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The article in the issue 2:2:

The date of the publication:
2013-11-14
The number of pages:
56
The issue:
2:2
Commentaries:
2
The Authors
Paweł Przywara, Alexander Boldachev, Mehdi Shokri, Einar Duenger Bohn, Paweł Rojek, Basil Lourié, Andrew Schumann,

Philosopher, writer, musician, media theorist; studied philosphy in the Catholic University in Lublin, wrote the dissertation under prof. Antoni B. Stępień supervision („Husserl's and Carnap's Theories of Space” (Lublin, 2005) – see also the paper on http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2858/), his main scientific interests are theory of perception, phenomenology of space, philosophy of science, literature theory, CMC-studies, theory of conversation and philosophy of language (especially problem of mentalese).

E-mail: pawel_przywara@yahoo.com
 

ARTICLE:

Thinking about Mentalese

Whereas the notion of thinking is not difficult to understand to us, since we know what thinking is (because we sometimes think, cogitate and observe ourselves thinking), the notion of mentalese or thought-language seems to be more than ambiguous. Its ambiguity does not rise from Jerry Fodor's conception only but rather from different epistemological views of our mentality. If we are physicalists (as Fodor and his followers are) we think about our thinking processes as brain events only. If we follow Edmund Husserl's phenomenology for example, we do not treat our mind as brain at all. Correspondingly mentalese for physicalists is (and must be) something completely different than for phenomenologists.

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