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Błażej Skrzypulec

Błażej Skrzypulec is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Philosophy of Jagiellonian University (Kraków, Poland). Interested in philosophy of perception, analytic metaphysics, formal ontology, and social ontology. In his dissertation he develops an ontological model of visual content.
 

ARTICLES:

Two Types of Visual Objects

Issue: 4:2 (The fourth issue)
While it is widely accepted that human vision represents objects, it is less clear which of the various philosophical notions of ‘object’ adequately characterizes visual objects. In this paper, I show that within contemporary cognitive psychology visual objects are characterized in two distinct, incompatible ways. On the one hand, models of visual organization describe visual objects in terms of combinations of features, in accordance with the philosophical bundle theories of objects. However, models of visual persistence apply a notion of visual objects that is more similar to that endorsed in philosophical substratum theories. Here I discuss arguments that might show either that only one of the above notions of visual objects is adequate in the context of human vision, or that the category of visual objects is not uniform and contains entities properly characterized by different philosophical conceptions.


Dynamic Essences: Absolute, Prospective, Retrospective, and Relative Modalities

Issue: 7:1 (The twenty fifth issue)
Essential properties are usually thought as properties that things must always
possess, whereas accidental properties are considered as changeable. In this
paper, we challenge this traditional view. We argue that in some important
cases, such as social or biological development, we face not only the change of
accidents, but also the change of essences. To analyze this kind of change we
propose an alternative view on the relations between the modalities and time.
Some properties might be necessary or possible for a thing in a classical sense
throughout its existence, whereas others might be necessary or possible only
for some restricted periods. We distinguish therefore absolute, prospective,
retrospective, and relative modalities. As we argue, these non-classical
concepts of modality are useful in analysis of some puzzling case of seemingly
changing essences.


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