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Paweł Przywara

Philosopher, writer, musician, media theorist; studied philosphy in the Catholic University in Lublin, wrote the dissertation under prof. Antoni B. Stępień supervision („Husserl's and Carnap's Theories of Space” (Lublin, 2005) – see also the paper on, his main scientific interests are theory of perception, phenomenology of space, philosophy of science, literature theory, CMC-studies, theory of conversation and philosophy of language (especially problem of mentalese).




Pragmatico-Linguistic and Semiotic Tools in Analysis of Electronic Conversation

Issue: 3/4 (The third/fourth issue)
CMC-studies researchers do not pay their attention on methods of pragmatics (here theory of conversation) probably because the Internet in its communicative aspect is treated as textual medium or hypertextual one, and because communication via the Internet is often seen as impersonal (Wood, Smith [2005]). Users of the electronic communication channel usually do not see each other, hence there is no non-verbal communication between them – they send text messages constructed and displayed with the use of given software. Pragmatico-linguistic analyses have been developed in an area of philosophy of language (J. Austin, J. Searle, H.P. Grice) and psycholinguistics (H.H. Clarke) and those scientific disciplines did not (and obviously could not) deal with online communication/conversation, and they were out of the scope of interest of CMC-studies scientists.

Thinking about Mentalese

Issue: 6 (The sixth issue)
Whereas the notion of thinking is not difficult to understand to us, since we know what thinking is (because we sometimes think, cogitate and observe ourselves thinking), the notion of mentalese or thought-language seems to be more than ambiguous. Its ambiguity does not rise from Jerry Fodor's conception only but rather from different epistemological views of our mentality. If we are physicalists (as Fodor and his followers are) we think about our thinking processes as brain events only.