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ARTICLES:
Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio
Issue: 9:3/4 (the thirty fifth/sixth issue)
In this paper, the theory of necessity proposed by Robert Grosseteste is
presented. After showing the wide range of various kinds of
determination discussed by him (connected with: (1) one’s knowledge
about the future, (2) predestination, (3) fate, (4) grace, (5) sin and
temptation), a different context of Grosseteste’s use of the notion of
necessity is analyzed (within logical and metaphysical approaches). At
the heart of his theory lie: the definition of necessity, which is that
something lacks the capacity (posse) for its opposite, and the distinction
between two perspectives within which we can consider necessity: (1)
the one according to which the truthfulness of a dictum determines that it
cannot be the opposite, (2) a pre- or atemporal one, as if something had
not yet begun. On these grounds, Robert explains that God’s omniscience
is compatible with contingency, including human free decisions. Robert’s
theory is still relevant and useful in contemporary debates, as it can
provide strong arguments and enrich discussions, thanks to the twoperspectives
approach, which generates nine kinds of positions on the
spectrum of determinism and indeterminism.
presented. After showing the wide range of various kinds of
determination discussed by him (connected with: (1) one’s knowledge
about the future, (2) predestination, (3) fate, (4) grace, (5) sin and
temptation), a different context of Grosseteste’s use of the notion of
necessity is analyzed (within logical and metaphysical approaches). At
the heart of his theory lie: the definition of necessity, which is that
something lacks the capacity (posse) for its opposite, and the distinction
between two perspectives within which we can consider necessity: (1)
the one according to which the truthfulness of a dictum determines that it
cannot be the opposite, (2) a pre- or atemporal one, as if something had
not yet begun. On these grounds, Robert explains that God’s omniscience
is compatible with contingency, including human free decisions. Robert’s
theory is still relevant and useful in contemporary debates, as it can
provide strong arguments and enrich discussions, thanks to the twoperspectives
approach, which generates nine kinds of positions on the
spectrum of determinism and indeterminism.
Issue: ()
Non-Monotonic Reasoning in Medieval Theology: Problems and Assumptions
Issue: 11:3/4 (The forty third/fourth issue)
Some interesting cases of non-monotonic reasoning have already been identified in medieval theological texts. Jacob Archambault proved in 2015 that the argumentation presented by St Anselm of Canterbury in his Proslogion has non-monotonic “embeddings”. My own contribution from 2011 indicated that we can argue that a non-monotonic logic underlies some discussions provided by St Thomas Aquinas in his Summa theologiae, and showed that Boethius of Dacia used non-monotonic reasoning in his De aeternitate mundi. In this article, I would like to briefly present these examples and verify whether we can speak about similar cases in medieval Biblical exegesis. My aim is to outline particular problems connected with the identification of non-monotonicity which are specific to theology, as well as assumptions that should be adopted to successfully discuss this issue.
