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Nikolai N. Nepejvoda

Born at 1949 at a small not existing now village near Belgorod. In 1970 he become a specialist-mathematician in Moscow State University (MSU) and in 1974 Ph.D in mathematical logic (MSU). In 1988 he become Dr.Sc. in logic and informatics (Novosibirsk, Institute of Mathematics and Computing Center of AN USSR). He worked intermittently from 1973 till 2012 in Izhevsk, Udmurt State University and institutions of RAS. Also he worked in Novosibirsk Institute of mathematics and in Novosibirsk State University (1981-1983 and 2000-2002) Now he is a leading researcher in Institute of Program Systems (Pereslavl-Zalessky). He has more than 200 papers and books in logic, informatics, linguistic, philosophy, pedagogic. His main results are the following:
1970-1973 Systems of predicative constructive set theory with unlimited set formation but mnon-classical non-binary logics
1978-1982 One of founders of logical program synthesis in constructive intuitionist logic
1982-1984 First constructive logic of limited resources: nilpotent logic where Law of Identity is refuted.
1983-1993 Theory of informalizable notions
1988 Proofs as graphs
1996 Spheres of mind and spaces of ignorance (conception of pr. Beloselsky revisited and reconsidered from the point of view of logic and informatics)
2001 System of programming styles instead of zoo of “programming methodologies and paradigms” and its application to program architectures and multi-language programming.
2003 Quasi-artificial languages
2008 Logic of invertible constructions: reversive  constructive logic
2012 Program algebras



Abstract Incompleteness Theorems and Their Influence in Methodology

Issue: 3/4 (The third/fourth issue)
Gödel theorem of incompleteness and Chaitin theorem of incognizable are affecting many philosophical speculations and many branches of Western philosophy. Due to their importance it is reasonable to clarify whether they deal with one kind of precisely defined structures or with a wide class of such (and maybe not fully defined) structures. So we start with a popular outline of proof of their very common and abstract nature making them in essence basic and inevitable restrictions of precise thinking.