytic aposteriority of the hypothetical perspective).

In the second Critique the focus changes: whereas the theoretical standpoint takes the understanding (especially in its logical, analytic a priori employment) as its defining perspective, the practical standpoint takes reason (in its hypothetical employment) as its defining perspective. Only within the context of this radical change of standpoint (such that the analytic a posteriori—in this case, the idea of freedom—is no longer the conclusion, but the starting-point of the inquiry) can practical reason’s search for (practically!) synthetic a priori principles be understood. Interestingly, when Kant distinguishes action in nature (i.e., as viewed from the empirical perspective) from moral action, he says “this ought expresses a possible action whose basis is nothing but a mere concept” (CPR A547/B575); that is, morality occurs when we hypothetically view our experience (a posteriori) as contained in a concept such as “good”. Taken in this way, we can regard Kant’s overall moral philosophy as a defense of the analytic aposteriority of freedom.12 Morality for Kant just is the adoption of a concept as a hypothesis that a person then imposes onto his or her experience in such a way that experience conforms itself to the concept, rather than vice versa. This is the essence of the Kantian analytic a posteriori as it appears in his Critiques, though without being named.

Recognizing the crucial role of the analytic a posteriori in Kantian (moral) metaphysics brings added focus and clarity not only to the intricacies of his moral philosophy as such, but also to his use of the moral themes in various other applications, such as to the areas of aesthetics and religion. Without going into detail here, I shall mention just one example that relates to both of these areas. Kant’s portrayal of beauty as a symbol of morality makes little (or no) sense if we regard it as an expression of any of the three epistemological classifications that Kant explicitly recognizes (i.e., analytic apriority, synthetic apriority, and synthetic aposteriority). Kant himself clearly distinguishes the use of symbols to elucidate ideas that have no intuitive instantiation from the use of schemata to elucidate concepts that can be directly manifested in intuition. Only the latter would count as synthetic a posteriori judgments that are grounded in synthetic a priori principles, thus justifying a person in claiming to express objective knowledge through propositions that relate given intuitions to their conceptual features. The function of symbolism, according to Kant, is precisely to fill the gap left by the inadequacy of the three well-established epistemological classifications. When employing a symbol, we employ the faculty of imagination to interpret a set of intuitions stemming from our (a posteriori) experience of some empirical object(s) as if they were “contained in” the concept of an idea whose object lies beyond all possible experience. Had Kant recognized that this analogical containment makes the products of the imagination’s hypothetical employment analytic a posteriori, his appeal to beauty as a bridge between freedom and nature in the third Critique, as well as his use of very similar logic in his discussion of religious symbolism (see note 13), would have been much easier to grasp.

4. Naming, Imagining, and The Power of Belief in Twentieth-Century Philosophy

Rather than tracing other aspects of Kant’s system that can be interpreted as defending truth-claims of an analytic a posteriori type, I shall turn my attention now to the various ways this epistemological classification can be found operating in twentieth-century philosophy. We have already seen (in §2) that several abortive attempts were made, during the third quarter of the twentieth century, to rescue analytic aposteriority from oblivion. While none of those succeeded in sparking renewed interest, and even my own effort to show that the classification has a place (both
in Kant’s system and in philosophy as a whole) has not prompted a flood of responses. Some influential advances that have been made in twentieth-century philosophy can be regarded as relating to just this type of truth-claim. In this concluding section I shall therefore examine several examples of the latter, before reflecting briefly on two more recent attempts and on the potential for future development.

Foremost among these new developments are the revolutionary insights about the nature of “designation” (i.e., fixing a reference) in general and of naming in particular, elaborated in Saul Kripke’s influential book, Naming and Necessity [5]. He convincingly defends the existence of two previously neglected classifications of truth, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori (NN 38), based on considerations revolving around the process of naming and the discovery of new facts about the objects so named. Two of his most widely discussed examples, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” (140) and the designation of a meter as being rigidly fixed by reference to the length of a specific stick in Paris (54), illustrate these two unusual epistemological and (as Kripke claims [e.g., 35]) metaphysical classifications. As I argued in detail 25 years ago (in “APK”), the conclusions Kripke reaches are largely correct, but his assumption about how they require a revision of Kant’s epistemological framework is seriously flawed. His error on the latter is rooted in the fact that Kripke adopts definitions of his key terms (especially “necessary” vs. “contingent”, but also “a priori” vs. “a posteriori” and “analytic” vs. “synthetic”) that were commonplace among analytic philosophers of his day, but differ in significant ways from Kant’s own definitions of the same terms. Once the differences in definitions are accounted for and appropriate translations are made, Kripke’s insights turn out to be entirely consistent with Kant’s epistemological framework – provided we extend Kant’s framework to include the analytic a posteriori, as proposed in §3.

In a nutshell, Kant’s framework (as summarized in §1) takes analyticity-syntheticity and apriority-aposteriority to be the fundamental distinctions, and interprets necessity-contingency as a subordinate classification that has applications of different types for different classifications of truth. By contrast, Kripke takes necessity-contingency and apriority-aposteriority as basic and interprets analyticity-syntheticity in terms of these classes. In order to translate Kripke’s conclusions into Kant’s framework, we must in most cases read Kripke’s “necessity”/“contingency” as referring to one aspect of what Kant would call “apriority”/“aposteriority”, respectively, and his “apriority”/“aposteriority” as equivalent to Kant’s “analyticity”/“syntheticity. Even though Kripke’s official definition of “analytic” makes analytic aposteriority impossible, he comes very close at one point to acknowledging a role for what would be equivalent to this classification, given his own definitions. As noted in “APK” 270n.

Kripke’s framework disallows the analytic a posteriori by definition, since “analytic” is stipulated to mean that which is “both necessary and a priori” (NN, 39). He admits at one point, however, that his definition of analyticity may be too strict, in which case something very much like the analytic a posteriori is suggested: “If statements whose a priori truth is known via the fixing of a reference are counted as analytic, then some analytic truths are contingent” (NN, 122n, emphasis added).

Applying the proposed mapping of Kripke’s terminology onto Kant’s, I argued (in “APK” 264, 268-269) that propositions such as “Hesperus is Phosphorus” are not necessary a posteriori (on Kant’s terms) but are either synthetic a posteriori (if the context concerns the empirical assertion that two apparently very different observed objects are, in fact, the same object) or analytic a priori (if one is attending to the logical meaning of the two names, understood as both referring to the planet Venus). Similarly, I argued (in “APK” 265,269-270) that Kripke’s demonstration that propositions rigidly designating a referent are contingent a priori would, according to Kant’s framework, amount to a proof that we are using an analytic a posteriori proposition every time we designate in this manner—a feature that is most obvious when we name someone (or something) for the first time.

Without going into further detail on Kripke’s revolution—the reader interested in its relevance to my defense of analytic aposteriority should consult “APK”—let us note that his
genuine advance on Kant was to demonstrate the crucial difference between naming an object and defining a term (“APK” 171):

To name requires that we adopt a practical perspective, according to which we act “as if” (or stipulate that) a certain object is to be rigidly designated by a certain word. That is, we subsume an object as experienced (a posteriori) under a given concept (analytically). To define, by contrast, requires that we adopt a logical perspective, according to which we devote all our attention to accumulating a set of properties which describe a concept uniquely. That is, we subsume a set of general characteristics (a priori) under a given concept (analytically).

What I added to that revolution, in “APK”, was the proposal that Kant’s (or for that matter, Kripke’s) framework for classifying types of truth should be regarded not as establishing fixed categories, but as delineating different contexts of understanding a given proposition. In other words, one and the same proposition (such as “fire is hot”) might function in an analytic a posteriori way in one context (e.g., when expressing one’s first discovery that fire is hot), in a synthetic a posteriori way in another context (e.g., when describing one’s experience of a hot fire to others who know already that fire is hot), and in an analytic a priori way in yet another context (e.g., when talking about the meaning of the relevant words). That theory (or something like it) provides the most effective response both to Quine’s criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, as well as to the various doubts that have been expressed regarding the usefulness of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori (see reference 7 and note 5).

A decade after “APK” appeared, Andrew Cutrofello published an entire book, Imagining Otherwise, explicitly basing his main argument on the proposal that analytic aposteriority constitutes a legitimate epistemological classification. Using Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a sounding board, he presents a “metapsychology” focused on Freudian psychoanalysis in the wake of Lacan. Rather than affirming a perspectival interpretation of Kant’s framework that has room for all four classifications, however, Cutrofello treats the analytic a posteriori and the synthetic a priori as mutually exclusive, so that one must choose either Kant and the synthetic apriority of transcendental philosophy or Freud and the analytic aposteriority of “metapsychological epoché” (IO 3). When the latter option is carried to its completion in the spirit of Hume16 and various postmodern theorists, what emerges closely resembles the structure of Kant’s first Critique—IO has sections detailing the Aesthetics, Logics, Principles, Paralogisms, Antinomies, Ideals, and Ethics of the unconscious—yet its content consists of an innovative phenomenology of neurosis, perversion, and psychosis. Just as Kant’s emphasis on the importance of synthetic apriority leads him (almost neurotically)17 to impose what amounts to a “taboo against thinking the analytic a posteriori” (141), Cutrofello reads Freud’s “Kantian inheritance” as “a systematic challenge to Kant’s thesis concerning the synthetic a priori” (8-9).

While the details of Cutrofello’s application of analytic aposteriority are intriguing, to say the least, what matters most for our purposes is that Cutrofello has explicitly taken on the challenge of treating this almost forgotten classification with the seriousness it deserves. Indeed, the importance of his study is not so much the specific details of his postmodern critique (or [psycho]analysis) of Kant, as the general fact that he takes as his philosophical backdrop the Continental tradition, encompassing the trajectory from phenomenology and existentialism to deconstructionism and critical theory. As such, his book makes an ideal contrast to Kripke’s, aptly illustrating the relevance of analytic aposteriority to both major twentieth-century philosophical traditions. What is ironic about Cutrofello’s approach is that its either-or strategy lends itself to a psychoanalytic diagnosis of irrational exclusivism not unlike the one he levels against Kant. As a result, he ends up offering little more insight than Kant does into the deep epistemological distinction between the synthetic a priori and the analytic a posteriori. By contrast, adopting a perspectival strategy, whereby all four classifications are allowed their proper domains of application, has the potential to lead us beyond the kind of us-and-them labeling that tends to plague any form of exclusivism.
Although I have given but two examples of twentieth-century philosophers who have affirmed the legitimacy of the analytic a posteriori (one implicitly, the other explicitly), many other potential applications could be cited. Using the foregoing examples as inspiration, let me therefore conclude by sketching a few of the other areas where twentieth-century philosophy can be fruitfully interpreted as following this line of development. I shall follow the suggestion offered in an essay on the lasting influence of Kant and Kierkegaard (see note 3), where I argued that the impact of these two philosophers on the twentieth century can best be understood in terms of the interplay between synthetic apriority and analytic aposteriority. That is, I firmly reject Cutrofello’s assumption that these two classifications are somehow locked in competition, forcing us to choose one or the other. For Kant’s explicit aim, as he tells us in CPR Bxxx, was not only “to annul knowledge” of metaphysical ideas (via the synthetic a priori), but also “to make room for faith” in those same ideas (via the analytic a posteriori). Along these lines, my suggestion in “PRKK” 256-258 was that the analytic a posteriori shows itself most notably in areas of human experience characterized by the power of belief.

The nature and function of belief, as opposed to knowledge, was the focus of vast amounts of attention by analytic philosophers in the twentieth century. Perhaps this emphasis was nowhere manifested more powerfully than in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, where the whole strategy of analyzing ordinary language usage could be fruitfully interpreted in terms of attending to the way our experiences of the world (a posteriori) are already contained (analytically) in the meanings of key philosophical words. What the later Wittgenstein accomplished, as a much more significant advance on Kant than that of the early Wittgenstein (whose Tractatus focuses more on the interplay between analytic apriority and synthetic aposteriority), was to recognize the open-endedness of human language as the locus of metaphysical power—even if that power is all-too-often misused by philosophers to create problems that are not genuine. Wittgenstein’s decision to ground his arguments in the metaphor of a “language game” might seem unfortunate; yet this very metaphor can be interpreted, from what I have called Kant’s hypothetical perspective (with its inevitable outworking in the practical standpoint), as the foundation for the analytic aposteriority of his whole approach: our linguistic structures are to be viewed analytically, with attention focused on the meanings contained within them, yet that very containment is to be explained by examining the experienced reality of the “game” that forms the context of their usage.

Tracing the Continental tradition back to its earliest roots in Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Heidegger’s Being and Time, we can detect similar potential applications for a perspectival understanding of analytic aposteriority. Cutrofello’s appeal (though only in passing) to the concept of epoché (see IO 3)—what Husserl also called “bracketing”—suggests the significance of this notion to phenomenology; as a further development of (and complement to) Kantian transcendental reflection, it can be interpreted as a call to view the nature of reality in the open-ended terms of analytic aposteriority. Similarly, the role of intentionality and imagination in demarcating a “horizon” of understanding, from which context each person sets out to interpret the world, can best be understood as a conceptually-grounded power (hence, analytic) that encompasses within it each experience a person calls his or her own (hence, a posteriori). Admittedly, these are only hints as to how one might proceed in relating this much-maligned epistemological classification to the developments of twentieth-century philosophy; but in a nutshell, much of the emphasis of both analytic and Continental philosophers during the past century has been on unveiling the depths of experienced reality in ways that go beyond what Kant called “empirical knowledge”, so my point here is merely that a clearer awareness of the status of such post-empirical knowing (as analytic a posteriori) would provide a fruitful way of understanding how these developments relate to other, more time-honored aspects of human knowing.

Finally, although my main focus in this paper has been on the twentieth century, it is worth mentioning that two (admittedly, rather meager) attempts have been made, during the first decade of this century (both in 2003), to restore respectability to the analytic a posteriori. Unfortunately, neither of them mentioned any of the previous attempts, discussed above, so it is not surprising that both attempts reached very limited conclusions. First, Walter Block, in his brief overview of Kant’s
fourfold epistemological framework [3], before relating it (like Cutrofello) to a field outside of philosophy, starts with a single paragraph on the analytic a posteriori, portraying it (very much along the lines suggested in “APK”) in terms of “the ways in which we come to learn language.” Unfortunately, having presented it as a valid classification, he makes no significant application of it in his essay.

Second and more significantly, Åsa Maria Wikforss devotes an entire article to assessing analytic aposteriority [8], concluding that it is not plausible to expect analyticity and aposteriority to be rendered consistent in the same way Kripke reconciled necessity and aposteriority. Appealing primarily to Tyler Burge (whose “externalism” never explicitly affirms the analytic a posteriori, but does seem to hint at it), Wikforss considers whether Burge’s approach could do for analyticity what Kripke did for necessity—i.e., make it a posteriori by locating necessity in objects (e.g., Hesperus and Phosphorus) rather than in descriptions. The problem, she claims, is that “the epistemic aspect is not so easily dismissed” in the case of analyticity. This argument seems persuasive if we accept the same understanding of the basic terms that Kripke, Wikforss, and the analytic tradition in general adopt. My response to Wikforss, however, can be brief for precisely that reason: given the redefinition of Kant’s key terms that has become commonplace in the literature, the project of resurrecting the analytic a posteriori is, indeed, hopeless. But if we recover the original meanings Kant assigned to the key terms, as I suggested in “APK”, then Wikforss’ argument becomes a non sequitur: if Kripke’s insights regarding the contingent a priori (see note 23) amount to an affirmation of analytic aposteriority on Kant’s terms, then one who accepts those insights as valid cannot also deny the importance of the latter classification.

Although in this section I have only scratched the surface of its possible applications, the foregoing evidence should be sufficient to demonstrate the great importance of analytic aposteriority for contemporary philosophy. Were we to extend this study beyond philosophy proper, to areas of application such as philosophy of science, the relevance of the analytic a posteriori would prove to be even more relevant; for it would enable us to understand how Kant can claim at one and the same time that knowledge of the thing in itself is impossible (from the perspective of synthetic apriority) and yet to allow that scientists engaged in studying aspects of the world that transcend human observation (the level of the synthetic a posteriori) may in some sense be obtaining knowledge of the thing in itself (understood as analytic a posteriori). I have elsewhere summarized this deep compatibility between synthetic apriority and analytic aposteriority in words that intentionally allude to Owen Barfield’s classic work [6]:

Classifying our hypothetical beliefs about the world [as analytic a posteriori] can do the crucial work of saving the appearances, both from being proudly mistaken for ultimate reality and from being discarded as mere appearances. The synthetic a priori class of knowledge occupied most of Kant’s attention; for he argued that all legitimate transcendental knowledge is of this type. This is why he said the question “How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?” is the central question of all Critical philosophy. Kant fully recognized that Critical philosophy is a propaedeutic to metaphysics as such. What he did not recognize is that, in order to construct an actual system of metaphysics (even one that conforms to the educative principles laid down in the three Critiques), we must go beyond the synthetic a priori and immerse our inquiry in precisely the opposite ground. The extent to which twentieth-century philosophers recognized this need and have made genuine progress (often rejecting the letter of the Kantian law, yet if I am correct, following its spirit even more than Kant himself did) is the extent to which they have opened themselves up to that level of the human cognitive capacity that, in terms of Kant’s own framework, would have to be called analytic a posteriori.
References:
5. Kripke S., Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980); hereafter, NN

Notes:
1. See especially the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; hereafter CPR. All quotations cite Werner Pluhar’s translation (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), using the German (Akademie Ausgabe) pagination provided in the margins.
4. The rejection of this distinction by analytic philosophers is ironic, since the meaningfulness of the very name of this approach to philosophizing is called into question, if the basic opposition that gives rise to the term itself is considered meaningless. Yet this irony all too often escapes even the most prominent philosophers. I well recall the opening words of a series of introductory philosophy lectures delivered at Oxford University by Professor Sir Peter Strawson in the mid-1980s (paraphrased here from memory): “There are two types of philosophy in the world today: those that focus on solving philosophical problems through the analysis and clarification of language, and those that do not. In this course, we will deal only with the former type of philosophy.”
5. See note 2. For a collection of more recent essays illustrating the wide range of approaches to apriority, see Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
6. Benardete raises the intriguing possibility, though only in passing, that Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics is, as its title already explicitly suggests, the science of the analytic a posteriori in just the sense Benardete is proposing (506). “The posterior analytic of color” is called “chromatics” (508,513), he goes on to suggest, whereas that of sound is called “sonics”.
7. Benardete, 508. He later adds: p.510: “The analytic a posteriori is founded on a principle expressly opposed to that of Hume, namely, that there are distinctions of reason which disclose empirical elements in reality which are distinguishable, and even different, from one another, though they are inherently incapable of being separated.”
8. Kant himself considers a very similar example in the Introduction to CPR, “All bodies are extended” (B11), and he agrees that it must be analytic. Interestingly, in the first edition he had used the example of “heaviness” (A8) to make the same point. Perhaps his change was prompted by a vague awareness that there is something odd about the necessity with which weight is included in our concept of a body—namely, we can know that containment relation only through experience, so the proposition must be a posteriori.
9. Even more surprising (and highly suggestive) is Benardete’s apparently essentialist conclusion: “Metaphysics is the posterior analytic of reality. Its object is to supply a posterior analytic of time and space, of motion and
rest, of essence and existence, of being and non-being” (Benardete, 513), and in so doing, to provide “noetic” insight into the “eternal order” itself (514).

10. In what follows, I shall summarize the arguments presented in my article, “Knowledge and Experience—An Examination of the Four Reflective ‘Perspectives’ in Kant’s Critical Philosophy”, Kant-Studien 78:2 (1987), pp.170-200, subsequently revised and reprinted as KSP, chapter IV; see especially KSP 129-139. See also 366-369, for a summary of the application to Kripke, discussed in §4, below.

11. In terms of Kant’s fourfold epistemological framework, the fault of speculative metaphysics can be explained as follows (KSP 130): “metaphysical reflection which has not been limited by a prior use of transcendental [i.e., genuine synthetic a priori] reflection will be patterned solely along the lines of a pseudo-transcendental mixture of empirical [i.e., synthetic a posteriori] and logical [i.e., analytic a priori] reflection: that is, it will attempt to produce synthetic a priori knowledge by conflating the logical perspective and it’s a priori aspect with the empirical perspective and its synthetic aspect.”

12. As Kant himself warns, “practical cognition” provides a kind of “a priori cognition”, but only “from a practical point of view” (CPR xxi). As I argue in KSP 132-137, the change of standpoint from the first to the second Critique changes the context (from theory to practice, from science to morality) and thus changes the meanings of the key terms defining Kant’s epistemological framework.

13. See Critique of Judgment, §59. For a similar passage relating to religious symbols, see Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, 6:64-65n.

14. See note 15 for one major exception to this statement.

15. Andrew Cutrofello, Imagining Otherwise: Metapsychology and the analytic a posteriori (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997); hereafter IO. He refers explicitly to the influence of “APK” in opening up the possibility of analytic aposteriority (pp.11-12; see also pp.25,162), but does not appear to be aware of the other texts where I defend its compatibility with Kant’s own philosophy.

16. Cutrofello suggests, for example, that Hume’s own view of causality would, given Kant’s terminological framework, be classified as analytic a priori (IO 15).

17. As one of many examples of Cutrofello’s attempt to psychoanalyze Kant, he claims that Kant shares with the Marquis de Sade an “underlying masochism” (IO 4)—though Sade’s masochism was, of course, quite explicit. Likewise, he interprets Kant’s claims regarding the necessity of the principles of pure understanding (especially the law of causality) not as philosophical arguments but, like “a dream-report” (62), “as clinical evidence—i.e., as an analysand’s statements about how he takes human experience to be structured.”

18. “PRKK” also rejects Cutrofello’s undeveloped assertion that Hume may have been himself a supporter of the analytic a posteriori (see note 16); instead, I portray Hume and Hegel as following a trajectory that highlights the far more ordinary contrast between synthetic aposteriority and analytic a priori. “PRKK” also cites examples of analytic aposteriority in the philosophies of Kierkegaard (250-252), Otto (253-255) and Tillich (255-256).

19. Cf. “PRKK” 250. Cutrofello’s negative (psycho)analysis of Kant’s position is unable to account for the fact that Kant was so explicit in his affirmation of faith in the ideas of reason, once we recognize that such faith is an expression of the very analytic aposteriority that Cutrofello accuses Kant of denying. I show, by contrast, that Kant’s affirmation of the analytic a posteriori shows up in each Critique, especially in the Dialectic and/or Doctrine of Method sections (“PRKK” 248-249), as well as in the fourth and final part of Religion, where Kant’s special definition of religion itself can be viewed as analytic a posteriori (249). The fact that Kant failed to give this classification a distinct name within his epistemological framework should not blind us to the fact that the idea of analytic aposteriority permeates every aspect of his philosophy.

20. It is no accident that Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics focuses on the faculty of imagination as the missing link to interpreting CPR. Kant’s repeated insistence that the imagination is a hidden faculty, whose depths we humans are never likely to plumb, is surely related to his refusal to acknowledge analytic aposteriority as a legitimate epistemological classification. Along these lines I would like to thank Guy Lown for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, especially his insistence on the open-endedness of the analytic a posteriori and its relevance to twentieth-century phenomenology. As Guy aptly wrote in a recent email, “Hypothesis is the phenomenology of the fictional object.”

21. Ibid., pp.65-66. For further discussion of this classification, Block refers to 13 sources by six different economists: Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Murray N. Rothbard, Ludwig von Mises, G.A. Selgin, Glenn Fox, and Mario Rizzo. However, none of the works Block cites refer explicitly to the analytic a posteriori.

22. Using the text at http://people.su.se/~wikforss/Burge%20Berlin%204.pdf, I cite the section numbers rather than the published pagination.

23. Ibid., §4.2. Significantly, Wikforss does not deal with Kripke’s theory of contingent apriority, where “APK” locates a type of analytic aposteriority.

24. On the unknowability of the thing in itself, see KSP Appendix V. I have defended the compatibility of Kant and quantum mechanics in “Quantum Causality and Kantian Quarks”, forthcoming in THEORIA: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.